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ABSTRACT
The central theme of this study is the relationship between culture and polity in a 
transnational setting. The conceptualisation of culture-polity relationship has been 
largely dominated by the classical model of the nation-state in which officially 
sanctioned, territorially bounded culture is thought to generate among the population 
a sense of belongingness to a shared community, thereby strengthening legitimacy of 
the polity. The question, then, is whether such a strong, reciprocal link between 
political and cultural integration is being replicated at the level of the European 
Union. This study analyses the EU’s cultural schemes encompassing education, 
audiovisual media as well as traditional arts, focusing on different and often 
conflicting views on culture advocated by various policy actors in which different 
visions of European society and governance are implicated. Through the systematic 
examination of specific EU cultural policy measures, the thesis puts forward two 
main arguments. Firstly, in the course of the development of EU cultural policy, the 
notion of culture modelled on state-sanctioned, unified national culture has given 
way to a focus on more market-oriented, pragmatic aspects of culture. Secondly, this 
change in the conceptualisation of culture is related to a new way of organising 
cultural spaces in which the networking and exchanges of cultural professionals and 
organisations play a central role. The thesis concludes that so far the EU has not had 
much success in articulating a viable model of culture which could reconcile the twin 
ideal of unity and diversity in the context of contemporary Europe.
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Introduction1
Over the past decade, the theme of European culture and identity has become a 
highly topical issue both in scholarly and political debates. This growing interest in 
the cultural dimension of European integration has undoubtedly been stimulated by 
phenomena such as a steadily diminishing turnout for the European Parliament 
elections or the negative results of the Danish and French referenda on the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 as well as the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001. The 
problem, which has increasingly come to dominate many EU officials’ concerns, is 
that market integration alone has not been able to generate the commitment and 
allegiance of the citizens which are thought to be pivotal in sustaining the legitimacy 
of the European Union. As Jacques Delors famously put it, ‘You don’t fall in love 
with a common market; you need something else’.2 According to this logic, the task 
that now confronts EU policy makers is to find a way to go beyond purely technical 
or economic issues and foster a ‘European identity’ that will extend the integration 
into more ‘cultural’ or ‘meaningful’ spheres. In parallel to those concerns which are 
driven by political imperatives, scholarly attention on the EU’s legitimacy problem 
has also shifted from questions that exclusively centre on the decision-making 
structures and institutional structures of the EU to those regarding identity, social 
cohesion and solidarity, or more specifically, the question of a European demos.
The problem of legitimacy has not always been a pressing issue in the history 
of European integration. The European project was conceived as an elite enterprise in 
a post-war Western Europe whose political and economic climate was very different 
from today’s situation. While the memory and fear of war were strong, and while 
economic recovery dominated popular concerns, the incremental, project-based 
approach of the Monnet method worked well. By virtue of the fact that the member 
states were not fighting with each other, and that Europe’s economy was in 
expansion, European integration stood for peace and prosperity, and this helped 
people to make sense of the project (Dehousse, 2000).
1 With the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the ‘European Community (EC)’ became part of 
the ‘European Union (EU)’. Throughout this thesis, I generally use the term ‘EU’ except when I 
specifically refer to the European Community or the Community in the pre-Maastricht period of 
integration.
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However, these post-war circumstances are now several decades in the past, 
which means that the underlying basis for continuing integration may have also 
shifted considerably. The current legitimacy crisis of the EU, then, is not solely about 
insufficiently democratic EU institutions, or popular perceptions of the EU with its 
seemingly ever-expanding competence that is increasingly considered to be intrusive 
of people’s daily lives. It is also about a crisis of ‘European ideals’ as a mobilising 
factor and as an essential raison d’etre of the EU (Scott-Smith, 2003). The most 
fundamental of the EU’s political aspirations, as articulated in the Preamble of the 
Treaty of Rome, is ‘to lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe’. But this hardly constitutes a guiding principle, apart from a guarantee that 
the EU is to remain a union among distinct peoples. With the twin challenge of 
Eastern enlargement and the constitutional settlement that presently dominates the 
European political agenda, European integration is now at the threshold of another 
major transformation. Against this backdrop, the questions regarding the meaning of 
‘Europe’ have acquired more salience than ever before. Is Europe being unified 
beyond economic spheres, and in which direction is the European integration 
heading? What are the possible bases of European social solidarity? What does it 
mean to belong to ‘Europe’? If, as the treaty stipulates, European integration is to 
leave the distinct peoplehood of its components intact, what kind of unity is the EU 
trying to achieve? How are the definitions of European-ness being articulated, and 
who is excluded in the process?
This thesis is an attempt to address the above questions, at least in part, 
through an analysis of EU cultural policies. The understanding of ‘cultural policy’ 
that frames this study is that it is about the politics of culture in a broad sense -  it is 
about the clash of ideas, and the discursive and material determinations of the 
production and dissemination of cultural meanings (McGuigan, 1996). Accordingly, 
the main focus of the analysis covers policy areas that include education, audiovisual 
media, cultural industry, as well as the traditional arts. The thesis investigates how 
particular notions of ‘European-ness’ are institutionalised through specific EU 
cultural policy measures, examining the different and often conflicting views on
2 Quoted in the European, 3 November 1994, p.13.
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culture advocated by various policy actors in which different visions of European 
society and governance are implicated.
The EU’s involvement in the sphere of culture is a relatively new 
development, and it was not until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that the EU 
acquired a formal mandate in this policy domain. Given this recent origin and the 
legal limitations, it is perhaps surprising that the EU already boasts an impressive 
array of cultural programmes encompassing wide areas of cultural activities. In fact, 
EU cultural measures date back to the 1970s, and received a major impetus towards 
further expansion during the 1980s as a means to improve the EU’s image so as to 
tackle the aforementioned legitimacy problem. Despite the fact that there are cultural 
initiatives organised and implemented at the EU level, and despite the growing 
recognition of the importance of the EU’s cultural dimension, this is an area of 
research that suffers from relative neglect. Most writings on European culture and 
identity have so far remained somewhat impressionistic, without any empirical 
grounding. Many of these writings only pay cursory attention to what the EU has 
actually done in those policy fields, and they hardly provide explanations for changes 
in the form and contents of cultural policies. In this context, the present thesis seeks 
to redress this neglect by putting forward a detailed and systematic study of EU 
cultural policies.
The argument
The culture-politics nexus at the EU level has been problematic from the very 
beginning, not least because at the root of EU cultural intervention lies a fundamental 
dilemma which is encapsulated in the recurrent theme of ‘unity in diversity’ in EU 
discourse. On the on hand, there is a desire on the part of many European elites to 
build Europe around the notion of culturally integrated community. This has led to 
the EU’s many attempts at top-down imposition of standardised set of values and 
practices much akin to the ‘invention of tradition’ model of nation-building process 
described by Hobsbawm (1983). On the other hand, there is the undeniable fact that 
this putative European cultural unity the elites are trying to create is currently divided 
into nationally (or regionally) structured media, education systems and other cultural 
institutions with their own ways of organising and demarcating a cultural space. As
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we shall see in the following chapters, as much as EU policy makers have tried to 
expand EU competence in the cultural sphere, the EU does not have any power, both 
legally and financially, to homogenise the different cultural traditions and practices of 
its constituent parts. The overriding question, then, is how to reconcile the ideal of 
unity with this apparent diversity. If, as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the EU 
aims to ‘contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States ... at the 
same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’ (Article 128), we need 
to see how such a seemingly contradictory principle is put into practice on the level 
of concrete policy choices.
In both academic and more general discussion, questions about European 
identity and the construction of communal unity are typically framed by an 
assumption that the achievement of a culturally defined community is a prerequisite 
to the establishment of a political community. In this perspective, the nation-state 
appears as a convincing model in which officially-sanctioned, territorially-bounded 
culture is thought to generate among the population a sense of belongingness to a 
shared community, thereby consolidating the legitimacy of the policy. Much of the 
existing literature that approaches the problem of cultural integration within the 
framework of the EU’s legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit tends to view EU 
cultural initiatives from this particular perspective, and many commentators try to 
assess the (in)effectiveness of the EU’s current attempt at cultural policy-making by 
drawing a parallel between national cultural integration and European integration. 
However, as I hope to show in the following chapters, this approach is incomplete 
and even misleading in important ways. First and foremost, it treats national cultural 
unity as self-evident and unproblematic, and the value judgements made about the 
engineering of European cultural commonality thus rest on an idealised vision of 
national cultural homogeneity, which overlooks the politics of representation 
involved in establishing and maintaining the idea of ‘official’ culture.
The problem of the link between culture and politics in the EU is further 
confounded by a widely accepted recognition that the emergent Euro-polity is a sui 
generis political entity and differs in many ways from the familiar concept of the 
nation-state. Recent EU studies literature indicates that the EU represents a novel 
form of political system which entails not the creation of a hierarchical centre of 
power in Brussels but the linking of multiple, dispersed sites of political authority
spread among supranational, national and regional actors as well as non­
governmental policy experts and interest groups. The emphasis here is on the 
management of cross-border cooperation between the affected interests rather than 
the government of a unified citizenry. Conceived in this way, the governance of 
culture at the European level deviates from the conventional model of national 
cultural policy in which the state is seen as an authoritative regulator and 
disseminator of nationally-codified cultural knowledge and traditions among the 
general populace. This leads to the questions that lie at the centre of this thesis. If, as 
many writers on European integration suggest, the EU is not evolving into an 
approximation of a national state writ large, what does European cultural policy 
entail? Is it designed to promote Europe-wide cultural integration? What are the 
objectives and how are those objectives translated into actual policy practices? What 
kind of cultural elements are appropriated as representing ‘Europe’ and 
‘Europeanness’?
Some of these questions are in fact the theme of a few of the recent works 
which I have drawn on and which I also hope to complement. Building Europe by 
Cris Shore (2000) is probably the first monograph specifically dedicated to the study 
of the EU as a cultural construction (as opposed to the more abstract and historical 
idea of Europe and European unity). Based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out 
among EU civil servants, Shore shows how EU elites have deliberately tried to 
engineer a European consciousness through cultural and symbolic devices. I share 
Shore’s critical stance toward the Commission’s reified, essentialistic view on 
European cultural unity, but his account puts too much emphasis on demonstrating 
the affinity between the current attempts of EU cultural integration and the historical 
processes of nation-building, even though the similarities between the two are in no 
way insignificaut. As a result, Shore downplays the possibility that the cultural 
politics of the EU may entail a new configuration that cannot be fully captured by a 
classical nation-building model, which in my view obscures the direction and impact 
of EU cultural policies especially since the 1990s. With this regard I wish to add a 
more contemporary dimension. This study attempts to situate EU cultural measures 
within the general debates about contested relationships between culture and polity in 
the context of globalisation, the crisis of the welfare-state, the commercialisation of 
cultural processes and the transformation of the notion of governance.
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I have also drawn many theoretical insights from a series o f writings by 
Gerard Delanty (1995; 1998; 1999). Delanty also argues against an essentialising 
myth that European unity is founded upon cultural cohesion and its deep historical 
roots, and maintains that integration in a societally complex entity such as the EU 
entails not so much cultural homogenisation as cultural pluralisation. One of the 
questions that occupy the central place in Delanty’s works is how European 
integration can articulate a cultural model which would give expression to the reality 
of European society. I concur with Delanty that attempts to address this question 
have been confused by superimposing the reified image of national cultural cohesion 
onto Europe. However, my approach differs from Delanty’s analyses which remain - 
almost exclusively on a theoretical level and pay little attention to the institutional 
embeddedness of the European project. Rather than addressing the question of the 
EU’s cultural dimension solely as a theoretical problem, my principal concern in this 
thesis is to trace the ways in which the relationships between culture and politics 
have been negotiated in concrete institutional settings and to account for the
L
contradictory pulls and pressures of the ‘unity and diversity’ principle as they appear 
in specific policy-making contexts.
The thesis puts forward two main arguments. First, there have been 
considerable discrepancies between the rhetorical claims of EU policy actors and the 
actual organisations and mechanisms of EU cultural measures. In various EU policy 
documents, speeches or press releases, ‘European culture’ is characteristically 
regarded as the expression of distinct European values and practices, and therefore as 
the locus of European identity that binds the peoples of Europe together. On the other 
hand, at the level of actual policy management, the notion of European culture and 
identity very often seems to be articulated/not in terms of its symbolic contents but 
according to pragmatic, technical criteria/Europeanisation in this respect entails not 
the creation of a unified citizenry ‘glued’ together with a fixed set of cultural canons, 
^?ut merely increased transnational cooperation involving cultural operators across the 
member state^ In putting the general commitments to support culture into practice, 
the EU has largely moved away from a monolithic concept of culture to the emphasis 
on more pluralistic cultural exchanges and transnational networks ‘from below’.
Second, and closely related to the above, in the course of the development of 
EU cultural policy, its emphasis has largely shifted from a notion of culture modelled
13
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on a state-sanctioned, unified national culture to more market-oriented, utilitarian 
conceptions of culture. The rise of the neoliberal agenda in the overall process of 
European integration, coupled with new understandings about the distinct modes of 
EU governance, has brought a particular aspect of culture to the fore, namely, its 
capacity to generate multiple benefits of a primarily non-cultural nature. As we shall 
see, EU cultural policy is now articulated as something that contributes to urban 
regeneration, enhances European economic competitiveness through the promotion 
of cultural industries or improves the employment potential of the general 
population. As a result, the older rationale for EU cultural intervention as a way of 
fashioning a common European cultural identity has in large part receded into the 
background (but has not entirely,disappeared from EU official discourse).
At this stage, let me clarify the scope of this research. This thesis cannot 
cover all the potentially meaning-generating practices of the EU. As stated above, the 
main focus of the analysis is these areas of policy that fall within the responsibility of 
the Directorate-General for education and culture (see below). Other policy domains, 
such as citizenship, immigration, or external relations obviously have a crucial role in 
defining European identity, but do not in themselves constitute the central concern of 
this study. Nor is the thesis about people’s personal identification with the EU, or 
how EU cultural measures affect people’s sense of attachment and loyalty. Important 
as those issues may be, the fact that most cultural initiatives were introduced in the 
1980s and 1990s implies that it is probably too early to assess any tangible effects on 
people’s perceptions that these measures may or may not have. There is a related 
problem of whether different definitions and meanings of Europe articulated through 
EU cultural policy have a resonance in the wider social sphere, but that is also a 
question which cannot be fully expounded within the scope of this thesis. Similarly, 
it does not deal with the Europeanisation of member-state policies or national 
cultures, and therefore national case studies are not provided.
Method
This study is based on the analysis of documentary evidence. This includes official 
EU documents (policy proposals, opinions, recommendations, and various forms of 
legislation issued by EU institutions), speeches of major EU actors (Commissioners
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and the heads of state/government), EU commissioned agency reports and studies, 
press releases and other relevant documents which are publicly accessible on-line or 
available as hard copies at the European Documentation Centre (LSE). The reason 
for choosing documentation-based analysis over other methods is twofold. The first 
concerns the time-frame of this study. The thesis examines how cultural policies of 
the EU have developed and changed over time, covering a period beginning from the 
early 1970s to present. The advantage of using documentary evidence is that it can 
foreground this temporal dimension, compared to snapshot views offered by 
interviews or participant observations. Secondly, the thesis posits that there is a 
discrepancy between the EU rhetoric and actual policy practices. Rather than relying 
on the claims of individual EU policy actors, therefore, the analysis is based on texts 
produced within practical policy-making contexts as a way of highlighting what goes 
into concrete cultural policy measures.
The EU policy-making process is famously arcane, and in order to appreciate 
the different weight carried by the different types of policy documents, it is helpful to 
identify the basic modus operandi of EU institutions that has a bearing on cultural 
policies. As the executive organ of the EU the most important power of the European 
Commission (hereafter the Commission) lies in its function to initiate policy 
proposals (in the form of Commission Communications), although it also produces 
recommendations or opinions and executes adopted legislations. The Commission 
proposals are usually a product of an extensive process of consultation, involving the 
networks of interest groups, experts, national civil servants and politicians, the result 
of which is sometimes published. The administrative and technical work of the 
Commission is carried out by the Directorates-General (DGs). Of particular relevance 
to this study are the DG X (information, communication, culture and audiovisual 
media) and DG XXII (education and training) which have recently been reorganised 
into a single Directorate for Culture and Education, covering wide areas of policy 
relating to audiovisual media, languages, youth, sport and issues concerning civil 
society.
The Council of the European Union (hereafter the Council), which used to be 
called the Council of Ministers, adopts or amends proposals from the Commission to 
whom it delegates the implementation of its decision. Despite the fact that treaty 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have extended qualified majority voting across a
15
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wide range of policy domains, culture is an area where unanimity rule still applies in 
the Council’s voting procedure.3 Besides binding legislative instruments (regulations, 
directives and decisions), the Council can adopt an array of non-binding, but just as 
important, texts such as resolutions, declarations, recommendations or opinions 
which have been a major part of EU’s cultural policy outlook. In addition, national 
interests are also represented in the European Council (the meeting of the heads of 
state and/or government) which has provided a forum for successive treaty reforms as 
well as shaping the ‘big’ strategic questions regarding the overall direction of the EU. 
Apart from its decision on the Maastricht Treaty including its ‘cultural clause’, the 
European Council has made indirect inputs in the cultural domain by setting agendas 
that influenced the course of the development of cultural policy.
Among EU institutions, the European Parliament has been most consistent in 
advocating pro-integration causes. In the area of cultural policies, this can be seen 
from the Parliament’s various resolutions and opinions dating back to the 1970s, 
urging the Commission to make inroads into measures to protect and promote 
‘European culture’. However, and despite its increased decision-making powers, the 
Parliament’s role in influencing the EU’s cultural agenda still remains limited.
Plan of the thesis
The thesis is roughly divided into two parts. The first two chapters mostly deal with 
theoretical problems through the review of existing literature, with the aim of 
building a conceptual context for understanding the culture-politics relations in the 
EU. The rest of the thesis is dedicated to the empirical analysis of EU cultural 
initiatives, with each chapter focusing on a specific area of cultural policy. Chapter 1 
examines theories of European integration. Theoretical debates about the nature of 
European integration have been dominated by neo-functionalism and 
intergovemmentalism. This has begun to change in recent years, with the emergence 
of a new type of literature that foregrounds the distinct form of EU governance. 
These works emphasise the complex and pluralistic nature of EU political processes 
which are captured by terms such as the ‘regulatory state’ or ‘multilevel’ or
3 However, the Council’s decisions in the area of education are made by the qualified majority voting.
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‘network’ governance. Instead of conceptualising European integration as a 
centripetal process, the ‘governance’ literature highlights different and conflicting 
tendencies within the EU political system not governed by a single, overarching 
logic. Following this ‘governance turn’ in EU studies, the chapter argues that the 
question of the future direction of integration should not be reduced to a simple 
dichotomy between national and supranational levels.
The second chapter looks at the politics of culture at the level of the nation­
state. It starts with a review of theories of nationalism with the aim of highlighting 
national cultural integration as a contentious process. This will be followed by a brief 
history of the cultural policies of the Western European states, which is intended to 
provide a sketch of a general background against which EU cultural policy has 
developed over the years. It will be my contention that whereas national cultural 
policies up until the immediate post-war era had centred on establishing and 
disseminating national canons of ‘high’ culture, more recent developments indicate 
that conceptions of national culture and the ways in which the state intervenes in this 
sphere have undergone some changes following the rise of neoliberal discourse and 
the increased commercialisation of cultural processes.
Chapter 3 charts the general evolution of the EU cultural policy framework 
and examines the official discourses on culture from their emergence in the 1970s to 
the most recent comprehensive cultural programme, Culture 2000. It also looks at 
other policy areas (e.g. Regional policy, information and technology, employment 
policy) whose main concerns are outside the immediate realm of ‘culture’ but which 
carry significance in influencing the overall shape of EU cultural policies. The central 
argument of this chapter is that there has been a shift from a symbolic notion of 
culture towards a more pragmatic approach that emphasises the multiple 
instrumentalities of culture.
The topic of Chapter 4 is education and training policies. Although normally 
regarded as outside the narrowly defined areas of cultural policy, state education has 
traditionally been one of the most important components in the cultural construction 
of nationhood. In keeping with this national model, the EU has also attempted to 
influence national curricula of the member states. These efforts to change the 
contents of national education have not been successful, and have given way to 
mobility-oriented schemes promoting transnational teacher or student exchanges. The
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chapter traces chronologically the developments and changes in EU education and 
training programmes such as ERASMUS, LINGUA and CONNECT, and argues that 
EU agenda on education policy has been increasingly geared towards preparing 
people for transnational labour markets.
Chapter 5 examines the representations of European history prevalent in the 
EU official discourse and discusses their role in the construction of a European 
cultural space. In its attempts to underline the cultural and historical roots of the 
current European project, the EU has launched several projects, one of which is the 
publication of its semi-official history ‘textbook’, Europe: the History o f Its Peoples, 
written by a French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. The analysis of these history- 
related projects are placed in the context of Europe’s boundary-drawing process, 
whereby the definition of ‘who belongs to Europe’ is inherently bound up with the 
construction of the ‘Other’.
In the sixth chapter, I examine the EU’s schemes for the conservation of 
cultural heritage. Although this support mechanism was designed to preserve and 
promote cultural (mainly architectural) heritage which is deemed to be of ‘European 
importance’, the EU has never offered any official criteria for determining what 
makes certain historical sites or objects more ‘European’ than others. Instead, in 
opting for technical criteria for eligibility for EU support, the operational framework 
of heritage programmes effectively prioritises the economic dimension of heritage 
over its cultural contents. However, the representation of cultural heritage as a locus 
of distinct European cultural identity has also come to be used by EU policy-makers 
to activate the rhetoric of antithesis between European particularity and the perceived 
homogenising threat posed by globalisation.
The theme of Chapter 7 is the European City of Culture as one of the most 
widely recognised Europe-wide festivals. The European City of Culture event was 
conceived as a means of displaying the cultural richness of Europe both in its 
commonality and diversity, and each year several cities are selected by the EU to host 
various cultural events with a theme related to Europe. In practice, however, the 
cities have tended to see the event as a means to tackle local problems that can be 
alleviated by urban regeneration strategies rather than as an opportunity to celebrate 
Europe’s cultural wealth. This chapter thus investigates why the City of Culture event 
has taken this particular course of development, which is set against the recent trend
18
for urban entrepreneurialism, and shows how this relates to the EU’s rationale for the 
continuous support for this event.
The final chapter deals with EU programmes for European audiovisual 
productions. The audiovisual issues were one of the most hotly debated topics in the 
Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations involving American officials insisting on 
market liberalisation on the one hand and European (mainly French) representatives 
claiming to make a stand for European particularity and diversity on the other. As it 
turned out, however, the dichotomy between market and culture was largely a 
rhetorical device deployed by anti-liberalisation interests. With this regard, the 
chapter aims to show that the main objectives of EU audiovisual programmes lie less 
in protecting a distinctive European cultural identity than in strengthening the 
competitiveness of European audiovisual industries against their American 
counterparts.
The thesis concludes that so far the EU has not succeeded in articulating the 
‘unity in diversity’ ideal in a form that is viable in the context of contemporary 
European society. EU policy makers seem to have recognised that the promotion of 
an ethno-cultural definition of European unity and identity is neither tenable nor 
desirable in multi-cultural, multi-ethnic Europe, although the desire for common 
roots still intrudes into their thinking. At the same time, while the EU’s support for 
cultural policy networks points towards the representation of plural cultural interests 
which may encourage the plurality of cultural spaces and authorities within Europe, 
the increasing dominance of market reasoning in EU cultural discourse altogether 
reduces the question of public responsibility and commitments towards the provision 
of diverse cultural resources down to a mere pursuit of economic growth.
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CHAPTER 1 
The European Polity
As we saw in Introduction, the principal concern of this thesis lies in the relationship 
between culture and polity. With this in mind, this chapter addresses theoretical 
problems about the ‘politics’ side of the argument. More specifically, the central 
question to be asked is: what sort of a political entity does the EU represent? The 
basic premise here is that different forms of governance may entail different kinds of 
cultural/social organisations, which also means distinct links between the two. The 
ideal of the nation-state postulates the congruence between political and cultural 
communities.4 In Gerard Delanty’s terms, ‘the great dreams of project of modernity’ 
was ‘the creation of unitary principle of integration capable of bringing together the 
domain of economy, polity, culture and society’ (2000: 87). This is, of course, an 
idealised model which does not often correspond with reality. However, the nation­
state ideal has proven to be so pervasive that, even when thinking about political 
integration at the transnational level, our conceptual universe is still framed in the 
language of the sovereign state and its national forms of societal organisation. As 
Schmitter says, this model ‘seems self-evident to us that this particular form of 
organizing political life will continue to dominate all other, spend most publicly 
generated funds, authoritatively allocate most resources, enjoy a unique source of 
legitimacy and furnish most people with a distinctive identity’ (1996:132).
How, then, can we conceptualise the EU as a polity? Studies of European 
integration frequently refer to the sui generis character of the European project. For 
many scholars, the distinctiveness of the EU lies in its ‘between-ness’ - neither a 
traditional form of nation-state nor a ‘normal’ international organisation (Laffan, 
1998). In an attempt to understand the nature of the EU as a political system, this 
chapter reviews theories of European integration starting from older theoretical 
paradigms including neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism. It argues that the 
older debate tends to be trapped in a supranational-national dichotomy largely 
excluding the possibility of various intermediate forms lying in between those two 
poles. The chapter then devotes much of its attention to recent ‘governance’ literature
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which goes some way towards explaining the distinctiveness of the EU without 
relying on conventional concepts linked to major characteristics of the modem nation 
state. My objective here is not so much to use different theoretical models in order to 
test my empirical findings in the subsequent chapters. Rather, this chapter aims to 
introduce analytical concepts which help to situate EU cultural policies in the overall 
development of European integration.
Neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism
Analysis of European integration has for a long time been dominated by two 
approaches - intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism. Despite their crucial 
differences and disagreements, neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism share a 
common feature that they are primarily theories about process and do not begin from 
explicit assumptions about end-states (Schmitter, 1996).
Ernst Haas, the early proponent of neofunctionalism, saw integration as ‘the 
process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over pre-existing national states’ (1958: 
16). The central elements of the neofunctionalist formulation focus on the linkages 
between policy-making elites across boundaries and the process of incremental 
problem-solving. Elites’ activities are initially motivated by overlapping interests 
rather than shared ideals or common identity, although political actors are expected 
to learn from their cooperative decision-making and may develop new ideals or 
identities. This self-interested shift in elites’ expectations would result in a delegation 
of political power to a central supranational authority, which, as a locus of transferred 
legitimacy, increases the dynamic towards the development of a new political 
community.
Facilitating the process of this ‘authority-legitimacy transfer’ was the logic of 
technical or functional spillover. Refining the original concept of spill-over 
(developed by functionalism) which relied on the notion of ‘technical self- 
determination’, Haas argued that spillover was neither automatic nor free of conflict.
4 The relationship between the nation state and culture will be the topic of the next chapter.
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Emphasis was thus placed on the potential linkages between sectors, beginning with 
those considered to be the least controversial. It was predicted that, as the process 
expanded to affect more actors and adjacent issue arenas, controversy would 
increase.
Contrary to the commonly-held view, neofunctionalism did not specifically 
predict that incremental problem-solving by transnational elites would lead to the 
supersession of the nation-state by a kind of a superstate. As a theory geared towards 
explaining the process of integration, neofunctionalism has left open the question of 
the end result. However, neofunctionalists, by defining the process largely in terms of 
the transfer of sovereignty to a single and overarching regional centre of authority, 
seemed to imply that something like a super-state was the probable outcome 
(Schmitter, 1996: 137). There was no concept in neofunctionalism of transcending 
the traditional territorial division of states. Almost by default, neofimctionalism 
suggested that those divisions were simply to be supplemented/ replaced by new 
territorially based organisations at the European level (Cram, 1997: 13). Interestingly, 
neofunctionalists’ implicit premise about the state as the basic unit of analysis goes 
against the direction mapped out by their predecessor, David Mitrany’s 
functionalism. Rejecting the widespread idea that political action must be 
underpinned by territorially-based central authorities, Mitrany advocated the view 
that governance arrangements could vary according to the function of political action 
(Schmitter, 1996:137, Cram 1997:44).
Intergovemmentalism, on the other hand, saw national governments as the 
principal agents engaging in interstate bargains which either drive or prevent progress 
in European integration. Stanley Hoffmann (1966), in his critique of 
neofimctionalism, highlighted the limits of ‘functional method’ to draw attention to 
the contingent nature of transnational cooperation. He argued that, contrary to the 
logic of ‘spill-over’ anticipated by the neofunctionalists, it was in fact the ‘logic of 
diversity’ which prevailed in the integration process. Each member state was a 
distinct entity with its own culture, interests and capabilities, and they were also 
situated differently within the broader global system. Drawing on some of the 
insights rooted in a realist tradition, Hoffmann emphasised the importance of the 
international environment and the role which national governments played within the 
global system (Cram, 1997:48). The role of national governments was to promote the
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interests of their peoples to the best of their abilities within an adversarial world 
system. Where vital interests are at stake, national governments would choose to 
maintain tight control over decision-making process instead of allowing incremental 
‘spill-over’ (Hoffmann, 1966).
Thus, in intergovemmentalist accounts, the preferences of member state 
governments are heavily weighed toward the preservation of sovereignty. If they 
create institutions above the level of the state, it is because the benefits of collective 
action through international institutions are deemed to outweigh any possible risk to 
autonomy. On this reading, crucial decision-making powers remain in the hands of 
member governments regardless of institutionalisation at the European level. It 
follows that political bargains struck between the member states determine the scope 
and limits of European integration (Rhodes and Mazey, 1995). Far from undermining 
the sovereignty of the nation-state, European integration might well strengthen the 
problem-solving capacities of the member states, since the Europeanisation of 
previously domestic issues tends to remove those issues from domestic controversy 
and into the area of executive control (Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1993). The 
intergovemmentalist perspective reminds us that losing formal authorities in some 
policy areas should not be readily equated with the loss of states’ actual capacity to 
act.
Although somewhat marginalised by the neofunctionalist- 
intergovemmentalist debates, there are other approaches developed in the earlier 
periods of European integration which have also provided ways of analysing 
European integration from different perspectives. Federalism, with its strong roots in 
the European resistance movement, was particularly popular among proponents of 
European integration in the immediate post-war period. Some authors point out that a 
federalist approach is more a political strategy designed with particular goals in mind 
than a theory explaining political integration (Cram, 1997). Federalism commonly 
describes political systems in which there is a division of authority between central 
and regional government. These territorial units yield a measure of authority to 
common, centralised institutions, but remain largely intact as units (Rosamond, 2000: 
23-29). The expectation of a federal state-like entity as the end product of European 
integration suggests that federalists saw statehood as either a desirable or inevitable 
mode of political organisation which could be stretched to fit governance at the
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European-level. Indeed, for Euro-federalists such as Denis de Rougemont, ‘Europe’ 
meant cultural as well as political unity, and their vision was essentially the 
reproduction on the European level of the nineteenth-century project of the nation- 
and state-building (Delanty, 1998).
In contrast to the result-oriented federalist approach, the main concern of 
transactionalism was the background conditions necessary for political integration to 
occur. In the work of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues, integration is defined as ‘the 
attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and 
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, 
dependable expectations of peaceful change among its populations’ (Deutsch et al., 
1957: 5). For Deutsch, cross-border transactions or communications (the flow of 
goods, services, people and messages) were necessary prerequisites that would give 
rise to ‘mutual relevance’. However, political community required ‘mutual 
responsiveness’ which would result from a complex learning process involving the 
emergence of shared symbols, identities, memories, values and norms. Central to this 
vision of integration was the interaction of societies and peoples as opposed to 
interstate relations, leading to the creation of a ‘security community’ in a social- 
psychological sense. Deutsch distinguished two separate categories of security 
communities. First, ‘amalgamated security communities’ involved the formal 
integration of states into a larger unit in the institutional domain. This more or less 
corresponds to the model of integration envisaged by neofunctionalists and 
federalists (Rosamond 2000:43). Second, ‘pluralistic security communities’ involved 
integration in the social sphere while the component governments retain their 
separate legal identities (thus preserving the nation-state system), and therefore did 
not necessitate the presence of any overarching authority structure at the transnational 
level (Deutsch, 1966). In this classification, the EC/EU would represent an instance 
of the former, but Deutsch was in favour of the ‘pluralistic’ communities as he 
considered them to be more durable and more likely to arise in practice (Rosamond, 
2000: 43).
All the above approaches share the same conventional concept of the state in 
analysing political integration. Whether implicitly (for neofunctionalists or 
transactionalists) or explicitly (for intergovemmentalists or federalists), the basic unit 
of analysis remains the territorially-based state system (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 57).
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This is not to dismiss the significance of their contributions to European integration 
studies, but those theoretical paradigms do not in themselves capture the 
distinctiveness of the EU. Standard analyses rooted in traditional state-related 
concepts ‘run the risk of underestimating the novelty of this open-ended integration 
process’ (Wessels, 1997: 270).
‘Doldrums period’
During the period beginning from the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958 
to the completion of the customs union in 1968, it was neofunctionalism that 
provided the most influential framework for European integration studies. The 
popularity of neofunctionalism was closely connected to the success of the so-called 
‘Monnet method’ with its incremental, technocratic approach which worked well 
when the scope and scale of integration was still limited. The triumph of this method 
was not just in terms of the efficiency of supranational decision-making but also in a 
sense that gradual integration via the ‘Monnet method’ was widely regarded as a 
legitimate path to the attainment of dominant ideals in post-war Europe which 
provided an underlying motivation for the European project in the first place - the 
securing of peace, the achievement of prosperity, and the undermining of nationalism 
(Weiler, 1999). To the extent that the member states were peacefully co-existing with 
each other and their economies were growing, European integration was deemed a 
success, and no serious challenge was mounted against the rationalist logic of 
Monnet’s supranational method.
However, the initial enthusiasm for neofunctionalism as a powerful all- 
encompassing theory was to be subdued by the 1965-1966 Empty Chair crisis, a 
series of incidents which undermined the theoretical premise of neofunctionalism and 
instead validated intergovemmentalism.5 Subsequently, the EC’s development 
generally stagnated until the early 1980s, a period which some theorists call the
5 In June 1965, because of de Gaulle’s opposition to (amongst other things) the Commission’s 
proposal to introduce qualified majority voting procedure in the Council of Ministers, the French 
officials boycotted the attendance of Council meetings, leading to the virtual paralysis of the 
Community. The ‘crisis’ lasted until January 1966 when a compromise was made between France and 
the other five member states. This incident had an effect of curtailing the Commission’s opportunism 
until the early 1980s (Dinan, 1999).
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‘doldrums era’ or the ‘dark ages’ of the Community (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995:37). 
With the faltering progress of European integration, this period also marked the 
decline of scholarly interest in theorising regional integration. The research produced 
during this ‘doldrums era’ nevertheless served as a forerunner for later studies of 
both the integration process and of the functioning of the EC/EU as a polity. The 
scholarship of this period (e.g. Puchala, Wallace, Webb), whose focus was on micro­
level case studies rather than on the elaboration of a grand theory, shared a view that 
the EC developed in an asymmetrical fashion, with differing degrees of policy 
integration from one sector to another, involving different but overlapping groups of 
actors at the European, national and even subnational levels. A corollary of this was 
that the EC existed in a ‘state of messy equilibrium’, not following a clear-cut, linear 
process envisaged by Haas’s neofunctionalism (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 39-41).
1992 and a new wave of integration theories
The relaunch of the EC/EU with the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht 
Treaty coincided with a renewed momentum for the study of European integration. 
To a significant extent, however, ‘the new debate paralleled the old’ in the mould of 
neofunctionalism or intergovemmentalism (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 43; 
Rosamond, 2000). In explaining the factors behind the acceleration of integration in 
the late 1980s, Sandoholtz and Zysman (1989) revived some of the key insights of 
neo-functionalism, namely, the importance of supranational institutions and 
transnational economic elites. Aided by a transnational industry coalition, they argue, 
the Commission was able to mobilise national governments to support the overall 
objective of market unification. But Sandholtz and Zysman also added a crucial 
dimension which supplements neofunctionalism’s tendency to ascribe too much 
explanatory power to the internal logic of integration without taking account of the 
impact of external environment. According to them, it was changes in international 
and domestic conditions that provided the source of new opportunities and 
constraints. Changing international economic structure such as the rise of Japan and 
the relative decline of the US, and the evident failure of existing national policies to 
redress the consequences of the protracted economic crisis since the late 1970s,
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together set the stage which both the Commission and business groups were able to 
exploit to their advantage, thereby triggering the 1992 process.
In contrast, Moravcsik in 1991 argued that it was not an elite alliance between 
the European officials and pan-European business elites which had brought about the 
Single European Act. Instead, he presented a model based on intergovemmentalism, 
lowest common denominator bargaining, and strict limits on sovereignty transfer. A 
central component of his argument is that there was a convergence of interests among 
leaders of France, Germany and Britain as an important precursor of agreement on 
the SEA. Moravcsik (1993) further elaborated on the topic of how the preferences of 
national governments, which determine their positions in international negotiations, 
are shaped by domestic societal forces. Within the framework of what he termed 
‘liberal intergovemmentalism’, national governments are seen to have used EC/EU 
institutions to increase the policy autonomy of national governments in relation to 
domestic interests, ‘particularly where domestic interests are weak or divided, EC 
institutions have been deliberately designed to assist national governments in 
overcoming domestic opposition’ (1993:515). Seen from a liberal 
intergovemmentalist perspective, instead of supranational elites tying member states 
into a process to which they may be resistant, the EC/EU may in fact strengthen the 
state by allowing national executives to manipulate their own domestic constituents 
into accepting common policies.
The Single Market programme also prompted a partial resuscitation of 
federalist theory. John Pinder’s ‘neo-federalist’ approach combines
neofimctionalism’s emphasis on economic and political linkages and federalism’s 
concern with constitutional principles. Unlike the original federalism, which placed 
too much emphasis on a once-and-for-all constitutional settlement to make a huge 
leap towards the ‘United States of Europe’, Pinder is attentive to the power of 
countervailing forces and thus more aware of the need to follow incrementalist 
strategies in view of (eventually) achieving a federal arrangement as a more viable 
solution (Pinder, 1986). Despite these scholarly inputs, the idea of federalism has 
until recently only received modest support in the actual political context.6 Given this
6 For instance, the European Parliament, in anticipation of the Single European Act, presented in 1984 
the ‘Draft Treaty establishing the European Union’ underlining the federal principles. However, 
suggestions contained in the Draft Treaty were hardly incorporated into the SEA.
27
history, it was perhaps quite unexpected that in the last couple of years questions 
regarding federalism and a European constitution have come to occupy centre stage 
in the EU political agenda. It can be argued that by entering into mainstream debate 
the idea of a constitution has lost part of its progressive-integrationist connotation 
(Weiler, 2002). Advocates of a ‘federal Europe’ - Jacques Delors, Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing and Joschka Fischer among others - are at pains to point out that their 
visions of federation do not entail the creation of a ‘superstate’, and that the nation­
state will still be irreplaceable in ensuring the EU’s legitimacy. Some authors argue 
that the EU already has most of the characteristics of what political science literature 
defines as a federation and therefore the current debate about whether the EU should 
evolve into a federal system misses the point (Borzel and Risse, 2000). Putting aside 
the question of the desirability or necessity of a Constitution, the prevailing debate 
surrounding the ‘finalite politique’ of European integration has been welcomed in 
some quarters as a way of tackling the crisis of legitimacy in a post-Cold War Europe 
where the fundamental rationale for continuing integration had shifted considerably.
‘Governance’ literature
Lately, attempts to understand European integration in its post-SEA, post-Maastricht 
state are accompanied by a growing literature examining the functioning of the EU as 
a polity or a system of governance. To a large extent, this new wave of literature has 
shifted their attention from the study of integration to the study of governance 
(Rosamond, 2000: 109). Whereas the earlier theories tended to view the EC/EU in 
terms of its process of becoming something else and therefore as a transitory 
phenomenon, this new type of literature converges on the point that the EU can be 
treated as an instance of a polity, or at least a political system, in its own right. 
Accordingly, the main focus of analyses has also shifted from the process of major 
institutional changes (such as treaty reforms) to the day-to-day functioning of the EU 
as a polity. It also means that these analyses tend to privilege policy actors involved 
in everyday politics (EU institutions, interest groups, numerous committees attached 
to the Commission and the Council, etc.) rather than the member state governments 
which are the main actors in ‘high politics’. The ‘governance literature’ does not 
deny the significance of national governments in EU politics, but its value lies in the
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fact that, by highlighting the less visible side of EU policy-making, these analyses 
draw our attention to concepts and practices that have been overlooked by more 
conventional approaches to European integration.
The term ‘governance’ is usually defined as being about the exercise of 
authority with or without the formal institutions of government. In recent years, 
however, the term has come to be used to note the drift of authority away from 
government, and this has become a major theme in both International Relations and 
policy analysis literature. Despite their different theoretical origins and emphases, a 
common thread running through those works is that they emphasise new processes of 
governing which depart from the traditional notion of the state (Jachtenfuchs, 1997; 
Rosamond, 2000; Stoker, 1998). One of the defining characteristics of this type of 
literature is that they stress the absence of a central authority and the transformation 
of the role of state actors who, although still powerful, no longer occupy their place at 
the hierarchical centre of an integrated society. The political arena is conceptualised 
as a space populated by autonomous political, economic and social actors who are 
linked by multifaceted interdependencies. Governance, on this reading, therefore 
involves the maintenance of order and patterns of structured cooperation among state 
and non-state actors in the absence of a central organising authority (Eising and 
Kohler-Koch, 1999).
The above characteristics are portrayed as a pervasive feature in all advanced 
capitalist societies, but it is an image which has become increasingly acceptable in 
EU studies circles. The basic assumption of the EU governance literature may be 
compatible with the intergovemmentalism in that European integration is seen to 
have started as the product of rational choices made by member governments 
(Wessels, 1997; Pierson, 1998). Or, it may have a neofunctionalist slant and privilege 
the role of supranational institutions and private interests (Mazey and Richardson, 
1995). But the fundamental difference from the earlier debate is that various actors 
are thought to become increasingly embedded in common institutional frameworks, 
as a result of which no single groups of actors can entirely dominate the policy 
process. To the extent that they portray a complex and pluralistic political process, 
not firmly under the control of national governments and not explicable either in 
terms of simple diplomatic bargaining or super-state in the making, the ‘governance’ 
literature marks a break away from simple, binary oppositions of power between
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national and European-level governments. Also crucial in this respect is a recognition 
that it is not analytically useful to place European integration on a linear continuum 
from intergovernmental cooperation to fully-fledged state-like entity. According to 
Brigid Laffan,:
The Union’s system of collective governance has produced a ‘prismatic 
political system’ in which rays of activity and authority are scattered or focused 
more or less effectively through institutions and social forces ... Rather than 
amassing extensive and autonomous political authority, the Union gradually 
alters the exercise of national political authority by enmeshing the member
n
states in a web of collaboration and cooperation (1998: 243).
What, then, is the context that gave rise to such dispersal of authorities? The 
governance literature does not necessarily point to the specific causes of this 
transformation, but connections are normally made with domestic and international 
structural changes. One argument which is particularly pertinent to the west 
European context relates to the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state in responding to 
a vast extension of state powers and its provision of public goods. This is linked to 
the post-war evolution of the western European system towards the welfare and 
service state for which the major raison d ’etre is the fulfilment of the citizens’ basic 
needs (Wessels, 1997). Since the mid-1980s the trend has been for the state to 
withdraw from parts of the economy, to retract from the provision of certain public 
goods, and to reduce the powers of government. In their differing adjustments to 
these changes west European states found themselves losing, and in some cases 
deliberately renouncing, certain public policy powers. Another notable feature in 
western Europe in the past decade or so is the proliferation of bodies with public 
policy functions outside the central governments. The shift towards more 
autonomous or semi-autonomous agency represents a move away from the inherited 
heavy state version of government towards a kind of partnership model incorporating
7 There is a growing body of research that investigates how the member states’ participation in EU 
governance impacts upon domestic policy-making, (see, for example, Cowles et al., 2001) But the 
concern of this chapter is not the Europeanisation of national politics but the transformation of EU 
governance itself.
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both state and non-state actors. On this reading, contemporary politics in western 
Europe were changing anyway, with traditional forms of politics and government 
being transformed in quite radical ways. Against this background, the EU has 
emerged as a part of reconfigured pattern of broader European governance (H. 
Wallace, 2000b:7-9; Wessels, 1997).
With regard to international structural changes, many authors see the 
evolution of new governance patterns in the light of globalisation. Globalisation is 
most often associated with increasingly free flow across borders of goods, services,
Q
money, people, technology and ideas. This is said to have enhanced opportunities for 
non-state (especially economic) actors to develop cross-border activities which often 
escape the reach of formal government. In this world of interconnectedness, the 
‘centralization and hierarchization of power within states and through states in the 
international system are steadily replaced by the pluralization of power among 
political, economic, cultural and social actors, groups, and communities within states, 
between states and across states’ (Axtmann, 1998: 10). Yet there remain serious 
controversies about the extent to which this represents a diminution of national 
autonomy.
This is not the place for a full engagement in the many debates about 
globalisation, so I would simply note here that the emerging form of governance in 
Europe may be read either as a defensive reaction against or a facilitator o f 
globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; Castells, 2000b). 9 A common line of argument is 
that global economic changes such as the free movement of capital and the 
emergence of transborder production networks have influenced the interests of key 
policy actors and have accelerated the momentum towards the liberalisation of the 
European economy.10 This has further unleashed market forces, which, in turn, 
renders national, territorially-bound government even more vulnerable to external 
pressures (Castells, 2000b, Streeck, 1996). In this context, the growth of EU-level
8 See, for example, Held et ah who define globalisation as ‘a process ... which embodies a 
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of 
their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power’ (Held et al. 1999: 16).
91 will explore in subsequent chapters how globalisation discourse has shaped EU policy agendas in 
the cultural sector.
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governance capacities may represent a sort of a second-best option chosen by West 
European states caught between the forces of globalisation and overloaded demands 
from the domestic arena in their efforts to manage the consequences of (economic) 
globalisation (H. Wallace, 2000a and b).
However, globalisation is not necessarily best understood as an independent 
variable affecting the EU and its constituent member states ‘from outside’, as causal 
arrows drawn between globalisation and Europeanisation may well run in the 
opposite direction (Rosamond, 1999; Ross, 1998). This leads us to the distinction 
drawn by William Wallace about formal and informal integration. Informal 
integration ‘consists of those intense patterns of interaction which develop without 
the impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, 
technology, communications networks, and social change’. On the other hand, formal 
integration refers to ‘changes in the framework of rules and regulations which 
encourage - or inhibit, or redirect - informal flows’ (1990:9). Depending on the 
analysts’ viewpoint, there are varying accounts about the push-pull balance between 
formal institution building and the level of informal cross-border interaction.
The EU as a regulatory order
One of the major contributions in the governance literature is made by Majone 
(1996a and 1996b) who has analysed the EU as a ‘regulatory state’. A regulatory 
state ‘may be less of a state in the traditional sense than a web of networks of 
national and supranational regulatory institutions held together by shared values and 
objectives, and by a common style of policy-making’ (1996a:276). Majone’s aim is 
to understand the EU in terms of the policy-making functions of the state. In 
advanced market economies, the state normally undertakes three roles. The first is 
regulation, that is, measures to address problems of market failure (such as 
monopolies). The others are redistribution (resource transfers, welfare provision 
including elementary education and medical care) and macro-economic stabilisation 
(the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to ensure economic growth, price stability
10 Depending on the theorist’s position, the key policy actor could be transnational business interests 
and/or the Commission (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989), or the member state governments (Streeck, 
1996).
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and satisfactory employment levels). In the European context, the EU is most active 
in the regulatory functions, while showing little progress in the other two. This 
distinguishes the EU from the normal model of European statehood. But if we look 
beyond the sphere of political economy which is Majone’s immediate concern, it is 
possible to list other core functions of the modem state which the EU crucially lacks. 
The most obvious example is that the EU does not have the characteristics which are 
central to the Weberian concept of the state - the monopoly of legitimate violence 
and a fixed, clearly demarcated territory.11
The primacy of the regulatory mode of governance represents the comparative 
advantage of the EU. Regulatory policy-making is inherently technocratic, based on 
the articulation and application of clear mles. Most crucially, it is possible to produce 
and implement regulatory policies with very limited expenditures of financial 
resource, because the costs of regulations tend to fall upon those who have to comply 
with them (businesses, employers, etc.). This can be linked to the Commission’s 
bureaucratic propensity towards increasing its own power. Not only does regulatory 
policy allow the Commission to expand its competence without much financial 
constraints, technical expertise required for complex social regulations also puts the 
Commission in a superior position vis-a-vis other EU institutions (notably the 
Council) as the main locus of lobbying in the EU (Cram, 1997; Mazey and 
Richardson, 1995; see also below). According to Majone, the preferred instruments 
of regulatory governance are ‘independent regulatory bodies, like independent central 
banks, courts of law, administrative tribunals or the European Commission’, which, 
unlike majoritarian institutions of the member states, have the effect of diffusing 
power (1996b:285).
The rise of regulatory instruments as a predominant mode of policy in the EU 
is closely bound up with the development of the Single Market. Until quite recently, 
that is, before the market-building project became an overwhelming concern in the 
mid-1980s, the dominant policy paradigm for many EU policy practitioners was a 
‘Community method’ or ‘Monnet method’ of supranational policy-making according 
to which more and more powers were transferred from the national to the EU level
11 In this connection, one may note the significance of the role of warfare in the formation of nation­
states and national identities (Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993). The EU was founded, at least at the level 
of ideas, on the goal of attaining peace.
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through incremental processes much akin to the neofunctionalist logic (H. Wallace, 
2000b). As the distinctive ‘Community method’ is largely, but not entirely, displaced 
by the regulatory model, the application of regulatory instruments has been expanded 
beyond the narrow confines of the economic sphere to include social and 
environmental policies (Majone, 1996b).
These changes in policy instruments reflect a shift in prevailing ideas in the 
EU from redistributive to efficiency concerns. Wolfgang Streeck (1996) argues that 
the history of European integration may be characterised by continuous conflict 
between two alternative political economic projects, that of a free trade and a welfare 
state-building. This has culminated in the 1980s in a (somewhat simplified) form of a 
battle between Jacques Delors’s ‘European social model’ project and the Thatcherite 
vision of neoliberal market-building.12 In Streeck’s view, ‘Thatcher won and Delors 
lost’, and the result is that ‘United Europe has not only failed to develop sovereign 
public power for governing its economy, but has over the years accumulated an 
institutional legacy ... that effectively precludes such development for any 
foreseeable future’ (1996:302). Similarly, Pierson and Leibfried argue that the 
reinvigoration of European integration in the 1980s ‘depended precisely on the 
emergence of an anti-social democratic consensus on economic policy within the 
major member states’ (1995: 450). The battle on the EU’s political economy may yet 
have to be settled, but there is growing evidence suggesting that even in policy 
sectors traditionally associated with protectionist line of reasoning, the policy debates 
about social concerns are increasingly framed in the language of market efficiency 
(H. Wallace, 2000b).
Acceptance of the regulatory model as a useful description of the EU implies 
a possibility that the EU may never perform the functions currently performed by 
nation-states. It means that we should not expect the EU to look like a traditional 
nation-state at all, nor its future development to follow a path from an 
intergovernmental forum to federation. Instead we could envisage a political division
12 For Delors, market building through the 1992 programme was not just to liberalise European 
economic space but was also intended to be a launching pad for constructing a supranational European 
state on the model of the nation state. One of the main features of his vision for state-building was the 
‘European model of society’ in which government, ‘beyond stimulating economic activity to provide 
welfare, should craft a wide range of public goods.. .in response to demands of solidarity’. However, 
most of his strategies for a ‘social Europe’ failed to materialise (Ross, 1995:46).
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of labour between the member states on the one hand, focusing on social and 
redistributional policy, and the EU on the other hand, focusing on regulatory policy 
(Caporaso, 1996:41). It may be that the EU’s main functions will continue to revolve 
around enhancing economic competitiveness and forcing structural adjustments in 
response to wider forces in the global economy (Laffan, 1998: 244). The transfer of 
regulatory functions to the EU, however, is not a politically neutral process. As 
Walby argues, the emergence of a EU regulatory state and the predominance of 
neoliberal policy orientation mean that ‘[tjhere is a new balance of social and 
political forces which is inimical to traditional policies of redistribution through 
welfare expenditure. The relative decline of the working class and increase in the 
middle classes have facilitated the development of political strategies and coalitions 
led by the better off which have marginalized and stigmatized many of those who 
were traditional beneficiaries of welfare’ (1999: 125). From this standpoint, 
Majone’s contention that regulation is a technical matter and therefore is not a 
political activity seems to miss an important point.
Multilevel Governance
The observation that European integration may not be a precise analogue for the 
processes of nation- or state-building is also central to the concept of multilevel 
governance:
The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach is the 
existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments 
and the interaction of political actors across those levels. Member state 
executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the 
European polity.. .MLG theorists argue that in a growing number of cases no 
one of these actors has exclusive competence over a particular policy (Marks et 
al., 1996: 41-42).
If we viewed the development of the EU solely in terms of authority transfers to its 
central institutions, European integration may look as though it is mirroring the 
trajectories of the modem nation-state. However, the main contention of the
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multilevel governance approach is that centralisation of new powers at the 
supranational level over the past couple of decades has been accompanied by 
decentralisation of decision-making to subnational levels of government. To be sure, 
this approach does not maintain that the nation state is on the verge of political 
impotence. Rather, their claim is that the dominance of national governments in 
policy processes has become diluted in several policy areas, with the result that ‘the 
EU has become a polity where authority is dispersed between levels of governance 
and amongst actors, and where there are significant sectoral variations in governance 
patterns’ (Rosamond, 2000:111). In this polity, states are not an exclusive link 
between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. Thus, 
multilevel governance analysis posits a set of overarching policy networks 
encompassing supranational, national, regional and local levels of authority (Marks et 
a l , 1996).
The de-centring of authority depicted by the multilevel governance model 
shares many features with federalism, although multilevel governance pictures 
political arenas at different levels as interconnected, and not nested as in the 
federalist model. That is to say, subnational actors are not exclusively nested in the 
hierarchical structure of the nation-state, as they simultaneously operate in both 
national and supranational arenas, creating transnational connections in the process 
(Marks et al., 1996). The idea that European integration promotes the empowerment 
of regions lies behind the concept of ‘Europe of the Regions’, even though the 
political resources and ability of subnational actors to reap benefits from this 
multilevel governance greatly varies from region to region (Rumford, 2002).
The model of multi-level governance typically rests on the analysis of EU cohesion
1 ^policy which had become the second largest line item in the EU budget . Significant 
in this respect is the 1988 cohesion policy reform which not only doubled its budget 
but also admitted new actors in the policy-making process by requiring collaborative 
networking among public and private actors at multiple levels for designing regional
13 Cohesion policy is designed to reduce disparities and promote a more even pattern of economic 
development across the EU. Its primary instrument has been the structural fund which targets regions 
suffering from low GDPs or industrial/agricultural decline.
36
development plans.14 However, as we have seen, the mode of EU governance is 
much more developed in the regulatory sphere than in the redistributive sphere, so 
the mobilisation of subnational actors has little to do with the availability of EU 
funding. In fact, it is argued that even at the present level the cohesion funds are not 
large enough to make a significant difference in economic terms, and that the 
political gesture of redistributing money has been more important than the actual 
effect (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999:149). Therefore, the emergence of certain 
subnational actors as key players in some EU policy sectors should be seen in the 
context of how much autonomy those subnational governments enjoy and whether 
there are any conflicts of interest with their national states (Marks et al., 1996). The 
point stressed here is that the cracks created in the relations between national- and 
subnational- level authorities have opened windows of opportunities, enabling sub­
national actors to take advantage of direct contacts with the European institutions 
without having to channel their interest through the nation-state. However, the model 
of multi-level governance has a broader utility in the analysis of policy areas other 
than cohesion policy. The Single European Act ‘institutionalised a double shift of 
decision making away from national states - to the market and to the European level’ 
(Hooghe and Marks, 1999:73). One consequence was a broadening of participation in 
EU decision-making, incorporating more private actors as well as different levels of 
governments.
Another important point is that multilevel governance is understood as a 
pattern of policy-making that has arisen in recent years and therefore ‘may not be a 
stable equilibrium’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001:28). This leaves open the possibility 
that other dominant patterns may emerge in the future. Indeed, there are signs 
indicating that the development of cohesion policy, around which the patterns of 
multi-level governance have crystallised, has taken a turn to retrenchment after its 
renegotiation in 1999. This is partly due to the rise of neoliberal ideology, and partly 
because of backlash from member governments in their attempts to regain control
14 Although the Commission did not use the term ‘multi-level’ governance to describe the 1988 
reform, it was actually the Commission’s intention, by prescribing elaborate rules about where and 
how to spend the fund, to establish direct connections with subnational actors beyond the control of 
national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). More intergovemmentalism-inspired account 
maintains that cohesion policy has developed as side-payments for poorer member states designed to 
facilitate package deals for advancing economic integration (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999).
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over EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). In addition, the current 
preoccupation with constitutionalism may be seen as demonstrating the persisting 
influence of the hierarchical model of the state. At the same time, however, the 
tendency of the EU since the 1990s to become even more polycentric has added a 
new dimension to the concept of multi-level governance, with more diverse and 
anomalous arrangements being devised for decision-making which allow different 
member states to integrate in different policy areas (Peterson and Bomberg, 2000).15 
Similarly, concepts such as multi-speed Europe and a European ‘core’ or ‘centre of 
gravity’, which came to receive a considerable degree of interest in the context of a 
EU constitution, may be an expression of diversification within the EU, a tendency 
which will be reinforced in view of the immanent Eastward enlargement. In this 
sense, those recent developments do not necessarily diminish the significance of the 
concept of multilevel governance in underlining complexity as the principal feature 
of the EU policy system and its attendant variability, unpredictability and diversity 
(Rosamond, 2000).16
The metaphor of a multi-level or multi-tier system has also been applied to 
the different levels of policy process. Peterson and Bomberg (1999) distinguish three 
different types of EU decision: history-making (such as treaty revisions, involving 
actors at the highest political levels), policy-setting (inter-institutional legislative 
process), and policy-shaping (determining policy details involving sub-systemic 
committees and working groups). Each tends to be taken at distinct levels of 
governance in most EU policy sectors, involving different actors and the different 
types of rationality which inform their actions. They conclude that no single theory 
can explain EU governance at all levels of analysis. Broad ‘macro’ approaches to
15 The Maastrich Treaty sanctioned flexible integration in the form of the EMU and other opt-out 
clauses, as well as setting up the intergovernmental second and third pillars outside the Community 
structures. The Amsterdam Treaty further accelerated the drift towards a differentiated EU by 
explicitly permitting groups of member states to deepen cooperation between themselves (Gstohl, 
2000).
16 The emphasis on the fragmentation of power and the lack of overall coherence in EU governance 
has given rise to a more radical claim that the EU represents a postmodern (post-sovereign) political 
form (Caporaso, 1996; Ruggie,1993). Others liken European integration to a medieval order with its 
dispersed and overlapping forms of authority which existed before the rise of the modem state (Bull, 
1977). These claims have been criticised for relying on the reified conception of the modem state as a 
fixed unit of sovereign space which in turn serves to exaggerate the novelty of the present situation 
(Anderson, 1996).
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integration, such as neofunctionalism or intergovemmentalism are particularly useful 
for explaining the major ‘history-making’ decisions of the EU. However, when it 
comes to explaining ‘policy setting’ or ‘policy shaping’ decisions which are shaped 
at a level far below the politicised worlds of ministers, Commissioners and EP party 
group leaders, ‘new institutionalism’ or policy network analysis (see below) would 
provide a more valuable approach. In a similar vein, Helen Wallace (2000) has 
identified variations in EU policy-making models across different policy sectors, 
each involving a distinct logic and therefore requiring different theoretical 
approaches.
New Institutionalism
The new institutionalism rests on a simple, commonsensical premise that institutions 
are an important factor that can influence political action. Rather than focusing on 
procedural or formal aspect of institutions which have been a central feature in EU 
studies (such as decision-making mechanisms or role of EU institutions), it asserts 
that institutions should be understood more broadly to include issues of both formal 
and informal mles, norms and values embedded in them, and day-to-day practices as 
well as organisations (Bulmer, 1994). Although this approach is more a set of 
assumptions for deriving analytical insights than a proper theory, institutionalism has 
a particular virtue in the study of the EU where informal and experimental practices 
tend to carry more weight compared to a stable, long-established polity (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999: 21). If the EU indeed represents a form of governance without the 
formal government, it is essential that we pay attention to those aspects of policy­
making beyond formal institutions.
Paul Pierson (1998) applies his ‘historical institutionalist’ approach to 
European integration. His starting point is that, despite intergovemmentalists’ claim 
about tight control exercised by the member states over the evolution of European 
organisations, there seem to be constant ‘gaps’ in their control which create room for 
supranational actors to influence the integration process and which, in turn, constrain 
the member states themselves. While incorporating some aspects of neofunctionalism 
including the significance of supranational actors and spillover logic, Pierson draws 
attention to the temporal dimension of institutional designs. Member state
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governments are often preoccupied with short-term outcomes which are geared 
towards domestic electoral success. Their decisions can produce all sorts of 
unanticipated consequences in the longer term. The preferences of national 
governments may also shift, leaving them with already-agreed commitments and 
highly developed policies that do not fit their current needs. However, institutions 
(standard operating procedures and conventions of behaviour as well as formal rules), 
once in place, are resilient to subsequent arrangements to reverse the course of their 
development. Thus, previous decisions of the member states may have a Tock-in’ 
effect, meaning that social adaptation to EU policies and practices drastically 
increases the cost of exit from existing arrangements, thereby making the evolution 
of the EU ‘path-dependent’.17
Such constraints on the power of the member states cannot be fully explained 
by intergovemmentalist accounts with their almost exclusive focus on ‘grand 
bargains’. As the outcomes of interstate bargains and treaties always need to be 
translated into actual political conduct and rule implementation, much happens in the 
intervals between interstate bargains during which the ability of member state 
governments to control the process becomes weaker. On the other hand, a crucial 
difference between institutionalism and neofunctionalism is that ‘neofunctionalism 
sees political control as a zero-sum phenomenon, with authority gradually transferred 
from member-state governments to supranational actors, while historical 
institutionalism emphasizes how the evolution of policies, rules and practices along 
with social adaptations create an increasingly structured polity which restricts the 
options available to all political actors’ (1998:48, emphasis in original). Historical 
institutionalist work points to the embeddedness of European policy actors (both 
national and supranational) in an evolving institutional setting. Viewing institutions 
as extending beyond the formal organs of government captures the complexity of 
political integration that cannot be reduced to simple accumulation of visible, formal
17 Such ‘lock-in’ effect manifests itself in the EU in the form of the acqui communautaire (which in 
English means ‘shared property’). There is no clear definition for this term, but it is usually 
understood among EU policy actors to refer to an accumulated body of formal and informal rules, 
norms, practices, procedures and meanings of the EU which any new member state must accept in its 
entirety (Wiener, 1999:38). Article C of the Treaty on European Union specifies: ‘The Union shall be 
served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the 
activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acqui 
communautaire’.
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power at the European level (Olsen, 2000). The significance of informal codes of 
conduct, ‘soft’ (non-binding) law and policy cooperation in EU integration is a 
crucial point to bear in mind because, apart from important exceptions such as the 
Television without Frontiers Directive, the EU’s policy instruments in culture and 
education mostly consist in secondary or non-binding legislation involving a large 
number of ‘informal’ actors.
Another strand of new institutionalism is called ‘sociological 
institutionalism’, which places greater emphasis on the cognitive or ideational 
dimensions of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Here, ‘institutions’ are defined as 
the mechanisms through which the world is rendered meaningful to social actors. In 
this perspective, institutions have a dual character. They are not only neutral devices 
for the accommodation of different interests in the pursuit of common policies, but 
also provide ‘symbolic guidance function’. This symbolic function ‘can be analysed 
in terms of its fundamental idea, which motivates actors in a specific way and creates 
links and obligations with regard to the specific order it incorporates’ (Jachtenfuchs, 
1997: 46). The central tenet of this approach, therefore, is a prominent and 
autonomous role assigned to ideas, norms, symbols and values with regard to both 
specific policy choices and political systems on a more general level. Ideas such as 
‘democracy’, ‘federalism’, or ‘liberal market economy’ do not just perform 
mechanisms for delivering public policies, but embody specific values about how 
political and social life should be organised. While actors may accept various 
obligations of EU membership based on utility-maximising calculations, it is also 
possible that compliance to rules, norms and practices, etc. is ‘based on the consent 
of actors who have internalised the belief that they have a normative obligation to 
accept certain institutions and policies under certain conditions’ (Olsen, 2000). For 
sociological institutionalists, therefore, actors’ interests are endogenous (as opposed 
to the rationalists’ view of material, exogenously-derived interests) to the processes 
of interaction that institutions represent (Rosamond, 2000).
The emphasis on the subjective aspects of institutions connects the debate 
with broader sociological concern about the social construction of reality which has 
recently been influential within International Relations. Social constructivism is a 
specific metatheoretical position that builds on Giddens’ structuration thesis (1984) 
in which actors and structure are conceptualised as co-constituting each other in the
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process of structuration (Christiansen, 1997). The starting point here is that the 
political world is not materially given but socially constructed. This leads to a line of 
analysis that does not say either that structures determine action, or that action 
determines structure. Rather it is through the processes of social interaction that 
structural properties are reproduced, and the interests and identities of actors are 
treated as endogenous to the interaction. The constructivist position therefore 
challenges taken-for-granted concepts such as ‘states’ and ‘international system’ 
which are assumed to be simply given and objective (Rosamond, 2000: 171-174). 
There are clear affinities here with the new governance model which blurs 
established conceptual boundaries between public and private, state and market, or 
domestic and international.
Constructivism has been applied to EU studies within the framework of the 
sociological strand of institutionalism which aims to locate EU institutions at the 
interface between structural change and political agency (Christiansen et al., 1999). 
With its focus on dynamic interaction between institutional norms and political 
action, sociological institutionalist research centres on the role of prevailing ideas 
and dominant discourses that can shape, but not dictate, the boundaries of what is 
politically possible. Without discounting the relevance of instrumental rationality, the 
constructivist position maintains that actors’ interests and preferences can also be 
shaped by their intersubjective understanding about what constitutes a legitimate 
political choice, which, in turn, produces/reproduces the EU political arena (Risse- 
Kappen: 1996:56).18 Thus shared beliefs and understanding about EU collective 
governance not only limits conceivable or acceptable policy options but also 
contributes to the creation of novel forms of governance.
That said, however, a qualification needs to be made about the extent to 
which EU governance embodies shared values among policy actors. Simon Bulmer 
argues that ‘culture’ in the EU context is likely to be shared procedural norms which 
should not be conflated with shared political culture embedded within the national
18 Risse-Kappen (1996) suggests that, although ideas can also be used in an instrumental way to 
legitimise policies motivated by purely material interests, instrumental use of ideas works best when 
there is an established consensus among actors about their value.
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context (Rhenish or Anglo-Saxon capitalism, for example) (Bulmer, 1994:372).19 
Being a relatively recent phenomenon, the EU only amounts to an aggregation of 
different political cultures. However, precisely because of its heterogeneous 
composition, the EU requires convincing policy concepts and their interpretations 
around which actors’ expectations can converge (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 
1999:275). EU actors come from different national settings and traditions, and in that 
sense, the negotiation of Community policies involves a competition between those 
actors who try to introduce what they consider to be the most appropriate mode of 
governance. But it is still possible to delineate prevailing sets of ideas that become 
predominant at different points of time. Thus while the EU lacks fundamental 
principles in the sense of a preconceived blueprint, actors in the course of engaging 
in multilateral negotiation processes develop a common discourse that provides a 
framework for consensus (W.Wallace, 2000).1 The most notable example of this is 
the shift in the 1980s towards the widespread acceptance of neo-liberalism and the 
decline of the European model of the welfare state as the basis for pushing European 
integration forwards, although liberal market-building doctrines are not 
unambiguously dominant as a guiding concept in different policy sectors and among 
different actors (H. Wallace, 2000a). Neo-institutionalism would argue that actors 
accept this particular idea not just because of its potential for increasing material 
welfare but also because it is believed to be an appropriate governing framework at 
the European level.
Network Governance
The use of the ‘network’ metaphor has now become widespread across the social 
sciences. There is no complete agreement on what constitutes a network, although it 
is understood that a network is an open structure in which social relationships are 
constituted in a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature. Participants in networks 
typically share a common interest but networks have no common or central
19 An example of procedural norms in EU policy-making is a considerable emphasis placed on 
achieving consensus. This is evident in the fact that, even in areas o f Council decision-making where 
the treaty now allows majority voting, national governments put a premium on unanimous decisions as
43
organising principles (Axford and Huggins, 1999). The most comprehensive work to 
date on the network form of social organisation is probably that of Manuel Castells 
(2000a and b). His concept of the ‘network society’ is built on a sociological concern 
with the transformation of (mainly) advanced capitalist societies worldwide rather 
than European integration as such. However, Castells sees the EU as the clearest 
manifestation of what he calls ‘the network state’ developed as a response to the 
challenges of globalisation:
It is a state characterized by the sharing of authority... along a network. A 
network, by definition, has nodes, not a center. Nodes may be of different sizes, 
and may be linked by asymmetrical relationships in the network, so that the 
network state does not preclude the existence of political inequalities among its 
members... [R]egardless of these asymmetries, the various nodes of the 
European network state are interdependent on each other, so that no node, even 
the most powerful, can ignore the others, even the smallest, in the decision­
making process (2000: 363).
/ In the study of European integration much of the work done by political scientists has
/  centred on the phenomenon of policy networks. Policy networks describe structures
of governance involving national and supranational officials, interest groups, 
lobbyists and other specialists who are linked together by mutual dependencies 
through the pooling and/or exchange of information and resources. The image of 
networks depicts the highly segmented nature of EU policy making in which 
consultation, advice and technocratic rationality are means used by policymakers to 
cope with highly-developed and complex social regulations. Policy networks tend to 
‘spring up around specific EU policy sectors, marshalling technocratic expertise and 
seeking to shape policy options which are likely to be endorsed by political decision­
makers at the systemic level’ (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 23). Policy network 
research therefore provides empirical evidence that governing does not have to be 
about the popular notion of centralised direction within an encompassing authority.
they recognise the political costs of defeating any one of the member states too badly or too frequently 
(Mazey and Richardson, 1995).
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Rather, the emerging picture is that of opportunity structures opened up at the 
European level which may be exploited by interdependent but autonomous actors 
with differing interests and agendas but also with willingness to engage in joint 
problem-solving (Kohler-Koch, 1996).
There are institutionalised forums for such bargaining and coordinatiop/but 
compared to policy networks operating at the national level, the EU is characterised 
by more|informal and flexible^ networking (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999).20 This 
makes EU policy-making processes more unpredictable but at the same time 
relatively open for influence and access from affected interests, although it would be 
wrong to assume that the ability to take advantage of such opportunities is evenly
'distributed across different types of actors (Mazey and Richardson, 1995). For
,,
instance, it is generally the case that businesses are much better organised and 
resourced than groups representing labour, environmental or consumer interests when 
it comes to lobbying in Brussels.21
There are significant variations in the nature of policy networks and in some 
policy areas there may be no networks at all. Nevertheless, more and more policy 
areas appear to be showing a high degree of ‘group density’ in the sense that most of 
the interests have become organised and are active at the European level (Mazey and 
Richardson, 1995). Where a relevant policy network does not exist in a particular 
sector, the Commission has been active in helping to create and sustain European- 
level associations and interest groups, sometimes by providing direct or indirect 
funding (Mazey and Richardson, 1995:349). The integration of these societal actors 
into the decision process may be regarded as an attempt to mobilise support groups 
not only for certain policies but for the integration process as a whole, since 
participation in these networks involves recognition of the EU as a legitimate level of 
governance (Banchoff and Smith, 1999; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999). But the 
push for channels of access and influence has been as considerable as the pull by the
20 Policy networks are also a prevalent feature in national politics in which the administration needs to 
call on private actors to supplement technical knowledge and/or to avoid taking the blame for a 
contested issue by de-politicising it. These networks are called ‘policy communities’ and are said to be 
more stable and more tightly integrated than EU policy networks (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 22- 
23).
21 This tendency has led Michael Mann to call the EU as ‘primarily a capitalist state’ (1998:204). 
However, it should also be mentioned that the distribution of opportunity between producer and non­
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Commission (Wessels, 1997). Private groups, however, are by no means the only
significant actors in EU policy networks. Policy network research also points to the
intensive participation of ^ national governments and administration^ in both the
preparation and implementation stages in the EU policy cycle. Their presence is
manifest in the extensive substructure of Council and Commission committees and
working groups which ensure the flow of information about the diversity of national 
• • 00working practices. Far from being insulated from the reach of member state 
governments, EU policy networks in fact gain strength from being so closely 
integrated in the whole process of exchange of information, negotiating and 
bargaining (Kohler-Koch, 1996).
Network models are not always confined to sectoral analysis, and have been 
expanded to describe a general mode of governance (although issue-specific 
variations remain). In her work on the EU as constituting a network mode of 
governance, Kohler-Koch (1996, 1999) distinguishes four different ideal-types of 
governance: statism, corporatism, pluralism and network.23 Her analysis builds on the 
policy network model combined with the insights of neo-institutionalism about the 
ideational (as well as organisational) dimensions of governance. The above typology 
of governance is a classification based not only on structural properties of the 
political system but also on actors’ perception of legitimate organising principles. 
The latter relates to belief systems about what is appropriate and exemplary in the 
ways problems are solved, how conflicts are mediated and how public-private 
relations are organised. Accordingly, network governance rests on a shared, if 
diffuse, understanding among political, societal and economic actors that this 
particular mode of governance can ‘bridge the heterogeneity of the EC’s members 
and compensate for the lack of democratic accountability by introducing elements of
producer groups varies depending on different policy sectors and different stages of policy process 
(Mazey and Richardson, 1995).
22 An indicator of the growing importance of national participation in the sub-systemic level of 
decision-making is provided by Wessels’ study (1997) which presents a dramatic increase in recent 
years in the number of committee and working group sessions attended by national civil servants and 
Commission representatives. This trend is particularly noteworthy considering that policy preparation 
and implementation are areas which were originally earmarked as prerogatives of the Commission.
23 The four categories are characterised as follows: statism is based on majority rule and a dedication 
to a common collective purpose; corporatism incorporates competing social interests in a consensus 
formation for the common good; pluralism combines majority rule and the individualistic pursuit of 
interests; and network governance builds on self-interested actors who aim for pragmatic positive-sum 
solutions rather than pursuing a preconceived common good (Kohler-Koch, 1999).
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functional representation’ (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999: 275). Legitimacy in this 
context is sector-specific and output-oriented with particular emphasis on 
performance efficiency. This is described as ‘a post-sovereign political system in 
which the outcomes agreed justify the continuing collective input’ (W. Wallace, 
2000: 533).
When compared to other systems, the most obvious feature of a network 
system is that politics is not about unifying a community of citizens in order to 
achieve the common good but of managing differentiation. This is a feature 
particularly evident in the case of the EU. In contrast to political systems where 
politics is based on the notion of common identity which is given expression through 
the pursuit of collective purpose, the network form of policy-making is characterised 
by actors’ voluntary participation and their recognition about the plurality of 
interests. Affected interests engage in collective decision-making based on the 
assumption that institutionalised cooperation may turn into mutual benefit for its 
participants despite differing interests and preferences (Kohler-Koch, 1996: 195). 
Political relations therefore depend more on pragmatic consensus than on affective 
commitment (H. Wallace, 2000: 63). Nevertheless, actors are not solely motivated by 
rational calculation, as bargaining is more about the distribution of benefits in joint 
problem-solving rather than simply enhancing individual gains. The EU political 
system, therefore, is ‘a negotiating system which embraces Community institutions 
as well as economic and social actors and defines the role of the ‘state’ ... not as the 
apex of a decision-making hierarchy, but as a mediator in the common endeavour to 
come to terms with competing interests and an activator pushing for designing 
common policies’ (Kohler-Koch, 1999: 18). Governing thus involves bringing 
together the relevant actors of society who are then tied up in dense and highly 
interwoven networks of interaction through which they reach agreement. Underlying 
this system is a question of recognition whereby ‘an increasing range of actors has 
come to acknowledge the EU as an appropriate framework for politics, alongside and 
not in place of national and subnational levels of government’ (Banchoff and Smith, 
1999:12).
It is worth recalling Castells’s formulation of a ‘network state’ (2000b) in 
which power is asymmetrically distributed across various nodes within a network. 
The ‘network governance’ model conveys little sense of political contestation and
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power, but in actual fact actors involved in EU policy networks are far from equal. 
As has been mentioned above, business lobbyists are much better represented in 
Brussels than interest groups in such areas as, for example, environment or consumer 
protection (Walby, 1999). Inequalities also exist between EU institutions, where the 
Commission and the Council (one might also add the European Court of Justice) 
have the upper hand over the European Parliament in shaping the contours of the EU 
polity. Not only do national governments still retain much decision-making capacity 
(in the form of the Council and intergovernmental treaties), but there are important 
differences of power among the member states, although the hierarchy of power 
varies in different policy sectors (Castells, 2000b). One is reminded here of the re- 
emergence of the idea of a European ‘centre of gravity’ which is often discussed in 
conjunction with an acknowledgement that historically Franco-German cooperation 
was one of the most important factors in moving European integration forward (see 
Fischer, 2000). The point that the network model pays insufficient attention to the 
issues of material power and politics can also be made with regard to ‘new 
governance’ theories in general (van Apeldoom et al. 2003). However, there is no 
reason to assume these theories cannot be combined with other approaches which 
could supplement those shortcomings. In this connection, one author underlines the 
continuing utility of intergovemmentalism: ‘For all its empirical and descriptive 
limitations ... the enduring insight of the intergovemmentalist position is that the 
question of the authority of governance mechanisms cannot ultimately be finessed by 
appeals to non-political criteria’ such as functionality, efficiency, or actors’ 
intersubjective understanding about their interests and identity (Bromley, 2001:301).
Concluding remarks
The aim of this chapter was to draw a broad outline of the EU as a political system. 
The chapter underlined the necessity to go beyond the intergovernmental- 
supranational divide in conceptualising European integration. It also tried to highlight 
the significance of the ‘governance turn’ (Rosamond, 2000) in EU theoretical 
literature which demonstrates that political authority and accountability can be shared 
and dispersed in a complex multi-level, multi-issue policy-making system. The idea 
of the new governance model is not just an analytical tool for academic debates but
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also a political concept which has found expression in the EU’s own governance 
a  discourse. A recent White Paper on European Governance states: ‘the Union cannot 
\  develop and deliver policy in the same way as a national government; it must build 
partnerships and rely on a wide variety of actors’ (CEC, 2001c:32). Similarly, in his 
elaboration of ‘network Europe’, the current Commission president Romano Prodi 
stresses that EU governance involves an interaction between multiple levels of the 
exercise of power, and the involvement of non-governmental actors in the policy­
making process. His idea of governance is that it comprises a partnership between 
‘EU institutions, national governments, regional and local authorities and civil 
society interacting in new ways: consulting one another on a whole range of issues, 
shaping, implementing and monitoring policy together’.24
However, the ‘new governance’ analyses also accept that the present state 
may represent an ‘unstable equilibrium’ and therefore may change in the long term. It 
is worth emphasising that the new mode of governance emerging at the EU level co­
exists with existing patterns of governance at the national and sub-national level. The 
EU was created in a context of established state authority, a n d \iational states 
continue to have considerable reserves of loyaljy along with extensive organisational 
and financial resources. Therefore, to note the flexible and plural nature of EU 
governance is merely to suggest that competition among different modes of 
I governance and complex patterns of overlap within the EU are likely to continue.
To draw a preliminary conclusion, different theories of political integration 
help to situate the development of EU cultural policy in the context of evolving 
political constellations. If the EU represents a new pattern of political configurations 
quite distinct from that of the nation-state, there may be no necessary co-relations 
between political integration and cultural integration. In this regard, recent studies of 
EU governance provide valuable conceptual tools in analysing the relationship 
between culture and polity. In the context of the foregoing discussion, I would now 
like to specify four points which will be elaborated throughout the rest of the thesis:
24 Speech by Romano Prodi ‘Towards a European civil society’, 6 April 2000, downloaded from 
<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/questen.ksh7reslist>
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1. The theoretical orientation of this study is consistent with neo-institutionalism in 
that it focuses on how different ideas about European culture and identity are 
developed and promoted through specific institutional (formal and informal) 
practices.
2. The rise of a neoliberal agenda in the 1980s and 1990s as one of the underlying 
principles in European integration has had an important structuring effect for 
subsequent developments in EU cultural policies.
The manner in which EU cultural policies came to be organised since the 1990s 
can be characterised as constituting a form of network governance.
4. Although the process of European integration is quite different from nation- or 
state-building processes, the EU official discourse continues to give expression to 
the quasi-nationalist, ethno-cultural understanding of ‘European-ness’.
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CHAPTER 2 
Culture and the nation-state
My argument in the previous chapter was that European integration is not exactly 
analogous to the processes of national integration. Yet, growing concern with the 
EU’s democratic deficit in the past decade has led many in academic and political 
circles to draw a parallel between the construction of a European demos and the 
nation-building process. The underlying assumption is that European political 
integration requires at least a certain level of cultural unity as the basis of social 
solidarity. The main theme of this chapter is to problematise this assumption which is 
implicated in the idealised model of the nation-state. In the first section, I will review 
literature on nationalism with the aim of highlighting the dynamic nature of the 
processes of nation-formation that include many tensions and inconsistencies. This 
will be followed by an observation about how the analyses of nations and national 
cultures can inform the study of European cultural integration in different ways. The 
last section will be a brief review of developments in the cultural policies of the EU 
member states, which provide a contextualisation for the examination of various EU 
cultural programmes in subsequent chapters.
At this point, and before moving on to a closer look at the configurations of 
national culture, something needs to be said about a host of different meanings 
ascribed to the term ‘culture’. Culture is a notoriously nebulous term, and many 
discussions about culture have been confused by the inability of theorists to agree on 
a common definition. In his many writings on the subject, Raymond Williams 
distinguished four main strands of meaning. The first refers to the ‘process of 
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development’ of individuals and is derived by 
metaphor from earlier definitions concerning the cultivation of the land, crops, and 
animals (1983:90). A second usage indicates a general process of social development 
or culture as a universal process, which is more less analogous to modem definitions 
of ‘civilisation’. In the third, more recent definition, culture denotes ‘the works and 
practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ (1983:90). This is the 
definition most commonly associated with aesthetic and literary traditions which 
constitute the main target of modem cultural policy.
51
Fourth, there is an anthropological understanding of culture that can be 
described as ‘a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group or 
humanity in general’ (Williams, 1983:90; 1981). It was Herder and the German 
romantic movement that first popularised the usage of ‘cultures’ in the plural so that 
the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods are recognised and 
clearly differentiated from a unilinear sense of ‘civilisation’(Steinmetz, 1999). The 
idea of coherent and organic cultural units, each embodying a distinct, whole ‘way of 
life’, is closely bound up with the discourse of nationalism and national culture. It 
pictures the space of culture primarily in terms of a series of separate ‘cultures’, with 
the interactions between them being of secondary importance. Williams’ own 
position initially favoured this holistic model as a way of challenging the elitist 
connotations of the other three meanings of culture, although his vision of cultural 
community was articulated along class, not ethnic or national, divisions (Couldry, 
2000). The romantic model of culture has been very influential in social science, but 
at the same time has been subject to much criticism for its nostalgic tendency to 
idealise a lost cultural wholeness in which culture is essentialised and almost 
naturalised. Another problem with the anthropological concept of culture is that it 
can be too expansive for it literally encompasses everything and as a result loses its
- i c  • * • *value as an analytical category (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Williams in his later 
writings sought to overcome both these problems by positing the definition of culture 
as: ‘the signifying system through which ... a social order is communicated, 
reproduced, experienced and explored’ (Williams, 1981:13). The notion of culture 
conceived in this way retains distinctions between that which is first and foremost 
about meaning and signification and that which is principally not, without the 
trappings of essentialism. From this perspective, what defines culture rests very
25 The problem of stretching the definition has become even more complicated by a recent ‘cultural 
turn’ in social theory, which either focuses on an unprecedented increase in the importance assigned 
to culture (advertising, design, etc.) in contemporary society or on the role of culture as universally 
constitutive of diverse social phenomena (Giddens’ structuration theory) (Nash, 2001; Steinmetz, 
1999). The sociological/ cultural strand of new institutionalism reviewed in Chapter 1 belongs to the 
latter approach. But my understanding of ‘culture’ in this chapter is narrower than the general and 
broad usage favoured by most studies influenced by the cultural turn. See Williams’ revised definition 
above.
26 For instance, activities such as film-making and cinema-going are socio-economic activities but they 
are distinguishable from the production and consumption of commodities that function mainly as 
means rather than ends in themselves, such as transport systems.
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much on a question of degree, ‘a question of balance between its functional and 
communicative aspects’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2002:12). All of the above meanings of 
culture have their relevance to the present chapter, and they constitute a useful 
reference point as we proceed with our discussion.
Nationalism and culture
If a simple distinction can be drawn between state-formation and nation-formation, it 
could be that the former is mainly concerned with the building of a body of law and 
public institutions, etc. whereas the latter is more of a cultural process (McCrone, 
1998; Wintle, 1996: 17-18), although of course these two spheres often overlap with 
and reinforce each other. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the theories of 
European integration, largely drawn from International Relations and political 
science literature, offer many valuable insights into the issues of political integration, 
but do not specifically address as their central concern how culture shapes, and is 
shaped by, that process. It is in an attempt to fill this theoretical gap that we now turn 
to the studies of nationalism. A caveat here is that I would not be able to do justice to 
the theoretical complexities of the literature on nationalism within the scope of this 
chapter, and neither would it be possible to take account of various elements 
involved in the rise and spread of nationalism. Accordingly my discussion will be 
mostly confined to examining the way in which the nation-state and nationalism 
embody particular constellations of culture and politics.
A good starting point for such a task is provided by Ernest Gellner’s work 
Nations and Nationalism (1983). His central thesis is that the formation of nation­
states is the inevitable outcome of processes of industrialisation and its concomitant 
complex division of labour. Whereas in agrarian societies the main source of 
collective identity was one’s place in a given, relatively fixed social structure, 
industrialisation and its attendant rapid social changes elevated the importance of 
‘culture’, understood here as the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a 
given community, which replaces structure as the provider of identity. This is so 
because social mobility and the context-less forms of communication required by 
industrial order demand social units to be large and yet culturally homogeneous. Thus 
‘culture’ requires standardisation over wide areas and needs to be maintained and
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serviced by centralised agencies in the form of an overarching system of education 
using a standardised linguistic medium. As the state is the only organisation large and 
powerful enough to sustain such a system, the state becomes a protector of culture, 
providing its ‘political roof. This process then brings about an inevitable ‘deep 
adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture’, leading to ‘the 
organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous 
groups’ (Ibid.: 35), with a consequence that ‘Modem man is not loyal to a monarch 
or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture’ (Ibid.:36).
Gellner’s particular usage of the term culture mostly refers to a literate, 
standardised, ‘high’ culture - ‘garden’ or ‘cultivated’ culture in his own terms, which 
is contrasted to ‘wild’ or ‘savage’ culture of premodem times. His point is that 
nationalism, contrary to nationalists’ self-presentation, is not founded upon the 
affirmation of premodem folk culture. In fact, its basic operation depends on a self- 
deception:
nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, 
where previously low culture had taken up the lives of the majority, and in 
some cases the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of 
a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of 
a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the 
establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually 
substitutable atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture 
of this kind, in place of the previous complex structure of local groups, 
sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the 
micro-groups themselves. That is what really happens (1983:57, emphasis in 
original).
So what happens to the many ‘wild’ cultures that are not elevated to the status of 
state-sponsored culture? According to Gellner, they would either be assimilated into 
an overarching official culture or would secede and seek their own political roof. 
Partly because the industrialisation process is uneven, fault lines develop between 
those who have been socialised into the new culture and those who, while living in 
the same country, speak a markedly different dialect or a language, or between the
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new dominant culture and those who adhere to cultural practices that have withstood 
the tidal wave of modernisation (Dunkerley et al, 2002). Culturally plural societies 
are ruled out under the conditions of modernity: ‘Nowadays people can live only in 
units defined by a shared culture... Genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable 
under current conditions’ (Gellner, 1983: 55).
Gellner’s work has been enormously influential, and puts forward a powerful 
explanation of nationalism that ties in culture, the state and the modes of production. 
But his theory is not without its weak points, and has been criticised for, among other 
things, its structural determinism and over-reliance on functionalist explanation, his 
neglect of nationalism’s vital connection with democracy and politics in general 
(O’Leary, 1998), or its failure to account for the emotive aspect of nationalism and 
why the masses should willingly follow modernising imperatives and be assimilated 
by all-powerful national cultural organisations (Smith, 1998). The most problematic 
in the context of the present discussion, perhaps, is that his theory too readily 
assumes as a norm a culturally homogeneous nation whose boundary is co-terminus 
with the state. The factual state of affairs is that national cultures are far from 
homogeneous, nor is the congruence between culture and the state as neat as Gellner 
suggests (McCrone, 1998; Smith, 1998). Although Gellner recognises this difficulty 
in addressing the problem of ‘entropy-resistant’ traits, the main thrust of his theory 
overemphasises the rigidity of culture and as a consequence plays down the 
significance of various sources of differentiation within national cultures. An 
important perspective which is left out here is that boundary-drawing entails the 
mechanisms of exclusion as well as inclusion, a process in which certain ethnicities, 
religions, languages and regions are accommodated by the state while others are 
marginalised or rejected as insufficiently national.
Closely related to this is Gellner’s lack of attention to the need for a 
continued reproduction of cultural boundaries. His assertions seem to suggest that, 
once nationally-codified cultural canons are established and their dissemination 
mechanisms (education system) are in place, a standardised national culture would 
take on an autonomously homogenising role. There is no doubt that historically there 
have been attempts to incorporate a broader populace into a nationally sanctioned 
‘high’ culture. But the struggle for inclusion is an ongoing battle which cultural 
authorities cannot always control. As Schlesinger points out, we need to analytically
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separate the questions of how a national culture is first constituted and how it persists 
through time. This requires a viewpoint that problematises national culture ‘and 
interrogates the strategies and mechanisms whereby it is maintained and its role in 
securing the dominance of given groups in a society’ (1987: 244).
If Gellner’s theory is overtly structuralist, Hobsbawm and his colleagues’ 
work on ‘invented traditions’ puts more emphasis on politics and political agents. 
The traditions Hobsbawm focuses on were ‘a set of practices, normally governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature’, devised by elites 
to inculcate among the masses ‘certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with the past’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). This 
includes the national anthem, the national flag, monuments and festivals. According 
to Hobsbawm, the practices of inventing traditions reached its apogee just before the 
first world war, that is, between 1870 and 1914. As the state’s relations with its 
subjects or citizens as individuals increasingly became intrusive and direct, the older 
forms of stratified social hierarchies were transformed, undermining the older 
devices by which their legitimacy had been maintained. And especially with the 
extension of political enfranchisement, some sort of mechanisms had to be ‘invented’ 
to maintain social cohesion by means of creating a sense of ‘continuity with a 
suitable historic past’. (1983: 1)
Thus if this particular period witnessed a flurry of activities that instituted 
various public ceremonies and public monuments, such practices are fundamentally 
bound up with the increased public management of the economy and society (the 
expansion of state bureaucracy, centralised education systems, etc.) which went hand 
in hand with the spread of mass politics, and this is where state, nation and society 
converged (1983: 265). Or, to borrow Gellner’s phrase, this is where a deep 
adjustment between polity and culture took place. Of particular interest here is the 
term ‘invention’ which conveys a sense of deliberate manipulation by political elites 
who have the power to create, or even fabricate, cultural traditions. This is at odds 
with Hobsbawm’s own admission that invented symbols tend to be more readily 
accepted when they are grounded in pre-existing cultural resources, which implies 
that culture is not as malleable as he himself suggests. It also raises a question as to 
whether ideological manipulation consciously programmed by the elites could 
actually prompt a desired reaction on the part of the masses. Again, what is missing
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is a view on culture as an object and product of contention. Hobsbawm may have 
gone a little too far in his attack on essentialism, but his work has an important 
implication for a conceptualisation of culture that does not rely on an exclusive focus 
on the authenticity and continuity of national cultural traditions and points towards 
the importance of recognising the changing meanings and functions of symbolic 
elements.
The point that culture cannot be pinned down to a fixed set of (inherent) 
commonalities can also be found in Deutsch’s model of national and transnational 
integration (see Chapter 1) which identifies cohesive communities by the ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘complementarity’ of their distinct communication networks. In his formulation, 
what counts in the definition of the membership of a nation is not cultural uniformity 
but ‘mutual compatibility’: ‘the ability to communicate more efficiently, and over a 
wide range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders’ (1966: 
97). Political institutions encourage community because they foster communication 
facilities that ensure such complementarity. Therefore, for Deutsch, the case of the 
Swiss nation (and its linguistic divisions) represented a formidable example that 
attests to the validity of his theory rather than, as Gellner believed, constituting an 
anomaly. However, as Schlesinger (1987) notes, the fundamental problem here is that 
this approach postulates the model of cultural integration so open and so relative that 
it offers no criteria of boundedness - it could refer to a village, a nation, or indeed, 
given the presence of sufficient communication facilities, the entire world.
The last point about boundedness is addressed by Anderson (1983) who 
adopts a similar but more sociologically oriented approach than Deutsch. In his now 
famous formulation, Anderson proposes that communities are ‘to be distinguished, 
not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ 
(1983:6). Anderson develops a complex argument starting from macrohistorical 
changes - the decline of universal religions and dynasties and the changing 
conception of time, all of which lay the foundation for a novel way of 
conceptualising collective solidarity. But it was not until the advent of print 
capitalism that such a distinctively modem style of imagining became possible. Or, in 
other words, it is the ‘half-fortuitous interplay’ between capitalism, print technology 
and the fatal diversity of languages which set the stage for the modem nation, as it 
created print language, which constitutes ‘unified fields of exchange and
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communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars’ (Ibid.: 44). The 
nation, therefore, is a particular kind of cultural entity which is imagined as limited 
because it cannot in principle extend to all humanities and has finite boundaries. It is 
also imagined as a community because it is based on feelings of ‘deep, horizontal 
comradeship’ that persist regardless of inequality and exploitation within particular 
nations (Ibid:7). Anderson then sets out to trace several distinctive paths to the 
‘imagined community’, and devotes his attention to various mechanisms and 
practices - of which the novel and the newspaper are accorded particular significance 
- that contributed to these processes. Through those mechanisms nations are endowed 
with a real, palpable existence, grounded in everyday life. Hence the abstract unity 
becomes taken-for-granted frames of reference experienced through mundane rituals 
(such as reading a newspaper) whereby national identity is ingrained upon 
unreflexive forms o f ‘common sense’ (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002).
In my view, one of the most valuable insights offered by Anderson is that his 
theory directs our attention to the issues of representation - how the nation is 
represented, and how this is intimately connected to people’s subjective 
understanding of the world (Eley and Suny, 1996). This position clearly conjoins 
with the constructivist approach to EU studies that focuses on the intersubjective 
making of social reality (see Chapter 1). Culture is not only an objective reality 
expressed in visible characteristics, but consists in what people perceive as reality. 
This is of course not to suggest that culture has no actual substance and is nothing but 
the imagination of some people. But instead of regarding culture as only identifiable 
by a list of characteristics, the emphasis on the conceptual component of culture 
allows us to recognise the significance of the discursive dimension of nationalism. 
Ways of thinking about social solidarity and collective identity play a crucial role in 
drawing and maintaining group boundaries. The world view prescribed by 
nationalism, which represents people as divided into culturally discrete nation-states 
and naturalises our attachments to our nation, has become so pervasive that it is 
difficult to conceptualise other modes of belonging. It is this general imbrication of 
nationalism discourse in our everyday life that gives nationalism at least part of its 
power (Billig: 1995, Calhoun, 1997). On this reading, the coherence of national 
society and the congruence between the nation (culture) and the state (politics) exist 
to the extent that people’s self-understanding is organised around the cultural framing
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of nationalism. Anderson’s view on the constitution of national culture seems quite 
close to Williams’s definition of culture as a system of signification.
The implications of this theory is that social realities are not fixed or given 
but unstable, changeable and contestable. This is a terrain which has been well 
explored by cultural studies. For example, Stuart Hall (1996) conceives of the nation 
as a system of cultural representation, and argues that, instead of thinking about 
cultural identity as an accomplished fact, we should think of it as always in process 
and constituted within representations. Although Anderson himself does not push the 
argument so far as to insist that social realities do not exist outside representations, 
his account shares the weakness of other ‘social constructivist’ approaches which 
tend to downplay the realm of material interest and power. This is one of the reasons 
why his theory can explain the way in which new kinds of ideas about the way 
communities should be organised are generated, but does not explain how and why 
these cultural frameworks gain social and political salience (Breuilly, 1996). This 
reminds us of a common problem with other theories of nationalism that devote 
much attention to how the nation is first constituted but do not address the question 
of how a national culture continues to be reproduced and maintained. To say that 
cultural identity only exists within (not outside) representations may be an 
overstatement, but if, as Anderson’s theory suggests, the formation of cultural 
communities depends on mental constructs of individuals, their stability must be 
ensured by political and institutional mooring (Brubaker: 1996).
The above theories posit that the conditions of national identity and culture 
arose in processes of institutional development that enable a sense of shared loyalties 
to take shape - that is, the creation of standardised institutions, whether centralised 
apparatuses of government or a comprehensive system of communications. Because 
those structural properties belong to modernity, those perspectives view nation- 
formation as a distinctively modem phenomenon. In contrast to this ‘modernist’ 
position, Smith (1991; 1998) stresses that we need to understand the premodem 
origins of nations to see how and why certain nationalisms flourish in the modem 
era. The main argument advanced here is that, rather than simply ‘inventing’ national 
cultures, nationalist movements draw on elements of pre-existing cultures of core 
ethnic groups. He holds that there have been two main routes to nationhood in 
Europe: bureaucratic incorporation and vernacular mobilisation. The former is
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characterised by countries such as France and England where the state has developed 
over centuries during which the mass of the population was gradually assimilated 
into the culture of the dominant ethnic group. The latter, characteristic of central-east 
Europe, is marked by the process whereby an ethnic group is mobilised by (non-state) 
elites drawing on myths and traditions appropriated from the pre-existing ethnic 
culture. It is because of this continuity and historical embeddedness that the nation is 
capable of evoking powerful expressions of belonging. This ‘ethno-symbolist’ 
approach provides persuasive accounts of why the idea of the nation has a popular 
resonance and addresses affective problems that are not sufficiently explored by other 
theorists such as Gellner and Hobsbawm.
In addition, ethno-symbolism also highlights the persistence of cultural 
divisions within nations whose recurring contestation about descent, history, culture 
and territory offer alternative visions of nationhood and community. The ‘modernist’ 
authors, in envisaging a fundamental break between premodem and modem forms of 
social organisation, have a tendency to reify modernity and as a result portray nation- 
formation in ‘quasi-teleological terms as a progressive permeation of all classes and 
sectors’, which is seen to create a total, unitary society that controls economic, 
cultural and political frontiers (Hutchinson, 2001: 75). On the other hand, however, 
the emphasis placed by Smith and other ethno-symbolists on the continuity of 
premodem cultural traditions embodied in collective memory tends to play down 
innovative and more contemporary formulations of culture. While not denying the 
continuing hold of national (and ethnic) collective memories on our cognition and 
emotion, it is important to recognise that both the form and contents of cultural units 
could go through various changes depending on historical and social conditions.
Taken together, theories of nationalism illuminate different facets of nation- 
formation from different angles, and offer valuable insights into the ways the nation 
came to represent a certain constellation of culture and politics in the modem age. 
One of their main theoretical disagreements revolves around the issue of how much 
political action is needed to transform a segmented and disunited population into a 
larger collectivity, and whether potential cultural communities precede such 
interventions (Eley and Suny, 1996). However, my main concern in this chapter is 
not whether cultural integration preceded political integration or vice versa in the 
formation of the nation-state. Rather, what I have been trying to emphasise is the
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closely intermingled and mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between 
culture and politics both on material and discursive levels which is at the heart of the 
constitution of national society. I have also tried to draw attention to the oft-forgotten 
fact that even established nations with their supposed cultural unity do have a 
plurality of different, sometimes conflicting representations about themselves. The 
harmonious notion of national cultural unity is necessarily compromised by the 
actualities of social fragmentation, class divisions, gender and ethnic exclusions, and 
hierarchies and relations of power (Calhoun, 1999). This means that the nation and 
national culture do not arise painlessly from consensual reflection on a naturally 
homogeneous culture, but is shaped in complex ways which embody conflicts and 
tensions and in conditions of contest between different political and social as well as 
cultural interests (Cubitt, 1998).
The implication of the above is that the process of nation-formation is never 
entirely complete, since the boundaries and nature of a national community are not 
static but routinely re-negotiated. In the words of Eley and Suny, ‘What looks from 
outside and from a distance as a bounded group appears much more divided and 
contested at closer range. Culture is more often not what people share, but what they 
choose to fight over’ (1996: 9). Following Brubaker (1992; 1996) who maintains 
that, rather than asking what the substance of a nation is, we should look at how 
particular cultural idioms of that nation are activated and reinforced in a specific 
institutional setting, I am proposing an analysis of EU cultural policies that centres on 
a question of how particular visions of European-ness are articulated and 
institutionalised as policy practices. Although national culture and identity may not 
be as ‘fluid’ as some postmodernist authors would argue, emphasising the changeable 
and contestable aspect of culture has a particular utility in the study of European 
integration which, as a ‘cultural project’, is very much in its nascent stage and whose 
future direction still remains unclear.
European demos and the problems of cultural integration
Given the pervasiveness of the discourse of nationalism, it should come as no 
surprise that many debates about the present stage and the future direction of 
European integration are also framed in the language of nationalism and nation-
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building (Schmitter, 1996). The overwhelming concern with culture and identity in 
the European context has so far centred on the plausibility and requisiteness of 
Europe as a ‘demos’, i.e. a political community with the potential for democratic self- 
governance as expressed in the concept of the modem nation (Zum, 2000). As one 
author put it, the ‘politicization of integration and its extension into sensitive political 
space necessities renewed attention to questions of community-building and the 
affective dimension of integration’ (Laffan, 1996:83). The implicit assumption is that 
jEurope requires its demos without which the EU would not be able to overcome its 
crisis of legitimacy, and this problem is thought to be inextricably linked with a 
shared identity and culture. This is also reflected in the thinking of many EU elites, 
who seem to believe that in order to create a Europe-wide political order the EU must 
first and foremost constitute itself culturally (Shore, 2000). At the basis of such an 
assumption lies a tacit understanding that national homogeneity provides the basis of 
legitimation for the state, and the nation-state the basis and articulation of national 
identity. It is the politically charged nature of ‘cultural identity’ that is underlined by 
those debates (Hedetoft, 1997).
In the context of discussing the possibility for the emergence of a European 
demos, Lars-Erik Cederman (2001) identifies four different approaches to the 
question of supranational identity formation combining theories of nationalism and 
European integration. I discuss his classification in some detail as it neatly 
categorises the theoretical literature examined so far along the culture-polity axis in 
relation to the EU. As each of the four categories consists of theories derived from 
very different intellectual traditions and does not constitute a coherent approach, it 
would be more accurate to treat Cederman’s taxonomy as overlapping interpretive 
frameworks rather than the classification of distinct theoretical positions.
The first category is represented by th e^ th no-symbqlist^approach to 
nationalism. Although Smith’s culture-driven account leaves room for political 
intervention, its emphasis on the existence of the ethnic core in national identity 
formation significantly limits the extent of cultural ‘invention’. With respect to 
European integration, Smith maintains that we can trace a diffuse sense of European 
identity based on a European ‘family of cultures’ - Roman law, democracy, Judaeo- 
Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism, etc. But since the European Union crucially 
lacks the emotional anchoring of historical memories of community which formed
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the basis of successful nationalisms, the EU officials’ attempt to furnish European 
cultural identity ‘from above’ is unlikely to find popular resonance, if not downright 
impossible (Smith, 1997). This position is broadly compatible with traditional forms 
of intergovemmentalism in European integration studies which underline the ‘logic 
of diversity’ (as opposed to the neofunctionalist ‘logic of spillover’) embedded in 
‘the weight of geography and history’ (Hoffmann, 1966: 868). Stretching this line of 
reasoning a little further, one may add to this category the ‘no Demos’ thesis made 
famous by the decision of the German Constitutional Court concerning the 
Maastricht Treaty ratification which, put in crude terms, applied the organic-cultural 
notion of Volk to Europe and declared the non-existence of a European demos (see 
Weiler, 1997b).
Contrary to the first, the second perspective does not just posit that the 
politico-cultural bond of the nation-state is historically contingent but actively 
advocates the separation of cultural and political identities. This is best exemplified 
by the ^lyper-rationalisty^pproach (Schlesinger, 1997) of Habermas who argues in 
favour of overarching civic values detached from national cultural traditions as a 
common denominator for a Europe-wide ‘constitutional patriotism’. To the extent 
that appropriate mechanisms required for a European public sphere (citizenship, 
transnational political discourse, etc.) are in place, European identity transcending the 
nation-state is a distinct possibility (Habermas, 1992). As this approach is predicated 
on political values, full cultural assimilation (or integration) is not required. Rather 
than approximating culture-politics configuration of the nation-state model, 
therefore, constitutional patriotism entails a qualitative transformation of political 
membership.
This argument in some sense taps into the distinction made between civic and 
ethnic nationalisms. Habermas’s proposal is basically the idealisation of the civic 
model transferred to the transnational level, while leaving unquestioned the 
presumption that the basis of cultural community ‘naturally’ resides in the nation 
(Calhoun, 2002). Empirically, most nationalisms combine the elements of both, and 
considering the increasingly politicised nature of cultural identities in contemporary 
society, the post-nationalist appeal to the de-coupling of the two organising principles 
of the nation-state raises a question as to whether a political community 
masquerading as culturally neutral may in fact end up suppressing cultural
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differences and potential rival claims (Kraus, 2003). Within integration theories, this 
culturally sanitised model is implicitly affirmed by classical neofunctionalism which 
viewed European integration as proceeding according to rationalist logic eventually 
leading to a supranational political unity. Along similar lines, Cederman classifies 
Hobsbawm’s ‘invention of tradition’ theory in this post-nationalist approach. 
However, while predicting the demise of the nation-state in a globalising world 
(1990), Hobsbawm is elsewhere sceptical about the prospects for the consolidation of 
popular allegiance to the EU, concluding that ‘Europe will remain “a Europe of 
nations’” (1997:274).
Third, there are pan-nationalists who apply essentialist, Herderian notions of 
culture not to European nation-states but to Europe itself. The assumption of this 
approach is that Europe is a unique cultural entity whose essence nevertheless lies 
dormant. To establish European supernational (not supranational) identity, therefore, 
all that is needed is to activate those latent cultural commonalities. This approach is 
most prominently advocated by Denis de Rougemont (see Chapter 5), but is also 
shared by some traditional Euro-federalists.
Finally, the fourth approach, which Cederman terms ‘bounded integration’, 
emphasises the stability of national identities upheld by institutional mechanisms. 
Cultural communities may be constructed in politically driven processes, but through 
various institutional practices of identity maintenance those identities become 
resilient to change. Among theories of nationalism this perspective is exemplified by 
Gellner’s account on the role of state-organised education in establishing and 
maintaining national culture. In addition to national education systems there are 
obviously other identity-conferring mechanisms such as various forms of 
communication media (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995; Deutsch, 1966; Schlesinger, 
1987). To be clear, the ‘bounded integration’ approach does not in principle preclude 
the possibility of European identity construction via the EU. After all, the implication 
of Gellner’s thesis is that a ‘post-industrial’ world, or one in which fewer people 
were employed in heavy industry, would be a post-national world, which may entail 
possibilities for supranational identity formation as demanded by a globalising 
economy (Calhoun, 1997: 80). But the crucial difference with post-nationalists is 
that, because of its emphasis on the institutional equilibrium of the nation-state, the 
bounded integration approach posits much more demanding conditions for
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supranational integration. Although Cederman does not explicitly spell it out, this 
approach clearly corresponds to the theoretical premise of new institutionalism in 
European integration studies described in Chapter 1.
As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, all the above strands of theoretical 
perspectives have bearings on the study of EU cultural policies as each of them 
features recurrently in EU discourse in which different and competing meanings of 
Europe and Europeanness find their expression. The theoretical orientation of the 
present study is broadly in line with the bounded integration approach in that its 
focus lies on the institutionalisation of culture, but there is one qualification to be 
made with regard to this particular approach. Cederman’s own position holds that 
‘bounded integration’ is the most promising approach not just as an analytical tool 
for an academic enquiry but also as a realistic option for actual attempts at identity 
construction (which means that he is implicitly advocating the construction of 
Europe-wide identity-conferring institutions). As with other studies premised on a 
view that a European demos is desirable in order to redress the EU’s democratic 
deficit, Cederman’s account tends to put too much weight on the unity and coherence 
of putative common culture and therefore fails to problematise the role of culture as 
the basis of European solidarity and legitimacy. The argument concerning cultural 
integration then hinges on an opposition between the presence and absence of 
‘common culture’, and how to create cultural commonality. Putting aside normative 
concern about the necessity of a European demos, this starting point is misleading, 
because it obscures the ambivalent and contentious nature of European discourse 
which is not just about unity and inclusion, but is also about the strategies of 
exclusion and the construction of difference which operate internally as well as 
externally (Delanty, 1995). Culture may be integrative, but it may also be 
disintegrative at the same time. Treating culture simply as a social glue leaves out an 
important aspect in (re)drawing of cultural boundaries, that is, specific interests and 
social circumstances involved in legitimising certain boundary markers over others 
(Wicker, 1997).
Connected to the above is that Cederman’s taxonomy tends to conceive of 
identity formation in ‘either-or terms’ - either national or supranational identity, 
presumably because ‘common culture’ must be located in one or the other, 
replicating the problematic dichotomy of supranational-national division in the EU
65
debate. Common membership of a cultural community may be one source of 
solidarity, but hardly the only one. There are many ways in which collective identities 
are constructed and maintained, although one of the most prominent identity-markers 
in modem times is arguably culture. Functional integration, concrete social networks 
and mutual engagement in the public sphere are also sources or dimensions of 
solidarity, which could co-exist with national forms of social organisation with 
varying degrees of salience (Calhoun, 2002). The question of how collective 
identities are constructed, therefore, is as much about the existence of cultural 
commonalities as with how some of the many possible features that can be used for 
group definition are selected and given social meaning (Benda-Beckmann and 
Verkuyten, 1995: 18). My contention is that, if we pose the idea of unified national 
culture as the only standard against which EU cultural integration is to be measured, 
we risk overlooking the politics of representation by which such internally diverse 
phenomena as cultures and social groups are made to appear as ‘natural’ and 
internally coherent (Calhoun, 1999). Seen from this perspective, a key question 
becomes how cultural fields are symbolically encoded with competing discourses and 
become socially operative as practices. It involves looking much more closely at the 
social foundations and power of competing ideas and discourses and the choices to 
be made between them.
However, in foregrounding the procedural aspect of European cultural 
project, I do not want to exaggerate the flexibility and changeability of culture. If the 
purposivenss of institutions is that they survive, it is also true that some 
institutionalised cultural forms do acquire a certain degree of stability and durability 
through continuous reproduction (Schopflin, 2000). I am suggesting here that the 
emerging European cultural space (or spaces) should be viewed as a contested space 
within finite limits of possibility, and that we need a perspective which can 
accommodate both change and continuity.
Cultural politics of the nation-state
One of my propositions in the preceding section is that the construction of the EU as 
a cultural entity needs to be situated in the social and political context. Having 
reviewed selected theories regarding the formation of the nation-state, we now move
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on to concrete issues of national cultural policies. Cultural policy has so far received 
scant attention from social scientists. That this area has not been among the priorities 
of political scientists may not be so surprising, given the relative financial 
insignificance of culture compared to other responsibilities of government (Eling, 
1999). Literature on nationalism, whose focus mainly lies on the historical emergence 
and spread of nationalism, does not explicitly address the question of what happens 
once the idea of the nation and national culture has become widely accepted. On the 
other hand, cultural studies, which foregrounds the ‘oppositional’ role of 
contemporary popular culture (or ‘sub-culture’), have until recently avoided policy-
97oriented research. Lately, the emphasis of cultural studies have been placed more 
and more on the audience, consumption and reception, and displaced attention from 
production and distribution of culture (Kellner, 1997:20). In consequence, apart from 
a small body of research dealing with the specialised issue of the administration of 
the ‘arts’, the literature on which we might draw in exploring national cultural 
policies is quite limited.
Bearing in mind the above limitations, the following is an attempt to map out 
the development and variations of European cultural policies from an institutional 
perspective, as the resources, tasks and functions of cultural measures have 
undergone constant changes to adapt to the new balance of political, economic and 
social forces. Cultural policy is principally about ‘the conditions of culture, the 
material and, also, the discursive determinations in time and space of cultural 
production and consumption’ (McGuigan, 1996: 22). The approach adopted here is to 
study cultural policy not only in the narrow terms of public administration of ‘the 
arts’ but as a crucial site where the meanings of ‘the nation’, ‘national identity’, or 
‘Europe’ is (re-)produced and circulated. As one writer put it, ‘a cultural policy is
27 In the early 1990s scholars associated with the Institute for Cultural Policy Studies at Griffith 
University, Australia, started to advocate a reorientation of cultural studies so as to align its research 
agenda with the Foucauldian notion of ‘governmental technologies’, thereby challenging the 
traditional preoccupation of cultural studies with cultural criticism and the anthropological notion of 
culture as a whole way of life, expounded by Raymond Williams (Hunter, 1988; Bennett, 1998). There 
is an ongoing debate on whether a theoretical framework that construes culture primarily as a 
bureaucratic or administrative process can be justified. The full extent of this debate cannot be 
recounted here, but I would point out that putting policy at the fore of cultural analysis does not 
necessitate such a single-minded focus on bureaucratic practices, and that cultural policy needs to be 
approached from a broader perspective, along with a range of other ideas, activities and sites that 
influence the production and circulation of cultural meaning (see O’Regan, 1992; McGuigan, 1996; 
Couldry, 2000).
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about more than simply supporting arts for art’s sake. .. .a ‘policy’ is also a concerted 
plan of action embodying a state view of the place and purpose, even perhaps the 
usefulness, of the arts and culture in the national community’ (Loosely, 1995:243). 
Because the space is limited, my discussion here will be quite sketchy, and will be 
based on broad generalisations, simplifying and subsuming disparate European cases 
under a few archetypes. In focusing on governmental cultural programmes I am in no 
way suggesting that the nation-state is the only site of culture that is worth 
investigating. Instead, this is simply to say that the state has been, and still remains, 
one of the most influential institutional mechanisms which shape and regulate 
cultural meanings and flows in the modem world.
The idea of arts and culture as a public policy arena requiring systematic 
government intervention only became prevalent in Europe in the post-war era. It is 
indicative in this connection that the Ministry for Culture in France - one of the 
countries with the tradition of a very strong link between the state and culture - was 
founded in 1959. However, from a broader perspective (cultural provision through 
the collection and disbursement of tax revenue), public support for cultural activities 
is far from new. Government or dynastic support for the production and consumption 
of culture stretches back to the age of absolutism when royal or aristocratic patronage 
began to replace the role of the church. In very general terms, as far as the structure 
of support is concerned, it is possible to distinguish two overall patterns that form the 
background against which twentieth-century cultural policies have evolved 
(Cummings and Katz, 1987). On the one hand, there were states with absolutist 
monarchies with strong traditions of court culture, typified by France and Austria. On 
the other hand, there were the more plutocratic, mercantilist states with more limited 
monarchies, such as England or the Netherlands, with the German and Italian proto­
states showing mixed traits.
As Elias (1983) has demonstrated, court society revolved around a structure 
of rituals and procedures which was founded on the need to exhibit power, wealth, 
status and above all, royal splendour in a conspicuous manner. This was crystallised 
into the construction of palaces and gardens as well as the establishment under royal 
patronage of major artistic projects on a grand scale. Hence, in Austria, Emperor 
Joseph I financed the construction of an opera house in Vienna in 1705 and of the 
Theater am Karnthner-Thor in 1708. In the same vein, many of the most prestigious
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institutions in France were bom in the age of absolutism, including the Comedie 
Frangaise, created under the reign of Louis XIV in 1680 as an ‘official’ theatre 
company. Remarkably, the basic stance regarding the centrality of public support for 
the arts and culture survived the Revolution. The succeeding regimes, far from 
destroying the former objects of royal largess, continued to support the institutions 
established by the dynasties they replaced. Thus, the initiative for the Louvre, 
conceived under Louis XVI, outlived its original patron and the museum was opened 
in 1793 to celebrate simultaneously the overthrow of the ancien regime and the glory 
of the Republican government (Duncan, 1995). What might have been the symbol of 
personal wealth and self-glorification, therefore, was co-opted as a display of 
spiritual value and, crucially, national splendour. Subsequently, public support for 
culture would be marked by the official recognition accorded to a clearly 
circumscribed group of ‘academic’ artists, and by the material encouragement 
granted to these official artists by means of public commissions or work on projects 
such as the Opera Gamier. As the scope of public intervention expanded throughout 
the nineteenth century, so did the number of institutions effectively controlled by the 
state not only to determine their budgets but also to appoint and dismiss their artistic 
directors. The preoccupation with national and international prestige rooted in 
monarchical traditions was to live on in French cultural policy through de Gaulle to 
Mitterand (Loosely, 1995; Eling, 1999).
Things were quite different in countries such as the Netherlands, and 
especially, England. Monarchs in those countries avoided the conspicuous 
consumption of the Bourbons or the Hapsburgs both as an expression of financial 
constraints and of Protestant antipathy towards grandeur (Cummings and Katz, 
1987). In the Netherlands, the rise of the Protestant middle class who attained 
economic dominance comparatively early led to the development of a thriving art 
market controlled by burghers and merchants, with the result that the division 
between ‘mass’ and ‘high’ culture was not so marked as elsewhere (Prior, 2002). In 
addition, there was often significant support from the towns which hosted regular 
concerts or plays. Similarly, in England, cultural sponsorship was largely left to the 
private pursuits of the aristocracy, or increasingly during the eighteenth century, to 
the upwardly mobile commercial class keen to use such artistic intervention as a 
mark of social distinction. On the other hand, artistic events such as concerts, theatre,
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and operas were mainly commercial ventures. Despite an apparent reluctance for 
directly financing artistic projects, however, the monarchy did intervene in the some 
aspects of cultural activities, either in the form of social protection through licensing 
plays or theatrical performances, or censoring the production of books (Williams, 
1981; Gray, 2000). It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the state gradually 
began to make inroads into publicly funded projects including the establishment of 
museums, academies, art schools and public libraries, the prime example being the 
foundation of the National Gallery in 1824. Even then, the Gallery was run by a 
system of trusteeship based on an ‘arm’s length’ principle instead of direct 
government control (Prior, 2002).
Notwithstanding national and regional variations, two common sets of ideas 
legitimated public support for culture in eighteenth- and the nineteenth-century 
Europe. First, debates on public funding of museums, galleries, libraries, art 
education, etc. during this period were framed largely by a discourse of moral 
betterment and social control. These institutions were expected to cultivate the 
masses, to bring them up to a higher level of civilisation. It was thus that the state 
entered as an active patron in the nineteenth century, presenting itself as the 
benevolent guardian of the most civilised of human expressions for the putative good 
of the public (Prior, 2002). In practical terms, publicly funded cultural projects had a 
political function to contain class struggle and secure civil order (McGuigan, 1996). 
As such, state intervention in the cultural sphere can be seen as part of the complex 
surveillance systems of the state developed during the nineteenth century to monitor 
social conditions and contain elements that might lead to instability (Tilly, 1992).
Secondly, with the rise of nationalism, the idea of consecrating a national 
culture came to the fore. This is most clearly illustrated by the Louvre, which became 
the paradigm model of a national museum and was replicated throughout Europe. 
As Duncan (1995) argues, these institutions of national cultural canons did not just 
act as a repository of national pride, reproducing a key set of values and ideals. They 
also addressed the visitor as an idealised citizen and an equal inheritor of those 
values, thereby uniting him/her with other citizens regardless of their individual
28 The influence of the Louvre on other nations was such that museum building accelerated markedly 
after its opening in 1793. For example, the Swedish national museum was founded a year after the 
Louvre, the Rijksmuseum in 1808, and the Prado in 1819.
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social position. The discourse of national cohesion and universal access, however, 
should not conceal the fact that museums, along with other institutions of cultural 
authority, were effectively closed for the masses, the very section of the population 
that was believed to be in need of spiritual enlightenment. The internal regulations of 
those institutions clearly prescribed the types of visitors to be discouraged, and very 
little help was given to uninitiated visitors by way of popular guides. Fine art in this 
sense was a symbolic resource for the differentiation of bourgeois elites from other 
social groups (Bourdieu and Darbel, 1991).
National ideals embodied in dominant aesthetic and literary traditions were 
also disseminated in more accessible forms through other institutional channels such 
as public education (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Weber, 1976) or public 
festivals and ceremonies (Hobsbawm, 1983). I do not mean to underestimate the 
impact of these mass-oriented mechanisms of cultural integration, but it is worth 
noting that the institutions of culture purporting to serve the public good can be as 
much internally dividing and alienating as unifying, very often along class lines 
(Bourdieu, 1990; Hoggart, 1958; Williams, 1958). What is significant is that the 
discrepancy between the rhetoric and the actual practices did not necessarily diminish 
the discursive power of ‘official’ national culture, as it continued to shape national 
cultural policies well into the twentieth century. In this sense, education systems, 
which are so central to Gellner’s account of cultural integration, do not so much 
integrate the people of a nation as they objectify the idea of the nation itself. It is a 
matter not only of a propagandists content in the curriculum but also of the 
perception of schooling as an egalitarian institutional mechanism that implicitly 
legitimates inegalitarian outcomes in economic and political positions (Schudson, 
1994).
The period between the first and the second world war marked a decisive 
turning point in the role of government in financing the arts and culture. Just as the 
idea of a self-conscious and systematic cultural policy was taken to its extreme in the 
fascist system, governments in many liberal democracies became actively involved in 
the cultural funding process in the defence against Nazism or fascism not only for
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reasons of national morale but also for propaganda (Rasky, 1998).29 But it was in the 
post-war reconstruction phase that state support for culture massively increased, to 
the extent that it was able to have a real impact on cultural production and 
distribution. The emergence of culture as a new policy arena needs to be placed in the 
context of the expansion of the general role of the state which was already noticeable 
in the nineteenth century but exploded in the years between World War I and World 
War n. This has culminated in the creation of the welfare state complex that 
dominated European political, social and economic life until the mid-1970s. Along 
with this change came the idea that the state should play an active role in bringing the 
‘good life’ to average citizens, providing for the working class on a collective basis 
what the upper and middle classes had been able to provide for themselves 
individually. Access to culture thus became analogous to access to medical care 
(Cummings and Katz, 1987a). Another significant change in this connection is the 
spread of the electronic media of mass communication, which became a major 
medium of cultural dissemination. Coupled with general social changes such as the 
rising standard in educational level, and the increase in disposable income and leisure 
time, the above trends have combined to create strong pressures for government 
intervention in the field of culture.
In terms of administrative structures, the cultural policies of post-war Western 
Europe can be differentiated into four types (Rasky, 1998). Generally speaking, the 
organisational structure of cultural programmes tends to follow the way the 
government is organised and does its business in other fields (Cummings and Katz, 
1987b):
1. The ‘French Ministry of Culture’ model, where there is a centralised bureaucracy 
in charge of cultural policies, and the funds are allocated through the budgetary 
processes. Responsibility for culture is either concentrated in a single ministry 
(France), or divided among several ministries (Italy).
2. The ‘arm’s length’ principle. Cultural policies are mainly formulated and 
implemented by quasi-autonomous organisations, as in the UK and Ireland. These
29 The examples of this are the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) 
established in 1940 in Britain (Gray, 2000), or the active involvement in the 1930s of the French 
Popular Front in cultural matters (Loosely, 1995).
72
organisations were supposedly designed to keep culture and politics separate, so 
that cultural policy judgements are made by experts based on artistic/aesthetic 
merit. Major cultural institutions tend to be private or semi-private, and receive far 
less public funding than in the other models.
3. The Nordic welfare-state model, where the government is heavily involved in 
directly subsidising cultural activities and artists. This is based on socio-economic 
considerations that cultural and artistic work is useful to the well-being of society 
in general and that artists should be supported through various mechanisms 
including grants, prizes, and artists’ income guarantees.
4. The federal model. In countries such as Germany and Switzerland, cultural policy 
is primarily the responsibility of regional or local authorities with substantial 
autonomy accorded to them.
The immediate post-war age saw a delineation of the field of culture as a target of 
systematic state intervention. Before this period, the administrative organisation of 
cultural measures was too fragmented for a self-conscious ‘cultural policy’ to 
emerge. Thus cultural policy, which had usually been subsumed under the 
educational functions of the state, diverged from other policy areas and became a 
specialised area. The above-mentioned birth of the French cultural ministry was not 
the creation of something entirely new. Its constituent parts were drawn from already 
existing departments in other ministries - arts and letters, architecture, and the 
national archives coming from the Ministry for Education, and the National Centre 
for Cinematography being transferred from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
(Aheame, 2002).
After the war, cultural policies in most west European countries inherited the 
nineteenth century concerns about the preservation and promotion of ‘high’ and 
prestige culture, together with the idea about culture’s civilising role. Culture at this 
time still meant the highest and lasting forms of artistic achievement of the past,
30 The Arts Council of Great Britain was never wholly independent of the political process, even if  its 
status as a ‘quango’ has allowed the pretence to be maintained. As neither politicians nor the Arts 
Council were wholly independent of the other, a consequence of this ambiguous status was that 
responsibility and accountability for culture were blurred (Gray, 2000). However, with the 
establishment of the Department of National Heritage - later relabelled as the Department for Culture,
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clearly distinguished from mere leisure or popular entertainment. Cultural policy was 
thus equated with the institutional dissemination of national ‘high’ culture as a 
process of bringing artistic excellence to the people, to construct a cultural stronghold 
against the devastating effects of commercial and foreign (mainly American) 
influence. Accordingly, concrete measures mainly consisted of the administration and 
financing of major museums, orchestras, theatres and high-profile educational 
institutions. (Rasky, 1998) While some folk elements have been incorporated into 
national cultural canons, there is again a logic of exclusion at work here, as 
commercial or mass culture was seen to represent a danger to the achievement of the 
common good. What was new, however, was that cultural policy now became part of 
the commitment to societal, rather than class-based, improvements in the standard of 
living contained in the welfare state paradigm. This is encapsulated in slogans such 
as ‘cultural democratisation’, even though the priority accorded to such goals at the 
level of aspirations and declarations was only partially matched by substantive policy 
initiative, both in terms of resources allocated to cultural measures and the content of 
the support (Eling, 1999).
The goal of incorporating the lower strata was aided by the new media, which 
transformed the cultural practices and values of these strata from the ground up. Thus 
it was no accident that the electronic media in Europe was assigned a public duty 
from the very beginning (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Radio, and later, television had clear 
and sharply defined cultural and educational functions. John Reith, the first Director 
General of the BBC, saw his aim as establishing ‘an institution for cultural 
enlightenment, a bulwark against the baleful influence of commercial entertainment, 
and for political education also, with the task of enabling a newly enfranchised 
general public to exercise their citizenship rights responsibly’ (McGuigan, 1996:56). 
In this way the BBC consolidated itself as one of the leading institutions of British 
national culture. Localism and regionalism was neglected in order to construct a 
national audience. Although the BBC monopoly of the public service broadcasting 
had already ended with the advent of regional ITV companies in the 1950s, these 
companies were required to observe principles of public service alongside their
Media and Sport - in 1992, the British ‘arm’s length’ model may be changing towards a more 
centralised structure.
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populist aims. The BBC also actively promoted ‘high culture’ with broadcasts of 
classical music and drama, in particular. This provided an important contexualisation 
for the foundation of the Arts Council of Great Britain at the end of the Second 
World War (McGuigan, 1996).
Government financial support for the arts continued to expand almost 
everywhere in the 1960s and 1970s, but the decision of many countries to concentrate 
support on large-scale, national and professional arts at the expense of small-scale, 
local, minority or amateur cultural provisions did not go unchallenged. The social 
movements of the 1960s brought identity issues to the fore by demanding, among 
other things, that ‘the rights and respect due to citizens not be conditional on 
conforming to any set of cultural ideal but instead be open to those who found in 
themselves or wished to forge different kinds of identities’ (Calhoun, 2001: 45). It is 
worth recalling that this period also witnessed a massive surge of immigrants of non- 
European origin, followed by the popularisation of the word ‘multiculturalism’ in 
immigrant-receiving countries in Europe, which could mean not only that a right to 
be different was actively endorsed but also these immigrants were simply presumed 
to be unassimilable (Jopke and Morawska, 2003).
The changing social and political landscape in the 1960s and 1970s led to the 
questioning of the imbalance of the distribution of funds, which greatly privileged 
Establishment arts and kept experimental and popular-participatory activities very 
much on the margins of public subsidy. The effect of such challenge was first 
translated into concrete policy programmes in the Nordic countries in the 1960s. 
Cultural politics in Scandinavian countries have a long tradition characterised by the 
active participation of numerous voluntary organisations, such as adult education 
organisations, amateur theatres, traditional folk music and dance groups, which 
emerged alongside state-run institutions of ‘high’ culture. In the 1960s and 1970s 
these grass-roots organisations and artists’ unions provided a basis for a broad 
consensus that creativity and cultural participation contributes to the self-realisation 
of people and therefore the revitalisation of social milieux (Toepler and Zimmer, 
2002). Active state involvement in the funding of cultural activities thereby came to 
be linked to such concepts as equity and social justice, rather than being perceived as 
a vehicle to symbolise ‘grandeur’. The main issue during this period has shifted from 
access to high culture to the question of how to foster creativity in ways that are
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relevant to the cultural reality of most people, especially the underprivileged, as a 
way of personal empowerment. Influenced by the Nordic states’ social democratic 
approach to cultural policy, governments in other parts of Europe (especially north­
western Europe) also started to promote an extended concept of culture covering 
areas of activity which had hitherto been excluded, although at this stage commercial 
or popular entertainment was still discouraged. The emphasis was accordingly laid on 
personal involvement and participation in amateur activities, in which community 
centres, a cultural policy innovation of the seventies, played an important role 
(Rasky, 1998). Also part of this change was the decentralisation of administration 
structures, aimed at improving social and geographical access through the provision 
of culture at the level closest to one’s own locale. Whereas in the 1950s and 60s 
regional and local governments mainly acted as agents for the implementation of 
centralised cultural measures, the responsibility for cultural planning itself began to 
shift to local authorities, most noticeably in the countries of northern Europe.
The goal of broader access to culture was made possible against the 
background of economic growth. The dramatic increase in cultural spending in the 
1960s and 1970s was part of a much larger explosion of government spending for 
social programmes in general. Thus, after the protracted economic crisis abruptly 
ended the expectations of permanent unbridled growth in social spending, the 
budgetary squeeze of the 1980s invariably affected the cultural sector as well. This 
was most obvious in Thatcherite Britain which initiated a series of radical re­
structurings as a necessary adjustment to changing economic circumstances 
(McGuigan, 1996). The rise of neoliberal thinking meant that private interests were 
seen as better equipped to manage public assets and services (Hansen, 2000). The 
most tangible result of this change in the cultural sphere was the increasing emphasis 
placed upon the economic effectiveness of cultural institutions. These public-sector 
organisations were called upon to think and function as though they were private 
businesses and to become ‘entrepreneurial’, which in specific terms involved 
introducing profit-maximising management practices and seeking private sources of 
funding (Bianchini, 1993). But what was significant in the marketisation of culture 
was not just that cultural activities needed to be economically efficient, but that arts 
and culture were ‘discovered’ as an economic sector in its own right. Culture came to 
be conceived of as an important economic resource which can make a significant
76
impact on employment, investment and the balance of trade. In this context, cultural 
industries (television, film production and distribution, popular music, design, 
fashion, etc.) became for the first time an important part of ‘public’ culture. The 
combination of culture, commerce, and economistic reasoning proved to be 
particularly influential in the urban regeneration strategies of cities suffering from the 
negative effects of de-industrialisation, (see chapter 7).
The linking together of culture and economics, either through using culture as 
a tool for the attainment of economic objectives or through insisting upon a more 
economically orientated approach to the delivery of cultural policies, has not been 
simply a British phenomenon. Elsewhere in Europe, there has been a partial shift of 
emphasis from the social-democratic doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s to a more 
liberal doctrine fostering the idea of public-private partnership. Even in Italy, whose 
cultural administration is generally considered to be one of the most bureaucratic in 
Europe, cultural institutions were given a degree of legal independence so that they 
could generate some private income to supplement shrinking state subsidies (Rasky,
1998).
Government retrenchment in the 1980s also manifested itself in the 
decentralisation or regionalisation of cultural responsibilities. Since the 1970s, the 
major feature of much of the European experience has been toward an increased role 
for more localised forms of financing and control of culture. But decentralisation 
could mean territorial decentralisation with the consequent development of regional 
cultural administrations, or institutional de-govemmentalisation in the sense of the 
establishment of a range of quasi-autonomous intermediary organisations. There are 
variations depending on the specific situations of individual countries. In the cases of 
Belgium and Spain, the introduction of new organisational structures with a 
responsibility for culture arose from the internal political demands of regions for 
cultural autonomy rather than being a direct consequence of the crisis of the welfare 
state. In the UK, the establishment of the Department of National Heritage in 1992 
may indicate a shift towards a more intrusive central government position, while a 
devolutionary shift can be observed in the splitting up of the Arts Council of Great 
Britain into three regionalised Councils of England, Scotland and Wales (Gray, 
2000).
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France was the only country that went against the general move of the 1980s 
towards austerity, as the state’s cultural budget effectively doubled under the 
presidency of Francois Mitterand (Toepler and Zimmer, 2002). Far from cutting back 
cultural spending, the prestigious investment projects initiated by the President - 
known as the grands project, including the construction of the Louvre pyramid, the 
Opera Bastille or the Bibliotheque de France - continued throughout the 1980s, and 
could be seen as the most ostentatious instance of the continuity with prior traditions. 
However, such projects were also justified on economic grounds, since, it was 
argued, encouraging creativity, enterprise and the presence of beauty will dynamise 
not just France’s art world but also revitalise its economy, indicating that French 
cultural policy was not immune to the ideological restructuring of the 1980s (Eling,
1999). As for the decentralisation of cultural policy-making, while the funding 
balance between the Ministry and the local authorities had shifted unambiguously in 
favour of the latter throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Ministry was still able in 
many cases to influence the financial decisions of local policy-makers by tying them 
into institutional mechanisms devised and dominated by them.
On the other hand, one of the main features of Jack Lang’s (the Minister of 
Culture during the Mitterand era) cultural agenda was his rejection of a rigid 
distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, giving an official recognition to the 
commercial dimension of the cultural sector. The concept of culture, at least on a 
symbolic level, was thus extended to cover virtually everything to do with one’s 
lifestyle, even though the funding involved never amounted to more than a fraction of 
the subsidies allocated to institutional high culture. Another focal point in this period 
was a series of battles fought by French cultural elites during the Uruguay round of 
GATT negotiations which pushed the idea of cultural security to the forefront (see 
Chapter 8).
Despite all the claims made about the profitability of the cultural sector which 
proliferated in the eighties, it is important not to overstate the case. Contrary to its 
rhetoric, the British Conservative governments never endorsed the extremist line of 
privatising the publicly subsidised arts. Instead, cultural organisations were obliged 
to seek joint funding from public and private sources, but business sponsorship never 
grew much beyond a ten per cent supplement to public subsidy in general. Similarly, 
in other parts of Europe, although attempts to raise finance from private sources have
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become increasingly common, this is still running at relatively low levels. Therefore, 
the most profound consequences of the eighties shift towards market discourse for 
cultural policy restructuring has been more ideological than material (McGuigan, 
1996). The predominance of neoliberal thinking continues up to present, but it is also 
increasingly coming under attack. The major strikes, protests and other forms of 
popular manifestations against prevailing market reasoning, which have been 
commonplace in many EU member states during the 1990s, may be taken to testify to 
a certain degree of de-stabilisation of neoliberal discourse (Hansen, 2000).
Government intervention in the cultural sphere has also been subject to much 
controversy on other fronts. The increase in leisure time and the higher educational 
level of wide sections of the population has led in recent years to a broadening of 
cultural interests, but also to growing requirements for personalised, creative leisure­
time organisation. The artistic and cultural development potential has become ever 
more comprehensive and more diverse, and the quality of cultural amenities is now 
seen as an important measure of the general quality of life, giving rise to the 
articulation of new demands on cultural policy (Bianchini, 1993). One explanation 
offered for the unprecedented role that culture came to play in contemporary society 
can be found in the shift to a post-industrial service economy, where the means of 
communication and information become more important than the mass production of 
commodities, giving more weight to signs (advertising, design, etc.) that increasingly 
mediate the social relations (Lash and Urry, 1994). In any case, attacks against 
publicly-subsidised Establishment art are regularly made on the grounds of more 
equitable management of the resources of society, while policy-makers are 
confronted with an ever-expanding definition of ‘culture’ and shifting opinions 
concerning the responsibilities of the state (Gray, 2000).
It should be remembered here that even in countries where culture is 
supported ‘lavishly’, all cultural programmes taken together account for only one or 
two per cent of the total national budget. So far the relative unimportance of culture 
has been a political asset much of the time, the positive effect being that 
controversies over the cultural agenda have been kept minimal (Cummings and Katz, 
1987b). Nevertheless, cultural support has actually continued at impressive levels 
despite general government retrenchment, and what is most impressive is that often 
the cuts proposed for the arts have actually been less than those proposed for much
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longer established government programmes (Gray, 2000). Both a cause and a 
consequence of this institutionalisation and growth of cultural programmes has been 
the tendency for culture to become a policy field in which the normal rules of the 
political process apply as in other fields. A parallel development is that the 
organisations of artists, institutions, and cultural professionals have evolved into 
interest groups that speak for cultural community in the governmental arena. National 
cultural terrain is now characterised by a plethora of interest groups, experts and 
other intermediaries who form policy networks, championing a variety of cultural 
forms and practices (Gray, 2000). As a result, there has been a remarkable increase in 
the political sophistication of the constituency for the arts and culture (Cummings 
and Katz, 1987b). Even in France, increasing involvement of professionals and 
interest groups in cultural policy has been observed, which means that the state and 
its core executive are not as powerful or autonomous vis-a-vis societal interests in 
this field, nor as united as the statist view of French policy-making would suggest 
(Eling, 1999).
Conclusion
The implication of the foregoing review of cultural policy developments is that we 
can observe both continuity and change at the same time. As political pressures and 
economic and social forces that influenced cultural practices have been broadly 
similar throughout the advanced-industrial democracies, there has been a marked 
tendency for the cultural policies of different countries to become more similar over 
time, but this has by no means eradicated country-specific variations. The 
commitment towards cultural support in Europe has remained fairly consistent, but 
the mechanisms utilised to undertake this task have been subject to amendments 
which have been driven by other concerns than those of culture itself (Toepler and 
Zimmer, 2002). In almost all European countries, the lion’s share of funds remains 
the preserve of institutions purveying elite culture and insulated against the laws of 
supply and demand. National elites, governments and cultural experts continue to 
perpetrate the idea that ‘high’ culture is something that the nation must be associated 
with, as a form of national and international prestige. Yet whilst the institutions of 
high culture remain at the heart of official versions of national self-imagery, forms of
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cultural authority have multiplied and fragmented (Edensor, 2002). As the means to 
develop and transmit culture have expanded over decades, important parts of 
contemporary cultural processes have come to escape the grip of the state, being 
transmitted through commercial and more informal networks. This, however, is not 
to suggest that traditional forms of national culture have become irrelevant. Rather, it 
means that an increasing range of activities and cultural fields has been endowed 
with national significance and converted into facets of national culture (Cubitt:1998).
If we follow Gellner, the role of the state was to provide a political roof for 
nationally-codified canons of high culture. However, cultural guardianship is no 
longer such a predominant feature of national culture, and in fact, it may even be 
argued that it was never as important as has been claimed. If anything, the more 
recent changes and adjustments that took place in the cultural policies of post-war 
Europe are characterised more by a bottom-up process whereby official 
understanding of national culture continuously expanded to incorporate new demands 
than by a top-down imposition of ‘high culture’. The state is increasingly having to 
mediate between different lobbyists and claims and decide where funds should be 
provided. In doing so, it must rank the tastes and desires of particular classes, ethnic 
groups, regions and so on. Perhaps this is why more and more emphasis is placed on 
the utility of cultural forms that lend themselves to a multitude of different uses in a 
pluralistic, multicultural society. Nearly every programme of cultural support has had 
multiple objectives. Different people will support the same programme for different 
reasons, and conversely, each supporter of government involvement in the cultural 
field is likely to have more than one objective in mind. The Pompidou Centre in 
Paris, for example, was built to symbolise the glories of French culture, to stimulate 
the redevelopment of the Beaubourg area of Paris and its tourist trade, to provide a 
cultural mecca for the enrichment of popular taste, and as a monument to the second 
President of the Fifth Republic (Cummings and Katz, 1987b). To the extent that 
public support for culture has had different political, economic or social functions but 
has never been purely about creativity and cultural expressions, the link between 
culture and polity has always involved elements of instrumentality. While such a 
statement may give undue weight to the instrumentality of culture, it does capture the 
multiple uses and ever-changing notions which centre upon certain cultural forms, 
and testify to their symbolic flexibility.
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My aim in tracing the developments of national cultural policies in Western 
Europe was twofold. First, I tried to show that putting the idea of culturally 
constructing the nation into actual policy practices involves a certain degree of 
discrepancy between the rhetorical commitments to the idealised national culture and 
actually managing concrete programmes with limited resource. The centrality of the 
nation-state as a regulator and disseminator of ‘national’ culture remains intact, but at 
the same time the cultural boundaries of what is perceived to be appropriately 
national and the ways in which those boundaries are maintained have gone through 
various adjustments if not total transformations. Second, European integration as a 
cultural project does not take place in a vacuum, and various actors who have a stake 
in the cultural dimension of the EU bring their own (nationally and locally 
formulated) ideas and practices to the EU political arena. Thus it is crucially 
important to take into account the continuities and changes in the cultural politics at 
the national level that shape the background against which EU cultural policies are 
formed. Without drawing a direct parallel between European and national integration, 
understanding how national cultures are institutionalised by the state allows us a 
vantage point for analysing EU cultural policies.
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CHAPTER 3 
The evolution of the EU cultural policy
The aim of this chapter is to provide an empirical background for the subsequent 
chapters through an overview of how EU cultural policy has developed over the 
years. It traces the emergence and development of EU cultural action as it has been 
shaped and reshaped according to the economic and legal tools with which the EU
o  1
has been able to act at different stages of European integration. Although the 
original Treaty of Rome did not specifically recognise the Community competence in 
the field of culture, initiatives in this area had already begun to take shape in the 
1970s. The seemingly expanding scope of cultural activities at the EU level has led 
many commentators to note that the ultimate aim of the EU could be to create a 
super-nation in which the relationship between a polity and culture is moulded in a 
classical nation-building model (see Shore, 2000; Axford and Huggins, 1998; Wood, 
1998). As I hope to show below, the link between the EU and culture is not as 
straightforward as these authors may suggest. Cultural policy has developed unevenly 
as part of the process of the formation of the EU, and it reflects changing ideas about 
culture in concert with the tools and priorities of the Union (Beale, 1999). As a 
consequence, legal, political and economic conditions that prevailed at any given 
time have so far largely determined the shape of EU cultural policy, which exists in 
very different forms from those of the nation-state.
The chapter chronologically follows the evolution of EU cultural policy, and 
is divided into five sections. The first two sections will look at developments in the 
1970s and the 80s. This will be followed by the examination of the cultural 
provisions in the Maastricht Treaty introduced in 1992. The rest of the chapter will 
deal with the question of how and to what extent the conceptualisation of ‘culture’ 
and ‘cultural policy’ in the EU has changed in the latter part of the 1990s. In charting 
the development of EU cultural agenda over three decades, the chapter argues that 
the focus of cultural action has shifted from the forging of symbolic unity to the
31 Until quite recently, the European Commission has avoided using the word ‘EU cultural policy’. 
Instead, what can be described as cultural policy has normally been called ‘cultural action’ or 
‘Community action in the cultural sector’.
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pragmatic promotion of cultural cooperation, with profound implications for the 
possible form of relationships between the EU, culture and identity.
The emergence of Community cultural action (1970-1984)
Until the introduction of the ‘cultural clause’ in the Maastricht treaty in 1992, culture 
was, from a strictly legalistic point of view, not a sphere of Community competence. 
However, the absence of a legal basis for ‘culture’ did not impede Community 
involvement in cultural matters, and the starting point for EU cultural action dates 
back as early as the beginning of the 1970s. The European Parliament was the first 
European institution that specifically called for Community action in the field of 
culture (McMahon, 1995: 122). In a more indirect and ambiguous way, the 
European heads of state also issued a series of statements which endorsed the idea 
that European integration involved not only economic but also cultural dimensions
I T
(CEC, 1977: 5). A more tangible step towards defining a cultural basis for 
European integration was made in 1973 when leaders of the then nine EC member 
states signed ‘the Declaration on European Identity’ at the Copenhagen Summit. As 
the declaration itself makes it clear, the concern with the issue of ‘European identity’ 
at this stage mainly lay in the need to define a common position of the member states 
vis-a-vis external actors (i.e. external identity in world affairs), which should not be 
conflated with the EU’s later attempts at generating European identity among 
ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, the statement underlined internal cultural 
commonality to legitimise a move towards a common foreign policy, proclaiming 
that ‘[t]he diversity of cultures within the framework of common European 
civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing 
convergence of attitudes to life ... all give the European identity its originality and its 
own dynamism’.34
32 Official Journal, 1974, C62/5.
33 For instance, the 1969 meeting at the Hague summit regarded Europe as an ‘exceptional seat of 
development, culture and progress’, and that it was ‘indispensable to preserve it’, Point 4 of the 
Communique, Bulletin EC 1-1970, Part one, Chapter 1. Also see the final declaration of the Paris 
Summit in 1972, Bulletin EC 10-1972, Part one, Chapter 1.
34 Bulletin EC 12-1973, point 2501.
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In the wake of all those statements, the European Commission created in 
1973 a cultural affairs unit which later became the Directorate-General X (Culture, 
audiovisual and sport) (Bekemans, 1990: 48). In 1977 this unit produced the first 
comprehensive document concerning Community action in the cultural sector. The 
Commission’s main intention in presenting this document was to identify the areas in 
the cultural sector where the Treaty’s existing provisions could be applied. The 
absence of explicit legal basis for cultural action in the original Treaty of Rome 
meant that there was a built-in bias towards framing culture in terms of economic 
integration. Thus, the 1977 document defined the cultural sector as ‘the socio­
economic whole formed by persons and undertakings dedicated to the production and 
distribution of cultural goods and services’. Accordingly, Community action in the 
cultural sector was ‘necessarily centred on solving the economic and social problems 
which arise in this sector as in all other’ (CEC, 1977: 5). This included, among other 
areas, freedom of trade in cultural goods, combating theft of works of art, free 
movement and the right of establishment of cultural workers, and harmonisation of 
copyright and taxation in the cultural sector. Apart from the action inspired by the 
socio-economic rationale, however, the Commission’s proposal also contained some 
initiatives that fell outside the immediate scope of the Treaty, such as the 
preservation of architectural heritage, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of socio­
cultural activities at the European level (CEC, 1977: 19-25). Specific measures 
included Community patronage for a youth orchestra, organisation of ‘European 
rooms’ in museums, and support for the European co-production of television 
programmes. Nonetheless, no action was taken in response to these proposals, 
despite the favourable reaction of the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee (McMahon, 1995).
The Commission’s own assessment of the 1977 proposal, published in 1982, 
reaffirmed the EC’s ‘economic and social responsibilities towards the cultural 
sector’, and once again established the same lines of priority action: freedom of trade 
in cultural goods; improving the living and working conditions of cultural workers; 
enlarging the audience; and conservation of the architectural heritage (CEC, 1982: 4). 
The relevance of the first two areas to the existing Treaty provisions is quite evident. 
But this time the Commission also emphasised how the areas that were beyond the 
strict application of the Treaty were related to the overall priorities of economic
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integration. Thus, in the area of ‘widening the audience’ (which in this context 
mainly referred to the development of the audiovisual media), widening access to 
culture was said to ‘offer cultural workers more opportunities for work and thus 
enhance their earnings’ (CEC, 1982: 15). As for the action regarding heritage 
conservation, the document stressed that ‘it is a contribution to a rich resource that 
generates economic activity...and that conservation is itself an economically and 
socially viable activity for the firm and workers connected to it’ (Ibid.: 18).
In contrast to the previous proposal, the 1982 document elicited a response 
from the Council in the form of the first ever meeting of culture ministers in 1982. 
The meetings, which were held informally at first but later on a formal basis, marked 
the first stage in institutional recognition of the Community’s cultural role (CEC, 
1992a). However, this did not diminish the contested nature of its competence in the 
field of culture, as the meetings acquired a very ambiguous and confusing legal 
status: these meetings were called ‘the Council and the Ministers responsible for 
Cultural Affairs meeting within the Council’ which could adopt either Community 
acts (as ‘Council’), intergovernmental acts (as representatives of member state 
governments, and therefore outside the Community framework), or mixed acts 
(Bekemans, 1990: 23). Indeed, at most of the meetings throughout the 1980s, the 
ministers made no commitments and confined themselves to declaring an intention 
for further cooperation in this area. When specific measures were actually adopted, 
they were passed in the form of resolutions ‘of the representatives of the governments 
of the Member States’, indicating an unwillingness on the part of the member states 
to consider the subject matter of the resolutions as falling within the Community 
competence (McMahon, 1995: 136).35 Thus, leaving aside the areas of culture that 
directly affected the formation of the single market, the actual implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations remained extremely modest.
‘A People’s Europe’ (1984-1991)
35 These resolutions were regarding audiovisual piracy, the promotion and development of a European 
programme industry and harmonisation of rules on the sequence of film distribution through the 
various media, Bulletin EC 6-1984, point 2161.
86
The complex legal status of the Council of culture ministers is just one instance 
where the promotion of, and resistance to, EC cultural action manifest themselves 
simultaneously. But by the mid-1980s, the discourse on EC cultural action started to 
cluster around a different set of premises. Several factors provided an impetus to this 
change. First and foremost, there was a growing awareness among the European 
officials that the image of technocratic Europe was alienating ordinary citizens. The 
desire to promote people’s involvement in the unification process was first expressed 
clearly in the Tindemans Report on the European Union which was drawn up by the 
Belgian Prime Minister in 1976. In underlining the importance of ‘a Citizen’s 
Europe’, the report recommended that Europe ‘must make itself felt in education and 
culture, news and communications’ as a ‘concrete manifestation of European
-JiT
solidarity’. The theme of EC cultural action was relaunched by the Solemn 
Declaration on European Union, issued in 1983 at the European Council meeting in 
Stuttgart. The section on cultural co-operation upheld the need to extend the scope of 
European co-operation in the cultural field, which was to be pursued not for its own 
sake but ‘in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an
' i n
element in the European identity’. No immediate action was taken following this 
Declaration, but combined with an embarrassingly low turn-out at the direct election 
to the European Parliament in 1984, it acted as yet another reminder that the lack of 
popular involvement in European integration could impede ‘an ever closer union’ 
envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. Thus, the Fontainebleau European Council 
meeting shortly afterwards considered essential once again that ‘the Community 
should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to 
strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest 
of the world’. To this end, it established an ad hoc committee on ‘a People’s 
Europe’ (the Adonnino Committee), which submitted a report to the European 
Council in Brussels and Milan in the following year.
The Adonnino Report consisted of two parts.39 The first report concentrated 
on measures to promote citizens’ rights such as the free movement of persons and
36 ‘Tindemans Report’, Bulletin Supplement 1/76.
37 Bulletin, EC 6-1983, Ch. 6.
38 Bulletin, EC 6-1984, Part 1, Ch. 1.
39 EC Bulletin Supplement 7/85.
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right of residence throughout the Community. The second part of the report dealt 
with cultural initiatives, stressing that ‘it is also through action in the areas of culture 
and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community’s 
image in the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and 
must be sought’ (CEC, 1985a: 21). More surprising than this general statement were 
the specific measures chosen from amongst the various aspects of ‘culture’. These 
included proposals for the development of a European ‘audiovisual area’ and a 
multilingual, ‘truly European television channel’, the creation of an Academy of 
Science, Technology and Art (‘Europe needs an institution with international 
influence to highlight the achievements of European science and the originality of 
European civilization in all its diversity’), and an Euro-lottery (‘to make Europe 
come alive for the Europeans, an event with popular appeal could help promote the 
European idea’). The report also called for the creation of Community sport teams, 
increased level of youth exchanges, and the promotion of a ‘European dimension’ in 
education. The Adonnino Committee went even further and proposed a new set of 
symbols which was clearly inspired by the centrality of national symbols as the locus 
of national identity. Foremost among these was the creation of the EC emblem and 
flag, a circle of twelve gold stars set against an azure background, which was adopted 
from the logo of the Council of Europe. Similarly, the music from the ‘Ode to Joy’ 
from the fourth movement of Beethoven’s ninth symphony, which is also the anthem 
of the Council of Europe, was proposed as the European anthem.40 The report also 
recommended the creation of the Europe Day, the harmonised European passport, 
driving license and car number-plates, and European postage stamps ‘bearing 
identical designs of subjects which highlight the Community or its underlying values’ 
(CEC, 1985a: 18-30).
The emphasis on those symbolic campaigns as a strategy for creating ‘a 
People’s Europe’ thus represented a departure in the Commission’s approaches to the 
hitherto neglected domain of culture. The Commission’s own formulation on the 
relationship between culture, collective identity and European unity betrays the idea 
behind this change: ‘European identity is the result of shared history and common
40 The idea for this was also borrowed from the Council of Europe. It is only the music of ‘Ode to Joy’ 
that was adopted as the official anthem, as Schiller’s lyrics pose the problem of language.
cultural and fundamental values. But awareness of it can be strengthened by symbolic 
action, a consciousness-raising campaign and the growing convergence of European 
ambitions’ (CEC, 1988b: 5). Here, cultural action was conceptualised in terms of 
awakening and activating forgotten common traits based on a historically-rooted 
cultural unity. A rediscovered European identity would in turn strengthen people’s 
sense of belonging to the European Community. There is a clear discursive similarity 
between this type of argument and the ‘Euro-nationalist’ writings championed by 
writers such as Denis de Rougemont in the immediate post-war era (Varenne, 1993). 
At this point, then, the Commission was following the model of culture on which the 
nation-state had traditionally been founded (Shore, 2000).
Following the endorsement of the Adonnino Report by the European Council 
in June 1985, many of the proposals contained in the report have been implemented. 
The European flag was hoisted for the first time outside the EC headquarters in 
Brussels at a formal ceremony on 29 May 1986. As a commemoration of decisive 
moments in the history of European integration, the first Europe Day was celebrated 
on 9 May 1986, the anniversary of the 1951 Schuman Declaration which led to the 
founding of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Commission has launched 
a number of other symbolic initiatives, including EC-sponsored competitions and 
awards (such as the ‘Europe of Tomorrow’ young scriptwriters competition), the 
European Youth Orchestra, the European City of Culture events, a series of 
‘European Years’ dedicated to the promotion of certain EC-chosen themes (such as 
‘the European Cinema and Television Year’ (1988) or ‘the European Year of Music’ 
(1985)) (CEC, 1988b). Along with those highly symbolic measures, various low-key 
cultural projects were also introduced in the mid-1980s. These ranged from the 
audiovisual ‘Media’ programme and pilot projects for the conservation of heritage, to 
schemes to support cultural or youth exchanges, training and business sponsorship of 
arts.41 Reviewing the progress towards the achievement of a People’s Europe in 
1988, the Commission showed confidence in the effectiveness of such 
‘consciousness-raising campaigns’: ‘[the] sense of European identity has begun to 
take shape thanks partly to the concrete measures taken by the Community’ (CEC, 
1988b: 3).
41 More detailed discussion of those schemes will be given in the later chapters.
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In parallel to the pursuit of ‘a People’s Europe’, an accelerated drive towards 
the completion of the single market in the late 1980s created an additional 
momentum pushing for a stronger cultural action at the Community level. The 
Commission’s orientation document drawn up in 1987 put forward a rationale behind 
an increased effort in the cultural sector: ‘The sense of being part of European culture 
is one of the prerequisites for that solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large 
market, and the considerable changes it will bring about in living conditions within 
the Community, is to secure the popular support it needs.’ (CEC, 1987: 1) The same 
document envisaged five fields of activity as the framework programme for the 
period between 1988 and 1992, which were nothing more than a reorganisation of 
past proposals under different headings: the creation of a European cultural area 
(creation of an internal market for culture, better living and working conditions for 
cultural workers); the promotion of the European audiovisual industry; access to 
cultural resources (promotion of multilingualism, support for heritage conservation 
and culture in the regions); training for the cultural sector (cultural administrators, 
specialists and translators/interpreters); and dialogue with the rest of the world 
(cultural exchanges with non-member countries, especially in Eastern Europe).
There are in fact two different notions of culture that were employed in the 
1987 Communication. Firstly, the document can be read as yet another attempt by the 
Commission to engineer popular consensus in support of economic integration. To 
counteract the impact of the emerging single market, cultural measures were 
designed ‘to win the support of the general public and the special interest groups 
involved’ (CEC, 1987: 3). By emphasising an image of the Community which was 
neither economistic nor technocratic, the Commission sought to portray a positive 
picture of Europe. This is a variation of Euro-nationalist discourse. According to the 
Commission, ‘Europe’s cultural dimension is deeply rooted in the collective 
consciousness of its inhabitants’, so cultural action at the Community level is simply 
an ‘answer to the legitimate expectations of the people of Europe’ (CEC, 1987: 1 - 
note the singular use of ‘people’).
But it is also possible to identify a different type of discourse which was to 
become increasingly dominant in the course of 1990s, based on the concept of culture 
as an instrument of economic development. This was in fact a theme already 
explored at an EC-sponsored conference held in Florence in March 1987 on culture
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and its relations with technology and the economy.42 The conference recognised the 
increasing economic significance of cultural activity, and concluded that culture 
should be seen as a common denominator in all areas of economic activity. Building 
on the outcome of this conference, the 1987 document highlighted the responsibility 
of the Community in ‘the creation of new jobs in the cultural sector in association 
with the expansion of tourism and regional and technological development’ and in 
‘the emergence of a cultural industry which will be competitive within the 
Community and in the world at large’ (CEC, 1987: 3). This may seem similar to the 
socio-economic justification for cultural action which the Commission had initially 
employed in the 1970s. However, it marks a departure from the period when culture 
was simply a residual category in European integration. As a result of the growing 
inter-relationship between culture, economy and technology, so the new logic goes, 
culture could now positively contribute to the overall aims of economic integration as 
a resource to be valorised, rather than being seen as a secondary element in the 
pursuit of economic prosperity.
The Commission communication of 1987 was welcomed at the meeting of 
the culture ministers in December 1987. Nevertheless, the Ministers did not adopt the 
priority measures as identified by the Commission. Instead, they were rearranged 
along the following lines, which effectively narrowed the scope of action: the 
audiovisual sector; books and reading; the training of cultural workers; and business 
sponsorship of cultural activities 43 Despite an impetus generated by the twin goals of 
‘a People’s Europe’ and the completion of the single market, the achievements in the 
period between 1985 and 1991 remained quite limited in practical terms. Many 
Commission proposals met with no response, and even if the Council approved 
certain schemes, they were adopted in the form of non-binding acts for which the 
Commission could find small amounts of money under its own authority (Shore, 
2000: 53). Even though the symbolic measures launched during this period may have 
appeared threatening enough to cause suspicion about the emergence of a European 
super-nation, cultural action was a marginal area in the overall activities of the 
Community, with direct cultural spending only amounting to 0.014% of the total
42 EC Bulletin 3-1987, Part 1, Ch. 1.
43 EC Bulletin 12-1987, Part 1, Ch. 2, Official Journal C197/2, 1988.
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budget (Bates and Wacker, 1993).44 The lack of formal legal competence and 
sufficient funding meant that the declared, ambitious aims of cultural initiatives 
actually ended in variegated, small-scale, and mostly one-off initiatives without any 
coherence or structure (CEC, 1992a: 3-4).
The Maastricht provisions
As far as the Community’s legal competence in culture is concerned, the situation has 
changed dramatically with the signing of the Treaty on European Union (the 
Maastricht Treaty) in 1992. Article 3(p) of the Maastricht Treaty stipulated that the 
Community shall contribute to the ‘flowering of the cultures of the Member States’. 
This was further developed in Article 128 which provided for the first time a specific 
Community competence in the field of culture:
1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and 
at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation 
between the Member States and, if necessary, supporting and 
supplementing their action in the following areas:
-  improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture 
and history of the European peoples;
-  conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European 
significance;
-  non-commercial cultural exchanges;
-  artistic and literary creation, including the audio-visual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third 
countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of 
culture, in particular the Council of Europe
44 Estimates made in 1993. This figure excludes spending in the audiovisual sector (such as MEDIA). 
But even if this sector is included, it only brings the figure up to 0.06% (Bates and Wacker, 1993).
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4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under 
other provisions of this Treaty
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in 
this article, the Council:
-  acting in accordance with the precedence referred to in Article 
189b and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall 
adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of laws and 
regulations of the Member States. The council shall act 
unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 189b;
-  acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall 
adopt recommendations.
It is a common view that Article 128 is very much a product of compromise between 
differing positions on cultural action at the European level, and a closer look at the 
provisions reveals that they are as much limiting as they are enabling. First of all, 
cultural action, as in other fields of EU activities, would have to respect the general 
principle of subsidiarity, which was also introduced by the Maastricht Treaty.45 This 
means that EU action in culture should only play a supplementary role to national or 
regional cultural policies ‘if necessary’. Any future harmonisation of the laws or 
regulations of the member states concerning culture is thus expressly ruled out. The 
emphasis here is clearly on promoting the diversity of national (and sub-national) 
cultures, as opposed to a centrally-planned, homogenising EU cultural policy. The 
Treaty provisions do not regard the EU as the first contact for cultural support. What 
they seek is the promotion of cooperation between European cultural and arts 
institutions in order to contribute to a qualitative improvement and quantitative 
increase in transnational movements and communications, which is significantly 
different from the conventional model of national cultural policies that seek to 
disseminate centrally-codified cultural canons (Ellmeier, 1998: 127).
Secondly, Article 128 established a complex decision-making procedure that 
requires a wide consensus for any cultural measures to be taken. On the one hand, the
93
introduction of ‘co-decision’ procedure gave the European Parliament much greater 
say in the shaping of EU cultural affairs. And the Committee of the Regions (CoR), 
newly created to advise the Commission on regional and local issues in the EU, must 
be consulted before the adoption of cultural initiatives. The empowered EP and the 
COR together established the grounds for much stronger representation in EU policy­
making of interests likely to be supportive of stronger, more extensive cultural 
policy. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers would have to act unanimously 
throughout the procedures, even when it adopts non-binding measures such as 
Council recommendations.46 The principle of unanimity could allow even one 
member state to block the process of implementing cultural action. This is in clear 
contrast to other policy fields where qualified majority voting is sufficient.
The Maastricht Treaty’s emphasis on cultural diversity and plurality is also 
evident in the requirement that makes it compulsory for the Council to consult the 
CoR’s opinions. Since its introduction, the CoR has been very vocal about the need 
for the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity, understood here as distinct 
‘ways of life’ embedded in local and regional practices and traditions (Barnett, 2001). 
The CoR has also challenged on many occasions the Commission’s tendency to 
construe cultural diversity as the diversity of national cultures, and therefore as the 
primary responsibility of the member states, arguing that it falsely posits 
homogeneous national cultures within the member states (COR, 1994 and 1997). 
Although the CoR’s role in formal decision-making process is very weak vis-a-vis 
other EU institutions, it plays an important informal role as a platform for exchange 
and networks between subnational actors with common interests (McCarthy, 1997). 
Along with the subsidiarity principle, the institutionalisation of regional interests in 
the form of the CoR may demonstrate the growing importance of multilevel 
governance in European integration.
It is important to emphasise at this point that the formal recognition of 
cultural action was not meant to establish the grounds for a Europe-wide cultural 
policy which would surpass or replace existing cultural provisions at the national or
45 Article 3b, ‘The Community shall take action ... only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.’
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regional level. The only explicit cultural brief for direct action that the EU was given 
by the Maastricht was to contribute to the ‘flowering of the cultures of the Member 
States’, and this has to be seen in the context of past suspicion of many member 
states that the Commission was working towards a centrally-planned EC cultural 
policy based on the EU officials’ uniform concept of what constitutes ‘European 
culture’ (Sandell, 1996: 271). This is also reflected in the fact that the only 
amendment to the ‘cultural clause’ made by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 was a 
further obligation for the Community to respect and promote cultural diversity.47 The 
Council reaffirmed this in 2002 stating that ‘it is essential to encourage co-operation 
and cultural exchanges in order to respect and promote the diversity of cultures in 
Europe and to improve their knowledge of one another’. However, it is the fourth 
section of Article 128 which in many respects is having the most impact on EU 
involvement in culture as it stipulates that the EU takes cultural aspects into account 
in its actions under other provisions of the Treaty. As I will show in the later section, 
this clause has officially created a new basis on which cultural activities came to take 
a greater share of resources within EU policy whose objectives are not specifically 
cultural.
Post-Maastricht cultural programmes
Notwithstanding the limits built into the ‘cultural clause’, the Maastricht Treaty 
formed a springboard from which the new conceptualisation of EU cultural action 
was formed. In the words of the Commission, ‘[t]he Community is on the threshold 
of a new era in which it will be able to grow beyond its purely economic dimension 
and enjoy unprecedented opportunity for cultural cooperation and support... thought 
should therefore be given to the future thrust of cultural action in this new 
environment.’ (CEC, 1992a: 1). In endorsing the future work programme proposed 
by the Commission in 1992, the Council noted:
46 The draft Constitutional Treaty, if adopted, would remove the unanimity condition in the file of 
culture.
47 Article 151 (formally Article 128), Title IV. The following phrase in italics were added to the 
original: ‘The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions 
of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity o f its cultures
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Future programmes may specifically include: encouraging the activities of 
European cultural networks of arts practitioners and cultural institutions such 
as museums, archives, libraries and monuments; encouraging business 
sponsorship of the arts; exchanges and training of personnel in the cultural field 
in support of the activities of Member States; increasing awareness of different 
cultures and safeguarding the Community’s linguistic diversity, as well as 
promoting respect for shared values.49
These priority areas of action were further developed into three new framework 
programmes: RAPHAEL, KALEIDOSCOPE, and ARIANE.50 Although these 
programmes focused on different areas of cultural activities, they all shared the same 
objectives and organising principles. One of the defining characteristics of the post- 
Maastricht cultural programmes is a renewed attention to the connection between 
culture and socio-economic development. As well as generating a sense of belonging 
to the Community among European citizens, cultural action was assigned the role of 
turning cultural resources into economic capital. In giving expression to Article 128, 
the programmes were intended to achieve the following:
-  encouraging cultural cooperation in the form of networks and partnerships 
between different players and promoting the circulation of cultural works;
-  supporting emblematic cultural initiatives;
-  making use of the opportunities provided, in an information society, by new 
communication technologies;
-  enhancing the cultural dimension of socio-economic development. (CEC, 
1994b: 4)
48 Council resolution on the role of culture in the development of the European Union, Official Journal 
C32, 05/02/2002.
49 Official Journal C336/1, 1992
50 In the early 1990s, the audiovisual policy started to branch out of the EU cultural policy and since 
then, EU official documents have been dealing with the culture and audiovisual sectors separately. For 
the development of the audiovisual programmes such as MEDIA, see Chapter 8.
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KALEIDOSCOPE51
The KALEIDOSCOPE programme had existed since 1991 as an experiment, and was 
extended in 1996 to cover larger numbers of projects for the period between 1996 
and 1999. It supported various types of artistic creation including the performing arts 
(dance, music, theatre, opera), plastic and spatial arts, applied arts and audiovisual 
works (creative works using multimedia). The programme was divided into two 
action lines. Firstly, support was given to events and cultural projects carried out in 
partnership or through networks. To be eligible for this type of support, projects had 
to be organised by networks or by partners involving at least three member states. In 
1999, 119 projects were selected with a budget of approximately EURO 8 million.52 
Secondly, it supported large-scale, high-profile co-operation projects of a symbolic 
nature. Under this heading, existing individual support measures that were deemed to 
be emblematic (the European City of Culture, Europe Day, the European Community 
Youth Orchestra, etc.) were also incorporated into this programme.
RAPHAEL53
Introduced in 1997 to cover the period until 1999, RAPHAEL supported projects for 
the conservation of heritage. Prior to that, a pilot programme in this area had been 
running since 1988. The programme supported the protection of cultural heritage, 
professional exchanges and cooperations, the development of conservation 
techniques and vocational training. As in the Kaleidoscope programme, eligible 
projects must involve networks or partners from at least two or three member states, 
depending on the scale of projects. The support covered cooperation of over 500 
operators from all the member states. The detailed analysis of this programme will be 
given in Chapter 6.
51 Decision No 719/96/EC establishing a programme to support artistic and cultural activities having a 
European dimension (Kaleidoscope), Official Journal L99/20, 20/04/1996. The initial proposal for this 
programme was forwarded to the Council by the Commission in October 1994 (CEC, 1994b), but was 
not adopted until March 1996 due to differences in the positions of the member states.
52 <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/cpkaleidoscope99_en.html> downloaded on 30/03/2001.
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ARIANE54
ARIANE, the EU support programme in the field of books and reading, was 
implemented from 1997 to 1999 based on three actions. Action 1 concerned the 
translation of quality twentieth century literary works and of reference works which 
had already been published and had won critical acclaim. Action 2 supported 
cooperation projects with an aim to improve citizens’ access to books and reading. 
Eligible projects had to involve at least three operators from three member states. 
Action 3 dealt with vocational training of translators and other professionals in the 
field of publishing. The total number of projects supported was 767, one of which 
was the Aristeion Prizes (European Literature and Translation Prize).
As the brief descriptions above show, these programmes were aimed directly at 
cultural professionals, institutions and organisers of cultural events, as opposed to the 
‘consciousness-raising campaign’ of the 1980s which targeted the general public. 
Along with this change in the method of cultural action, the notion of what 
constitutes the basis of EU cultural policy was also modified. In contrast to its earlier 
insistence on the existence of common cultural roots, the Commission has opted for a 
practical definition of ‘European-ness’ in EU cultural action after 1992, highlighting 
its form rather than the content. The word ‘European dimension’, as used in 
documents concerning those post-Maastricht cultural programmes, referred not to 
some supposed cultural unity, but simply to the fact that they involved cross-border 
cooperation between cultural operators from different member states. In putting flesh 
on the commitments of Article 128, therefore, the emphasis of EU cultural action has 
shifted from attempts to engineer a unified European cultural identity to the 
functional networking of occupational groups in the cultural sector.
At one level, this is purely an administrative problem. Given the limited 
resource available to this sector (in terms of funding, legal authority and a number of 
staff), the Commission has to rely on the knowledge and experience of already-
53 Decision No 2228/97/EC establishing a Community action programme in the field of cultural 
heritage (Raphael), Official Journal L305, 08/11/1997.
54 Decision No 2085/97/EC establishing a programme of support in the field of books and reading 
(Ariane), Official Journal L291, 24/10/1997.
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established cultural institutions and organisations in order to aim for a maximum 
impact and greater visibility of their chosen line of action. The operational rules for 
KALEIDOSCOPE and RAPHAEL are particularly indicative of such limitations. 
First of all, to be eligible for funds under these programmes, applicants had to be 
organised in an association or other form of legally recognised body, and their 
proposed projects had to be on a scale over ECU 5,000. The reason given for this was 
disproportionately high administration costs involved in the application process for 
both the Commission and the applicants.55 Further, EU contributions granted through 
this programme must not exceed 50% of overall project costs, and could not be used 
as a basic funding for the applicant organisation itself. In other words, this part- 
funding mechanism was only designed to contribute to actual projects through which 
to develop lasting cooperation frameworks and not to the establishment of new 
organisations (Ellmeier, 1998: 128). This has created a tendency in the EU that 
privileges high-profile, well-organised groups and institutions. According to a recent 
study carried out at the request of the Commission, many cultural operators 
participated in EU cultural programmes found EU support in this area to be ‘too 
professionally oriented, requiring too much long term planning and offering 
possibilities too complex and distant for many cultural actors to grasp’ (ECOTEC, 
2003: 36).
The limitations of Community resource also manifest themselves at the initial 
stage of drafting proposals. It has long been customary for the Commission to gather 
expertise from external professional bodies for the development and the writing of 
policy proposals (Fuchs, 1995).56 Before deciding on a specific course of action, the 
Commission organises Europe-wide consultation meetings with selected experts 
from different member states and often commissions professional associations and 
think-tanks to undertake background research or the evaluation of past measures. The 
way the proposals for the above three programmes came into being is no exception to 
this general rule (CEC, 1994b: 13). As one observer remarked in describing the 
nature of European telecommunications policy, the character of EU policy ‘is not so
55 Kaleidoscope programme - Information and call for applications, Official Journal C l44/12, 
19/04/1996 and C298/09, 09/10/1996.
56 This observation applies to the EU’s other policy fields. See Fuchs, 1995.
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much owed to the predilections of the Commission but owed to the way they are 
formulated in a network-like process’ (Fuchs, 1995: 427).
Effective policy measures thus require the construction of alliances between 
EU institutions, a range of policy experts and interest groups. This means that in the 
area of cultural policy, the Commission is dependent on the formation of European 
networks not only for the implementation of its measures but also for their 
information and expertise. In fact, the Council had already adopted a resolution in 
1991 which explicitly established the centrality of networks of cultural organisations 
as intermediaries for fostering cross-border cooperation.57 In the previous chapter, I 
have mentioned that the cultural sector has since the mid-1980s suffered from 
cutbacks in public funding as part of general neoliberal restructuring. Against this 
backdrop, new opportunities opened up at the European level provides a valuable 
source of funding for cultural professionals and organisations whose activities are 
supported less and less by their respective national states. Concentrating support on 
the formation of transnational networks also provides an additional justification for 
EU intervention in this sphere, as individual countries tend to finance national or 
bilateral operations, whereas support for multilateral European partnerships are 
relatively neglected at national or regional levels (CEC, 2004a:9).
The increased formation and presence in Brussels of Europe-wide cultural 
umbrella groups such as European Forum for Arts and Heritage (EFAH) or 
International European Theatre Meeting (IETM) may testify to the growing 
importance of those cultural networks in EU policy-making process (Ellmeier, 1998: 
121-122). Independently of financial support allocated within the framework of the 
above cultural programmes, the EU has also been providing support grants to cultural 
organisations which are deemed to be of ‘European interest’ under budgetary
C O
headings entered in the Commission’s administrative expenditure. The emergent 
patterns of decision-making in the EU, therefore, represent a restructuring of political 
opportunities for different actors, favouring certain sorts of action and organisation
57 Council resolution on cultural networks, Official Journal C314, 05/12/1991
58 There are 17 of these organisations: EFAH; IETM; European Union Youth Orchestra; European 
Union Baroque Orchestra; European Opera Centre; European Chamber Orchestra; 
EuropaChorAkademie (Choir); EJYO/Swinging Europe (Jazz); European Writers’ Congress;
European Council of Artists; Europa Nostra (heritage); European League of Institutes of the Arts;
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over others (Barnett, 2001). If the evolving nature of the EU is best described as ‘a 
network polity’, cultural action in the EU might be considered as one policy field in 
which the feature of a Europe-wide network polity is emerging, characterised by a 
form of transnational governance which exists in the absence of formally 
representative political institutions (Axford and Huggins, 1999).
This is not to say that the EU officials have totally abandoned the ‘mass 
campaign’ approach to their symbolic construction of Europe, because this form of 
cultural politics continue under a different guise. Following the near-disastrous 
French referendum in 1992, Jacques Delors enlisted a group of public relations 
experts to suggest ways to improve the EU’s image. The resulting report, drawn up 
by a Belgian MEP Willy de Clercq, was approved by the Commission in 1993. De 
Clercq report reflected the idea, which has become prevalent in political 
communication strategies of the Commission, that the democratic deficit is simply a 
case of communication failure, and underlined the need to send ‘the right message to 
the right people in the right way at the right time and in the right place’ (De Clercq, 
1993:5). The report then recommended that European governments should stop 
hying to explain the Maastricht Treaty to their publics and concentrate instead on 
presenting and promoting the EU as a ‘good product’ (Ibid: 13). In order to ‘sell’ 
Europe, therefore, the beneficial effects of the EU ‘must be interpreted and 
personalized to each of the target audience in their language, using stimuli to which 
they will respond, appealing to their emotions, to their common sense . . .’ (Ibid: 25). 
Most of the concrete measures proposed had already been suggested by the Adonnino 
Report, but the most remarkable aspect of the de Clercq report is that the theme of 
identity and belonging were superseded by a utilitarian notion of ‘European citizen’ 
as the consumer of a brand called ‘Europe’.
More recently, the Commission launched a series of public information 
campaigns just before the introduction of the single currency, sending out posters, 
leaflets and videos that extolled the benefits of Euro. Other strategies for promoting 
Euro included organising teams of trained speakers and celebrities to participate in 
public debates on Euro and a travelling exhibition for schools, banks, local
European Network of Cultural Administration Training Centres; EUnetART; European Theatre 
Convention; Pegasus Foundation; and International Yehudi Menuhin Foundation.
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authorities and businesses (Shore, 2000: 103). Using marketing and PR techniques in 
political campaigns is obviously not unique to the EU, but in the absence of formal 
political representation structures at the European level, these public campaigns of 
the EU merely serves to highlight the deep-seated problems of legitimacy. The way 
in which political problems are being commodified in Europe is described by Weiler 
as a process whereby ‘the Union has become a product for which the managers, 
alarmed by customer dissatisfaction, are engaged in brand development’, giving 
expression to ‘a Saatchi & Saatchi European citizenship’ (Weiler, 1997a: 500 and 
502).
Culture for multiple utilities
If the emphasis on networks has established a new set of terms around which the 
development of cultural action would be organised after 1992, there is another 
element in Article 128 which was significant in opening up a different possibility for 
EU cultural policy (Sandell, 1996). The ‘cultural compliance clause’ (Title IV) of 
Article 128 turned cultural matters formally into a cross-cutting issue, and has 
allowed culture to take a greater share of resources within existing programmes 
whose objectives are not specifically cultural. As has been pointed out in the earlier 
section, documents dating back to the late 1980s already exhibited awareness on the 
part of the Commission that culture could play a key role in the fields of 
employment, regional development or training. But it was only with Maastricht 
providing a legal base for culture within the Community that culture-related activities 
in other policy fields were identified as properly constituting the EU’s cultural 
measures as such. The significance of such official recognition becomes apparent 
when one looks at a study on EU cultural funds carried out for the Commission in 
1993. The study calculated that, apart from the direct DG X interest in culture, the 
EU, through other Directorates-General of the Commission, had indirectly 
channelled ECU 2.47 billion into cultural activities in the period 1989-93, which 
represented approximately 0.8% of the total Community budget. Of all the funds 
invested in the cultural sector, 82.7% came from the structural funds, 9.6% from 
science and techonology-related programmes, and only 7.7% from specific EU 
cultural programmes of the DG X (Bates and Wacker, 1993). From this study, the
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fact emerges that programmes with a direct and conscious cultural objective (funding 
handled primarily by DG X - such as Kaleidoscope and Ariane) were in reality a side­
show to the overall cultural initiatives which are indirectly managed by other 
Directorates-General (Sandell, 1996: 272).
In 1996, the Commission published a ‘First Report on the Consideration of 
Cultural Aspects in European Community Action’ in response to the ‘cultural 
compliance clause’ of the Maastricht Treaty. In this first attempt to provide a 
comprehensive list of what constitutes the EU cultural policies, the Commission has 
adopted a very broad definition of culture: ‘the concept of Culture is a nebulous one 
which can vary from one school of thought to another, from one society to another 
and from one era to another. It may include the Fine arts, literature, etc., but may also 
include all types of knowledge and features which characterise a society and make it 
possible to understand the world’ (CEC, 1996a: I, 3). This potentially ever-expanding 
definition means that virtually all EU programmes could mutate into cultural 
programmes, and the report covers an incredibly wide spectrum of activities, ranging 
from the regulatory aspects of the single market to foreign policies. The main 
objective of drawing up this list was to assess whether cultural elements in those 
various activities were compatible with the economic logic of market integration. 
While noting that ‘a great majority of the policies and actions implemented by the 
Community now include a cultural dimension or have an impact on certain cultural 
fields’, the report concluded that in many of these policy areas cultural objectives 
were not sufficiently respected due to the economic and commercial nature of the 
activities in question (CEC, 1996a: V, 1). The Commission thus suggested a number 
of ways in which the balance between different imperatives of ‘culture’ and 
‘economy’ could be achieved in different policy areas, with audiovisual policy and 
copyright harmonisation being held up as examples of such reconciliation.59 In other 
words, the report was focused on the question of how ‘culture’ and ‘cultural 
diversity’ could be utilised to serve multiple objectives which are essentially non- 
cultural. Culture has thus become a multi-dimensional sector through which various 
different policy issues could be managed. Among those EU actions that impinge
59 The Commission maintains that in those areas the economic logic of market integration and 
harmonisation actually facilitates the promotion of cultural diversity as it guarantees a more effective 
expression of individualised consumer preferences (see also Chapter 8).
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upon culture, there are some policy areas in particular in which ‘culture’ features 
prominently. In what follows I will give a summary of three closely inter-related 
policy areas whose spheres of activities also overlap with those of the three cultural 
programmes above.
Structural policy
With approximately 80% of Community cultural expenditure originating from the 
Structural Funds, Structural policy occupies a central place in the overall EU cultural 
action. Structural action aims to promote coherent social and economic development 
of the Community by reducing regional inequalities. Two types of regions are eligible 
for this funds: rural or ‘peripheral’ areas and areas suffering from industrial decline. 
Up until 1992, there was hardly any mention of ‘culture’ in Structural policy 
documents, even though money from Structural Funds had been going to the cultural 
sector. The connection between the two has become explicit with the introduction of 
the ‘cultural compliance clause’ (Delgado Moreira, 2000). In its 1996 communication 
on ‘Cohesion Policy and Culture’, the Commission firmly established the role of 
culture as providing an endogenous potential for regional and local development: 
‘Culture is not merely a public occupation creating extra costs but also an 
increasingly important part of the private economy with considerable growth 
potential, fostering creative, innovative and productive effects for regional and local 
economies’ (CEC, 1996c: 2). In this context, the importance of culture was identified 
at three levels. Firstly, culture could be a major source of employment. Activities 
related to the cultural heritage as well as cultural works and artefacts create jobs 
directly (arts and cultural industries) and indirectly (tourism). Secondly, culture 
makes a substantial contribution to the image and attractiveness of a region or a city, 
which is an important factor for further investment and relocating firms with 
significant implications for regenerating deprived urban or rural areas. Thirdly, 
culture can play a positive role in promoting the integration of disadvantaged sectors 
of society and thus contribute to social cohesion (EP, 1998: 45; CEC, 1996c: 4). 
Cultural diversity rather uniformity is here envisaged as a distinct advantage since it 
is cultural difference that would give to a region its uniqueness, thereby increasing 
the potential of a region to attract more tourists and business investments. Thus, for
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example, the Temple Bar regeneration project received assistance from the EU 
Structural Funds which mobilised the culture and media sector for the revitalisation 
of an area in Dublin. Temple Bar became a cultural quarter, with an Irish Film 
Centre, artists’ studios, art galleries, exhibition rooms, a jewellery design centre and a 
children’s theatre. As a result, 72 businesses moved into Temple Bar, and 1200 jobs 
were created. Today, Temple Bar is Ireland’s third biggest tourist attraction 
(Ellmeier, 1998:154).60
Information and communication technologies
EU’s Research and Development and Advanced Technologies sector has a major 
focus on information and communication technologies. Its objective is to strengthen 
the technological bases of European industry and to favour the development of its 
international competitiveness (CEC, 1996a: n, 23). These activities are led within the 
Fifth Framework Programme (1998-2002) which puts more emphasis on the 
development of the cultural sector compared to the previous Fourth Framework 
Programme (1994-98). Two of the programmes covered by the current framework 
pay particular attention to culture: the user-friendly Information Society programme 
and the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development programme.61 The latter 
features a key action called ‘The city of tomorrow and cultural heritage’ which, with 
a budget of EUR 170 million, promotes the protection and sustainable management 
of cultural heritage. The Information Society programmes, on the other hand, features 
a key theme ‘multimedia content and tools’ with an allocated sum of EUR 564 
million. It seeks to stimulate the development of tools and systems for managing, 
disseminating and using digital content with a cultural theme. The relevance of this 
sector to the EU audiovisual policy is quite obvious, but the application of digital 
technologies extends to more ‘traditional’ areas of culture including the music, 
publishing, museums and heritage sectors. The Commission presents the
60 For a more detailed examination of culture and urban regeneration, see Chapter 6
61 Information downloaded from the Commission’s official cultural portal 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/fman_en.htm> on 18/03/2002.
62 For example, the ‘Artiste’ project, funded by this programme in conjunction with sponsorship from 
the private sector, is in the process of digitalising, filing and networking high-quality reproductions of 
paintings held by Europe’s leading art museums (CEC, 2002f).
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relationship between technology, economy and cultural diversity as mutually 
complementing, as cultural diversity ensures the supply of original cultural content to 
the various content industries in Europe, thereby improving their competitive 
positions on the world market. This, in turn, is believed to protect and enhance 
Europe’s creativity and diversity which would otherwise be wiped out by the forces 
of globalisation (CEC, 1998c: 27).
Employment
The imperative to redefine cultural action in ways that reconcile with what remain 
the overwhelmingly economic imperatives of the EU has led to an emphasis upon the 
existing and potential employment impact of the cultural sector. Especially since the 
new Amsterdam Treaty included the employment issue as ‘a matter of common 
interest’, employment initiatives have become one of the key foci of EU policy in the 
late-1990s. According to a Commission document presented jointly by DG V 
(employment and social affairs) and DG X (culture, audiovisual and sport) in 1998, 
there is a strong case for ascribing more importance to culture in relation to 
employment (CEC, 1998e). The document estimated that some 3 million people are 
employed in the cultural sectors in the EU, amounting to about 2% of total 
employment. The assumption here is that the general increase in cultural demand, 
coupled with developments in the new technologies and other areas such as cultural 
tourism, would provide a background against which cultural activities could become 
an invaluable resource for the future development of employment in Europe. But the 
most interesting aspect of this analysis is not how the cultural sector as such can 
expand to absorb the unemployed population. What is novel in the Commission’s 
recent approach to culture and employment is the way in which cultural activities are 
believed to improve the employability of the general population. Significant in this 
respect is the European Employment Strategy which was agreed upon in December 
1997 at the Luxembourg summit of the European Council for the combating of 
unemployment. As a result of this summit, ‘the whole policy of the Community’ was 
to be ‘mobilised for employment more systematically and consciously than 
previously’ and the following four guidelines were established for future action: 
developing entrepreneurship; improving employability; encouraging adaptability;
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strengthening equal opportunities policy.63 In pursuing those objectives, culture’s 
‘utility’ extends beyond its role in a culture-industries employment strategy whose 
central pillar is to encourage networking and cooperation agreements between small- 
and medium- sized enterprises that dominates this particular sector (CEC, 1998e: 16- 
18). Culture is now considered a medium for cultivating those skills such as 
creativity and flexibility that are set to become crucial to the ‘jobs of the future’:
The nature o f work has altered radically: to participate more fully in 
society and the world of work, people are required to develop 
professional qualities based on more specific individual skills, such as 
creativity, initiative, flexibility, and human relations skills. Increasingly 
employers are seeking the potential for personal development and growth 
which cultural practices (exhibitions, performing arts, fine arts, etc.) may 
help to shape (CEC, 1998e: 19, emphasis in original).
Cultural practices are therefore framed as instruments which can make individuals 
more creative, entrepreneurial and adaptable, and which can, moreover, strengthen 
equal opportunities by promoting mutual respect (Barnet, 2001: 418-420). 
Furthermore, culture not only encourages personal development which can be 
channelled into the growth potential of Europe’s economy, but it also plays a role in 
overall social cohesion, thereby encouraging marginalised groups to resume their 
place in society in the context of occupational integration: ‘Training and participation 
in a variety of cultural activities are increasingly emerging as a significant tool of 
social integration whereby people can acquire new or improved skills and 
qualifications’ (CEC, 1998e: 19, emphasis in original).
One example of such occupational integration through culture is the 
workshop schools in Spain for jobless young people, jointly financed by the 
European Social Fund (part of the EU Structural Fund). These are training schemes 
designed to provide young people with qualifications in areas related to heritage 
conservation. As well as learning very specialised skills which are directly 
transferable to employment, the Commission claims that those young people have
63 Official Journal, C30/1, 28/01/1998.
107
improved their ‘initiative, flexibility and self-confidence’ through cultural activities 
which gave them ‘a very positive image in terms of identity, cultural memory and 
community development’ (CEC, 1998e: 20). Here, in a way that closely resembles 
the ‘social development’ approach to culture advocated by UNESCO, culture has 
come to contribute to social and employment policy objectives as it has been 
integrated into EU education and training programmes (Beale, 1999).64 Closely 
related to this is the concept of ‘Culture for all’ which has been on the EU agenda for 
cultural action since the mid-1990s: ‘access for citizens to culture in an operational or 
user capacity is an essential condition for full participation in society’.65 The role of 
culture in facilitating the development of society as a whole is further expanded by 
the recent addition of the concept of ‘the knowledge society’. As the Council 
resolution of January 2002 stated, it is crucial ‘to ensure that every citizen of the 
European Union is equipped with the skills needed to live and work in the 
information and knowledge society and that no one is excluded from access to the 
Internet and to other multimedia resources’, because ‘the shift to a digital, 
knowledge-based economy ... will be a powerful engine for growth, competitiveness 
and jobs’, the basis of which is ‘exploiting and networking European cultural 
diversity’.66 In this integrated vision of the ‘knowledge society’, the connections 
between culture, technology, employment, and social and economic cohesion are 
mobilised to form a fundamental basis on which the future development of the EU as 
a whole is thought to depend.
The latest attempt to incorporate this integral approach to culture in an 
‘inherently’ cultural programme (i.e. a programme operated by DG X) is exemplified 
by an initiative called Culture 2000 which has replaced the old Kaleidoscope, Ariane 
and Raphael programmes. Culture 2000 combines those three programmes into a 
single framework with a commitment of 167 million EUR over a five-year period 
from 2000 to 2004. For the preparation of this programme, the Commission 
undertook the most extensive consultations which have ever been conducted on
64 According to the report of UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Conference in 1998, cultural policies 
‘need to encompass new challenges in the arts and heritage yet go beyond these areas to embrace 
human development and the promotion of pluralism, as well as the fostering of social cohesion and 
creativity’, quoted in Beale, 1999.
65 Council resolution on access to culture for all, Official Journal C242/1, 1996.
66 Council resolution on culture and the knowledge society, Official Journal, C32/1, 05/02/2002.
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cultural issues within the EU, involving the member states, the European Parliament, 
the Council of Europe and UNESCO as well as cultural organisations (CEC, 1998c: 
9). A consensus that emerged out of those consultation procedures was that ‘culture 
is no longer considered a subsidiary activity but a driving force in society, making for 
creativity, vitality, dialogue and cohesion’ (Ibid.: 3). Culture was therefore 
considered to be ‘intrinsic to any response to the major challenges that we face today’ 
such as the acceleration of European integration, globalisation, the information 
society, employment and social cohesion. Thus, as well as the immediate goal of 
fostering cultural cooperation, the Culture 2000 programme is ultimately expected to 
tackle various problems arising from those contemporary socio-economic challenges. 
In practical terms, the methods through which this overall aim is pursued represent 
the combination of the two approaches examined above. As in the previous three 
programmes, the main target of support is cooperation and networking between 
cultural professionals, operators and cultural organisations of the member states. At 
the same time, this new programme also adopts a multi-dimensional approach and 
will ‘promote synergy and develop cultural creation, as much through the promotion 
of trans-sectoral activities involving a number of cultural sectors, as through 
supporting joint activities involving different Community programmes and 
policies’.68
What is more, Culture 2000 also aims to make culture, through the activities 
of cultural professionals, accessible to the greatest possible number of people and to 
encourage creativity in European society (CEC, 2002f). Ordinary citizens are thus 
expected to involve themselves more closely in European integration via EU cultural 
initiatives whose instrumentality lie less in changing people’s cultural orientation 
than in serving the economic and social imperatives of integration. This seems to 
represent a novel way of using cultural practices as a means of strengthening public 
engagement in the EU as it does not necessarily postulate cultural unity at the centre 
of people’s identification with a polity. Instead, it envisages a very utilitarian form of 
public involvement which can be measured by the extent to which people have been
67 Decision No 508/2000/EC establishing the Culture 2000 programme, Official Journal L63/1, 
10/03/2000.
68 Ibid.
109
functionally integrated into a pragmatic vision of a society delineated by the EU 
institutions.
Despite these ambitious objectives, the interim evaluation reports on the 
implementation of the Culture 2000 programme demonstrate certain limitations of 
this programme (CEC, 2003; ECOTEC, 2003). First, the geographical penetration of 
the programme is uneven. Of all the participating countries, France, Italy, Germany, 
Greece and Spain received 61% of overall Culture 2000 funding, which 
approximately corresponds to the number of applications submitted by these five 
countries (CEC, 2003).69 Secondly, as has been noted above, although the 
programme does seem to promote transnational cultural collaboration and exchange 
of resources (information/technology), the agency report found that cultural networks 
supported by this programme were not always inclusive, not visible or accessible to 
newcomers, and lacked involvement by minority cultures. Lastly, many cultural 
operators interviewed in the survey noted that cultural projects tend to follow funding 
opportunities rather than reflecting strategic, long-term goals set by the EU (such as 
socio-economic goals or its contribution to citizenship). In this sense, cultural 
cooperation has only developed in so far as it has helped individual organisations 
develop their own projects and achieve their own goals, and this has not improved 
the prospects for building shared European culture or citizenship (ECOTEC, 2003).
The latest Commission guideline for EU cultural programmes published in 
March 2004 (CEC, 2004b) confirms the role of cultural operators and networks as 
main actors in the emerging European cultural space. The guideline posits three 
central objectives: to improve the transnational mobility of people working in the 
cultural sector; to improve transnational circulation of works of art; and to facilitate 
intercultural dialogue. In the Commission’s words, the EU’s new cultural 
programme, which is due to replace the Culture 2000 programme in 2006, ‘will 
actively contribute to the bottom-up development of a European identity, by giving 
cultural operators and citizens more opportunities to create networks, to implement 
projects, to be more mobile and to enhance the cultural dialogue within Europe and
69 This figure is based on the nationalities of ‘project leaders’ (under whose names applications are 
made). However, it is difficult to assess the distribution of funds on a nationality basis as most projects 
had to include, as required by the operational rules of Culture 2000, a partnership of at least 3 
operators from 3 different countries.
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with other parts of the world’ (CEC, 2004b: 12). This is a much more pragmatic and 
modest goal compared to the ambitious ‘People’s Europe’ campaign of the 1980s.
Conclusion
Cultural action in the EU started as a subsidiary area of economic activities without 
adequate funds or legal authority. Materially speaking, the peripheral position of 
cultural initiatives in the overall EU policy has not changed significantly since the 
1970s, except that the Maastricht Treaty has officially recognised culture within the 
realm of EU competence. What has changed, however, is the way EU cultural policy 
came to be conceptualised, the process of which can be characterised as ‘the 
multiplication of culture’s utility’ (Bennet, 1995). In the 1980s, the utility of culture 
was framed principally in terms of its effectiveness in transforming the affective 
identification of the general public. But the introduction of the cultural clause in the 
Maastricht Treaty created both constraints and possibilities that have led the 
development of an EU cultural agenda in the 1990s in a different direction. Putting 
general Treaty commitments to support culture into practice has involved a shift from 
a symbolic notion of culture towards a more specific and practical approach in which 
culture is understood more as regional (or local) and diverse, and as a resource to be 
exploited in line with multiple objectives. Those objectives include: to increase direct 
employment; to boost the image of regions to attract investment; to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the European cultural/audiovisual industry; and to enhance 
people’s employability and to combat social exclusion.
With this shift in the role assigned to culture, the preferred method of 
implementing cultural action has also been modified to prioritise professional 
networking and partnerships over mass-oriented campaigns. It is interesting to ask 
whether the EU cultural policy embodies the postnational or postmodern form of 
governance, but that question is beyond the scope of this chapter. What the argument 
so far has tried to show is that the evolution of the triangular relationship between 
culture, the EU and its citizens is not likely to be shaped in a process akin to that of 
nation-building. The new understanding about how to govern a cultural space
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suggests an alternative locus of opportunity structures that undercut national states 
and national cultures.
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CHAPTER 4 
Education in the European Union
It is often argued that the success of European integration depends on the EU’s 
ability to forge a sense of shared identity among the peoples of Europe. This type of 
argument is typically based on the assumptions of polity-formation which are drawn 
on the model of the nation-state. The nationalism literature turns the attention, among 
other things, to the function of mass education as providing a crucial identity- 
conferring mechanism in the nation-building process (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 
1990). In this connection, this chapter looks at the EU’s education policy and 
explores its significance in the development of European integration.
For the purpose of the present chapter, I draw a distinction between the socio­
economic dimension and the politico-cultural dimension of education (Moschonas, 
1995). The former is primarily directed towards the investment in human capital, 
thereby contributing to the enhancement of the productivity of labour and the 
competitiveness of the economy. The latter, on the other hand, involves the 
transmission of cultural values and practices, thereby contributing to the 
creation/construction of a citizenry. In the context of the European Union, the socio­
economic dimension of education can be said to represent a function of economic 
integration, whereas the politico-cultural dimension is a function of political 
integration. Although these two dimensions are not mutually exclusive, I will argue 
that the development of EU education policy has been largely driven by economic 
imperatives while the cultural function of education continues to be left with the 
member states.
Early institutionalisation: 1971 -1984
The development of EU programmes in education has taken on a similar path to 
those in culture. Until the introduction of educational provisions in the Treaty on the 
European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), education did not formally fall within the 
competence of the European Community. But unlike cultural policy, there were a few 
indirect references to education in the original Treaty of Rome, including provisions
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for vocational training (Article 41, 118 and 128) and mutual recognition of 
certificates (Article 57) both of which concern the free movement of workers across 
the Community. As these provisions did not touch upon broad educational issues 
which were not directly related to the functioning of the single market, proposals for 
Community actions in the field of education were normally framed in economic 
terms which, in most cases, meant vocational training. In the early years of European 
integration, vocational training was not given a high priority in the overall 
Community agenda. The earliest move towards the development of a common policy 
in this area was taken in 1963 in the form of a Council decision laying down general
70principles for future action. One of the objectives of a common vocational training 
policy, the decision noted, was that vocational training was to be broadened and 
based firmly on general education. The question as to where a dividing line between 
general and vocational education could be drawn had been a controversial issue, but 
later in 1985, the European Court of Justice passed a landmark judgement that any 
form of education which prepares for a qualification for employment could be
71considered as vocational training. The Court therefore broadened the definition of 
vocational training to cover university or higher education and even some aspects of 
general education such as language learning.
Partly because of this connection with vocational training, Community action 
in the field of education started to take shape as early as 1971. In July 1971, the 
Commission set up two new bodies dedicated to the study of educational issues, the 
Working Party on Teaching and Education and the Interdepartmental Working Party 
on Coordination (CEC, 1973: 9). In November of the same year the Ministers for 
Education held their first meeting, and stated that Community measures in vocational 
training ‘should be supplemented by greater cooperation in the field of education as 
such’, the ultimate aim of which is ‘to define a European model of culture correlating 
with European integration’ (EC, 1987:11). 72
70 Council Decision 63/266/EEC, Official Journal No.63, 20/04/1963.
71 Case 293/83 Gravier. The European Court of Justice has played a major role in extending the 
Community competence in education through a series of other progressive rulings. See McMahon, 
1995.
72 As in the case of Cultural Ministers Council, the meetings of Educational Ministers often took the 
form of ‘Ministers for Education meeting within the Council’ rather than ‘the Council of the Ministers 
for Education’, indicating that education was outside the competence of the Community (and therefore
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In 1972, the Commission appointed the former Belgian minister of education 
Henri Janne to undertake a review of areas that might lend themselves to a future 
programme of action in the field of education. Janne enlisted a number of educational 
experts to form an advisory panel, and the resulting report, commonly referred to as 
the Janne Report, identified a possible scope for a Community policy on education. 
While acknowledging the limited competence allowed by the Treaty, the report noted 
that specific actions at the Community level should include promotion of foreign 
languages, staff and student exchanges between schools and universities, adult and 
continuing education and the introduction of the ‘European dimension’ in education, 
especially in subjects such as geography, history and civics (CEC, 1973).
In responding to the Janne Report, the Commission produced its first 
memorandum on education in 1974. Measures proposed in this communication were 
not as extensive as those envisaged by the Janne Report, and mainly consisted of 
pilot projects and feasibility studies in three areas: mobility of academic staff, 
researchers and students in higher education, education of the children of migrant 
workers and encouragement of the ‘European dimension’ in education (foreign 
language learning and the study of Europe) (CEC, 1974). The Ministers for education 
considered the Commission’s proposal at their second meeting and confirmed in their 
resolution ‘the need to institute European cooperation in the field of education’. The 
basis of Community action in this area was to be cooperation rather than the 
harmonisation of existing policies and systems. It was therefore stated that allowance 
must be made for the traditions of each country and the diversity of their respective 
education policies and systems (EC, 1987:15). Having agreed the principles of 
cooperation in the field of education, the Ministers set up an Education Committee, 
composed of representatives of the member states and of the Commission, whose 
first task was to prepare a detailed Action Programme.
The Action Programme was adopted by the education ministers in 1976, and 
identified six priority areas: better facilities for the education and training of national 
and the children of nationals of other member states and non-member countries; 
promotion of closer relations between education systems in Europe; compilation of
the ministers were meeting on an intergovernmental basis rather than within the Community 
framework).
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up-to-date documentation and statistics on education; cooperation in the field of 
higher education; teaching of foreign languages; and achievement of equal 
opportunity for free access to all forms of education (EC, 1987:23-7). Compared to 
the proposals contained in the Janne Report, the 1976 action programme is marked 
by its modesty. This was hardly surprising considering the relative silence of the 
Treaty on education. It adopted a two-pronged approach whereby a distinction was 
made between actions to be carried out at Community level and those which fell 
under the responsibility of member states. This ‘dual’ nature was to characterise the 
subsequent stages of developments of EU education policy, and eventually found 
legal expression in the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty. Since the 
1976 resolution was not a binding decision, the implementation of a major part of the 
action programme was dependent upon the good-will of each member state. As for 
initiatives to be taken at the Community level, measures proposed in the action 
programme were limited to a number of ‘non-commital’ measures such as studies 
and evaluation of existing educational policies, exchange of information and 
experience between the member states, study visits and seminars for teachers, and 
pilot projects, all of which belongs to a pre-decisional stage of policy-making 
(Beukel, 1993:160). Nevertheless, the 1976 action programme was significant in the 
development of EU educational policy in that it marked an acceptance of education 
beyond the strict legal limits of vocational training as a legitimate area of policy 
interest for the EU (McMahon, 1995:11).
Thus, although education came to be recognised in the 1970s as an area which 
required common solutions at Community level, the role assigned to the Community 
in this field was largely confined to the gathering and dissemination of information 
regarding the educational practices of the member states. In fact, the only substantial 
measure that was taken in the 1970s in the area of education was a Council Directive 
on the equal access for the children of migrant workers to education in the host 
country, the primary rationale of which, of course, was to facilitate the free 
movement of workers within the Community.73
73 Council Directive 77/486/EEC on the education o f the children o f migrant workers, Official Journal
L199, 1977.
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If the period between 1971-1980 marked a modest beginning in the evolution 
of the EU education policy, the 1970s also saw a gradual shift in the context of how 
education policy was planned both in the member states and in the Community 
institutions themselves. The oil shock of 1973 and the economic downturn that 
followed had triggered off dramatic rises in unemployment levels across European 
societies especially among young people. In adopting the 1976 action programme, 
therefore, the education ministers attached special weight to measures related to the 
preparation of young people for work and the transition from school to working life 
(EC, 1987: 25). At the time of the Ministers’ 1976 resolution, European policy­
makers assumed the problem of youth unemployment to be a passing phenomenon 
that would disappear once the economy picked up, and the planning of Community 
action accordingly consisted of one-off modifications to education on the one hand 
and vocational training on the other (Neave, 1984). By the latter part of 1978, 
however, belief in the short-term nature of youth unemployment could no longer be 
sustained, calling for a rethinking in existing approaches to training and education. 
Although the Community’s interest in education was legitimated by its connection to 
vocational training, the Community had hitherto upheld the traditional differentiation 
between education and vocational training, where the former maintained a more 
academic orientation (Neave, 1984; Moschonas, 1998). Faced with deep economic 
crisis and high levels of unemployment, the Community’s initial position of viewing 
education mostly in the context of academic qualities gave way to a more functional 
approach to education and training. What was required (or thought to be required) 
was a closer, integrated planning between the two sectors of education and training, 
which should contribute not only to the immediate goal of providing guidance and 
training for the unemployed but also to alleviate social and economic problems 
caused by unemployment. Thus, education and training together came to be 
conceived of as playing a crucial role in a wider context of social and employment 
strategies both at the levels of the member states and of the Community.
Such an approach is best exemplified in the institutional reorganisation of the 
Commission in 1981. Since January 1973, responsibility for education was placed 
under Directorate-General XII (Research and Science). Vocational training, on the 
other hand, was within the ambit of Directorate-General V, which dealt with 
employment and social affairs. In 1981 education and vocational training were
brought together under DG V to form an integrated social policy DG. Following this 
move, the first joint Council meeting of the Ministers of Labour and Social affairs 
and Ministers for Education was held in 1983. The conclusions of this joint session 
noted that education and vocational training policies could complement the interplay 
of economic, financial and employment policies in eradicating unemployment (EC, 
1987: 95-96).
This integrated approach to social policy has significantly raised the profile of 
education within the Community. But the increased level of interest was not 
necessarily translated into concrete action. In this connection, mention must be made 
about the role of the European Social Fund. The European Social Fund was 
established in 1974 as part of the Structural Funds with the principal aim of reducing 
regional inequalities across the member states by supporting vocational training for 
the unemployed. It is organised around a set of common objectives set by the 
Community but the fund itself is managed by the member states. When European 
leaders became preoccupied with the issues of unemployment in the late-1970s, it 
was in fact largely through the European Social Fund, and not through education or 
training policy, that the Community efforts to combat unemployment were 
channelled.
The single market and a People’s Europe
Apart from its implications for employment, education also came to play another 
important role in the strategic thinking of the Commission in the 1980s. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Adonnino Report of 1985 on a People’s 
Europe identified various ways to improve the image of the Community among its 
citizens. The first part of the report maintained that the most attractive aspect of the 
single market was for individuals to enjoy freedom of movement, emphasising the 
importance of mutual recognition of qualifications and strengthening the general 
right of residence. The second report, which contained sections specifically dedicated 
to education and training, proposed measures ‘to involve and interest young people in 
the further development of Europe’, including language training, school exchanges, 
voluntary work camps for youth, university cooperation, and enhancing Europe’s 
image in education and vocational training (CEC, 1985a). Similarly in 1985, the
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Commission White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market stressed that as 
part of the process of economic integration, the Commission intended to ‘increase its 
support for cooperation programmes between further education establishments in the 
different Member States with a view to promoting the mobility of students, 
facilitating the academic recognition of degrees and thus diplomas, and helping 
young people, in whose hands the future of the Community’s economy lies, to think 
in European terms’ (CEC, 1985b: 26).
Although nothing substantially new was proposed in those two documents, 
the ‘People’s Europe’ initiative and the goal of completing the single market created 
a background against which the Community made substantial inroads into education 
policy. In the run-up to 1992, education and training came to acquire a prominent 
supporting role in two respects. Firstly, the heightened interest in education in the 
1980s reflected a widespread concern that economic integration must be underpinned 
by popular support. Education was viewed in this context as a mechanism to create 
conditions conductive to political legitimisation through fostering a common 
European identity among future generations. Secondly, to the extent that Community 
measures introduced in the late 1980s were focused on facilitating the freedom of 
movement among a certain section of population (i.e. students and teachers) across 
the member states, education and training initiatives were simply an extension of the 
single market principles. The underlying rationale was economic, rather than cultural, 
in that preparing students and education professionals to operate more effectively 
within the single market was thought to help maximise Europe’s economic 
performance. As the Commission’s memorandum on the guidelines for educational 
actions for the period between 1988 and 1992 put it,:
The new Commission has therefore decided to place education and 
training at the forefront of its priorities to spearhead a new Community- 
wide commitment to invest in people, in their skills, their creativity and 
their versatility. Without investment in the present future workforce, 
Europe’s capacity to innovate, to compete, and to create wealth and 
prosperity for all its citizens will be severely impaired (CEC, 1988a: 1).
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From the mid-1980s to 1992, the Commission launched nine new education 
and training action programmes with a combined budget of well over a billion ECUs 
(See Table 1). Most of these programmes have in fact their origin in the 1976 action 
programme, but have been adopted as a result of the renewed impetus arising from 
the drive towards the completion of the single market. The EU’s earliest attempt to 
develop a training programme that was clearly its own was EUROTECNET (new 
technologies in training), which was approved in 1983. COMETT (Community 
action programme for Education and Training for Technology), the EU’s first 
programme in education, was established to promote university-industry cooperation 
in the field of new technology in 1986.74 Its objective was fourfold: to give a 
European dimension to cooperation between institutions of higher education and 
industry in the area of new technologies; to foster joint development of training 
programmes, exchange of experience and optimum use of training resources at 
Community level; to improve the supply of training at local, regional and national 
levels; and to develop the level of training in response to technological and social 
changes.
TABLE 1: First generation of EC education and training programmes
Programme Duration Budget 
execution 
up to 1992 
(ECU M)
Purpose
COMETT 1986-1995 206.6 University-industry cooperation 
in the field of technology 
training
ERASMUS 1987-1994 307.5 Mobility of university students 
and staff and joint curriculum 
projects
EUROTECNET 1983-1994 7.0 Promote innovation in training in 
respect of the new technologies
FORCE 1991-1994 31.3 Promote continuing vocational 
training
LINGUA 1990-1994 68.6 Promote foreign language 
competence within teacher 
education, secondary and higher 
education and vocational training
74 Decision 86/365/EEC, Official Journal L222, 1986.
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PETRA 1988-1994 79.7 Promote vocational training of 
young people and preparation for 
adult life
TEMPUS 1990-1994 194 Mobility scheme for university 
studies between EU and 
central/eastern Europe
YES 1988-1994 32.2 ‘Youth for Europe’ - exchanges 
of young people and centres
IRIS 1988-1995 0.75 Networking between vocational 
training projects for women
Source: CEC, 1993a
This was followed by the adoption of ERASMUS (mobility of university 
students), LINGUA (promotion of foreign language competence), PETRA (Action 
programme for the vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult 
and working life), YOUTH for Europe (Youth exchanges), IRIS (European network 
of vocational training projects for women), FORCE (Action programme for the 
development of continuing vocational training), and TEMPUS (Trans-European 
mobility scheme for University studies in central and eastern Europe). Despite their 
different target areas and objectives, these programmes were all built around the idea 
of facilitating mobility and exchange between the member states. The programmes 
also share the organising principle which involves the creation of transnational 
networks of organisations or joint projects between partners in different member 
states. They were all designed to establish direct relations between relevant 
organisations and the Commission based on voluntary participation from educational 
institutions and professionals. To the extent that initiatives for joint projects had to 
come from the participating organisations, the programmes sought to stimulate 
‘bottom-up’ demands for education policy at the European level (CEC, 1993a; 
McMahon, 1995). In the following section, I discuss what I consider to be three of 
the most important areas in the development of Community education policy in the 
1980s: mobility in higher education (Erasmus); foreign language competence 
(Lingua); and European dimension in education.
Transnational mobility in higher education
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Cooperation between institutions of higher education was identified as one of the 
priority areas in the 1970s, and pilot projects in this area had been in operation before 
the introduction of an independent Community programme, ERASMUS (European 
Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students). The ERASMUS programme 
was adopted in June 1987, based on Articles 128 (vocational training) and 235 of the 
Treaty. It was expected to achieve two broad objectives: firstly, to significantly 
increase the number of students spending an integrated period of study in another 
member state ‘in order that the Community may draw upon an adequate pool of 
manpower with first hand experience of economic and social aspects of other 
member states’; secondly, to increase the full intellectual potential of the universities 
‘by means of increased mobility of teaching staff, thereby improving the quality of 
the education and training provided by the universities with a view to securing the 
competitiveness of the Community in the world market’; and finally, ‘to strengthen 
the interaction between citizens in different member states with a view to 
consolidating the concept of a People’s Europe’.
In pursuing these objectives, ERASMUS set out three types of measures: the 
establishment and operation of inter-university cooperation programmes (ICPs) for 
exchanging students and teachers; a scheme for student mobility grants to be awarded 
for at least one term of study in another member country; the setting up of a 
European Community Course Credit Transfer System (ECTS) for the multilateral 
transfer of course credits, to be connected to the European Community Network of 
National Academic Recognition Information Centre (NARIC). Unlike previous 
cooperation arrangements supported by the Community, individual institutions could 
send applications under this programme without any reference to the national 
ministry or to regional authorities. Thus it achieved high visibility at the level of 
educational institutions.
Among all the education/training programmes introduced in the mid-1980s, 
ERASMUS was by far the largest both in terms of its budget and the attention it 
attracted. The centrality of this programme needs to be understood in the context of
75 Decision 87/327/EEC, Official Journal L166,1987. Article 235 allowed the Community to attain 
objectives mentioned in the Rome Treaty but not spelled out in any detail. In the present case, it was 
argued that the adoption of the Erasmus programme contributed to the fundamental objective of 
completing the single market.
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the Community’s long-standing attempts to foster labour mobility. The mobility of 
labour was one of the ‘four freedoms’ (along with capital, goods and services) which 
the Treaty of Rome originally set out to achieve. The Commission initially 
concentrated on encouraging employers and member states to recognise one 
another’s qualifications (Field, 1998). As the deadline for the completion of the 
single market approached, however, it became apparent that simple encouragement 
had failed to create a more mobile labour market, particularly among highly qualified 
employees. This experience has led to two strands of action in the sphere of 
education. One of them was a Directive on a general system for the recognition of 
higher education.76 This Directive, which was adopted in 1988, meant that each 
member state had to accept that a university degree awarded in one member state 
must be treated as a university degree in all member states. The other is the 
development of education and training programmes exemplified by Erasmus, which 
were designed to produce ever more graduates with ‘first-hand experience of 
studying, living and working in another Community country’ and ‘for whom the 
whole Europe as opposed to the single nation state is a natural area of activity’ (CEC, 
1991:28). In this sense, supporting student mobility represented a long-term 
investment for the creation of highly mobile, professional workers of the future.
In 2000, the Commission published an interesting survey (CEC, 2000a) on 
the socio-economic background of students participated in the Erasmus scheme. The 
survey results show that the majority of Erasmus students are from families with 
above-average income, having managerial/professional jobs and higher educational 
background. Of course, this just reflects the general situation regarding the access to 
higher education at member states level. However, considering that Erasmus, 
promoted as it is as the flagship programme of EU education policy, did not (and still 
does not) have any mechanisms to provide special support to groups that are 
financially less well-off, the Parliament’s concern about the tendency of the 
programme to unequally benefit the elite groups cannot be dismissed (EP, 2000b). 
Another finding of the Commission’s survey is the geographically uneven influence 
of Erasmus. The most popular destinations have been UK and Ireland because of 
linguistic reasons, while ‘unpopular’ areas do not attract enough students even to fill
76 Directive 89/48, Official Journal LI9, 1989.
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all available places. Rather than fostering cultural diversity through intercultural 
experiences which is one of the objectives of Erasmus, the unintended side-effect of 
Erasmus may be to contribute to the dominance of English which is fast becoming 
the semi-official language of the EU.
Teaching of foreign languages
As in the Community’s efforts to facilitate mobility in higher education, the learning 
of foreign languages was one of the first areas to be identified as a priority in the 
Community educational policy. This was already evident in the 1976 action 
programme, and as early as 1978 the Commission was proposing a series of measures 
involving the exchange of language teachers and support for early language teaching 
in primary school (CEC, 1978). However, the member states’ unwillingness to 
concede national prerogatives in this area has led the Community to shift the 
emphasis in its policy proposals from language learning at school to the vocational 
aspect of language teaching (Neave, 1984: 129). Thus, the first action programme in 
this area, ‘Lingua’, which was adopted in 1989 initially for the period of 1990-1994, 
was founded on the premise that improving technical and teaching skills of language 
teachers constituted a basic factor of vocational training.77 But this did not 
necessarily prevent the programme from becoming the subject of controversy in the 
course of its adoption. In one of the Council deliberations, Britain, Denmark and 
Germany expressed the view that the Commission’s original proposal marked an 
unacceptable extension of Community competence (Beukel, 1993:163). The resulting 
Decision duly emphasised that the role of Community-wide measures was merely to 
help promote the implementation of the member states’ policies and schemes in this 
area. The programme consisted of three action lines: measures to promote in-service 
training of foreign language teachers; measures to promote the learning of foreign 
languages in universities and in particular to develop the initial training of foreign 
language teachers; and measures to promote knowledge of foreign languages used in 
work relations and in economic life.
77 Decision 89/489/EEC, Official Journal L239, 1989.
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The establishment of the Lingua programme was also viewed as directly 
supporting the completion of the internal market, as the lack of foreign language 
competence among citizens was ‘not only a barrier to freedom of movement’ but also 
‘a handicap to the increasing business and trading connections within the 
Community’ (CEC, 1989b: 16). While the logic of the market would present 
linguistic diversity as an obstacle, however, the Lingua programme is expressly 
committed to ‘preserving the linguistic diversity and cultural wealth of Europe’. This 
commitment is clearly a concession made to the interests of the member states, as is 
evident in the fact that Lingua only supports the teaching/learning of the national 
languages of the member states, excluding regional or minority languages.78 Besides 
Lingua programme, the EU has demonstrated its commitment to promote lesser used 
languages (CEC, 1994f), but it has also made it clear that minority languages 
supported by the EU are those ‘indigenous’ to Europe, excluding major immigrant
70languages such as Arabic and Turkish.
European dimension in education80
The notion of a ‘European dimension’ in education appeared at the very early stage 
of the Community’s involvement in education and has been present throughout the 
development of EU discourse on education over three decades. Yet, there is still no 
agreed definition of what the European dimension in education amounts to and, 
accordingly, preferred means to promote such a dimension have differed from one 
proposal to the other (Field, 1998). Initially, a European dimension was understood 
to refer to the curricular and extra-curricular modes by which schools are encouraged 
to promote not only the dissemination of knowledge about the EU but also pupils’ 
identification with ‘Europe’. In other words, it was not just about a question of 
teaching about Europe, but of educating for European citizenship (Neave, 1984;
78 At the time of Lingua’s adoption the official languages of the Community were Danish, Dutch, 
English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish.
79 Official Journal C79, 31/03/1995.
80 Apart from the EU’s attempts to influence the school curricula of the member states, the EU runs the 
European Schools of which there are now ten. They were created in 1953 for the education of the 
children of EU officials, although other can also apply (but must pay school fees and are granted 
places only when available). The European Schools have been hailed by some as a valuable laboratory
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Sultana, 1995). As such, the European dimension represented the only area of the EU 
education policy where primacy was given to cultural-political concerns. It was also 
the most sensitive area as it touched upon the actual contents of education systems in 
each member state.
The recommendation contained in the 1973 Janne report suggested a number 
of ways in which a European dimension could be inserted into school curricula, 
ranging from the correction of history textbooks ‘with a view to expurging or 
amending nationalistic, biased passages’ to the teaching of European civics ‘based 
mainly on Community practices and institutions, on pluralism and on democracy’ 
(CEC, 1973:52). These suggestions obviously went far beyond the powers conferred 
upon the Community, and the Education Ministers quickly established that primary 
responsibilities for developing the European dimension lay with the member states 
while the Community initiatives in this area would only play a supporting role 
(Council of the EC, 1987: 25). Accordingly, it was suggested that a European 
dimension in schools should be complementary to existing subjects rather than 
replacing or modifying already established curricular provisions (Neave, 1984: 125).
A more favourable situation for the development of the European dimension 
was provided in the mid-1980s in the form of a move towards ‘a People’s Europe’, 
which drew the attention of European policy-makers to the desirability of European 
identity among ordinary citizens as a way of anchoring the process of economic 
integration. This has generated a renewed impetus to the Community’s attempts in 
educational fields, and the Education Ministers repeatedly declared their intention to 
strengthen the European dimension in schools first in September 1985 and then in 
May 1988. In their 1988 resolution, the Education Ministers indicated that one of the 
objectives of encouraging the European dimension in education was to:
Strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear 
to them the value of European civilization and of the foundations on 
which the European peoples intend to base their development today, that
for forging a future generation of European citizens, but also attracted criticisms for their elitist 
tendency to serve the privileged few (Finaldi-Baratieri, 2000).
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is in particular the safeguarding of the principles of democracy, social
Q 1
justice and respect for human rights.
Along with this cultural-political objective, an equal emphasis was placed on the 
preparation of young people to take part in the economic and social development of 
the Community in the context of the single market. In contrast to these ambitious 
goals, however, the actual measures proposed were rather limited. This was hardly 
surprising given the lack of Community competence in the sphere of school 
education. The resolution called for action both at the level of the member states and 
the Community, with most of the practical recommendations being addressed to the 
member states who were encouraged to, firstly, to incorporate the European 
dimension in educational systems, school programmes and teaching, teaching 
material and teacher training and secondly, to boost contacts between pupils and 
teachers from different countries. It may be noted that the 1988 resolution, as with its 
predecessors, has failed to establish a mechanism by which the member states could 
be held accountable for (not) carrying out the agreed upon curricular changes. At the 
level of the Community, action to be taken consisted of supporting the member 
states’ activities, monitoring and evaluating their progress. To this end, the 
Commission created within DG V a special European Dimension in Education Unit 
in 1989, which, in addition to the above task of monitoring, organised a number of 
small-scale activities such as summer schools and a teacher exchange scheme (Ryba, 
1995a).
While most member states responded positively to these recommendations, 
the practical consequences of the 1988 resolution remain quite problematic, not least 
because of the sheer variety of educational structures and practices maintained by 
different national and regional authorities (Ryba, 1995b). Unlike mobility-centred 
education and training programmes which proliferated in the late 1980s, no 
substantial progress was made in relation to Community-level actions in enhancing 
the European dimension. In the meantime, the concept of the European dimension 
has acquired a more pragmatic emphasis than a cultural one. As Raymond Ryba, a 
former Director of the European Dimension in Education Unit, observed, EU policy
81 Official Journal, C177, 1988.
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actors increasingly conceptualise the question of education for European citizenship 
in terms of how to prepare young people to make the most of the single market:
gone ... are any hints that may have existed of curricular changes aimed 
at substituting a European loyalty for existing national and regional 
ones... What is now seen as more to the point is the need to help young 
people in European countries to understand the new situation in which 
they are increasingly finding themselves, to know something of new 
rights and responsibilities which this new situation brings (Ryba, 1995b:
148).
In 1993, the Commission sought once again to stimulate interest in the subject with 
the publication of the Green Paper on the European dimension in education (CEC, 
1993:d). But, as will be discussed in the following sections, the change in the legal 
status of education brought about by the Maastricht Treaty hardly did any favours to 
the developments of content-related reforms. The momentum generated by ‘a 
People’s Europe’ to give substance to European identity through education was not 
sustained throughout the 1990s. Although EU institutions (especially the European 
Parliament) continued to underline the cultural foundations of EU education 
measures, it was the predominance of human resources agenda that characterised the 
policy direction of the 1990s.82 Furthermore, studies show that the rate by which the 
‘European dimension’ is incorporated into textbooks and school curricula of the 
member states has been very low, and even in countries where the status of 
‘European’ or EU themes has been improved, the ‘European dimension’ in national 
curricula is still relatively marginal (Ryba, 1992; Theiler, 1999).
82 A desire to lay claim to a European cultural heritage is reflected in the EU’s choice of titles for its 
educational programmes (Socrates, Erasmus, Comenius, Leonardo da Vinci, etc.) (Field, 1998). But 
this attachment to European cultural ideal does not seem to go beyond the level of a purely symbolic 
gesture.
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The Maastricht Treaty
By the time the Treaty on European Union was agreed, the Community had already 
established a wide array of education and training programmes primarily focused on 
the promotion of mobility and exchange. Yet, the Community’s achievements in this 
field should not be exaggerated. Financially, education and training policies only 
accounted for 0.57% of the Community’s total budget in 1992. The Community’s 
largest instrument in the field of human resource measures remained the European 
Social Fund, which, in 1992, had at its disposal sixteen times the yearly budget 
available to education and training action programmes (Field, 1998). Due to the lack 
of reference to education in the Treaty of Rome, the Community had no real role in 
primary or secondary education or in general adult education.83 Even in the areas 
where Community measures had already been launched, its action programmes were 
falling short of its own expectations. For example, the Erasmus programme’s original 
target was to see one student in ten spending some of their studies in another member 
state by 1992. The figure achieved in 1992 was actually around 4 per cent, even 
though the Commission’s own assessment of the programme deemed this figure as 
‘significant progress towards the 10 per cent mobility target’ (CEC, 1993a:10).
With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU acquired clearly specified 
responsibilities for education as distinguished from vocational training. Article 126 
set out the EU’s role in education, while the new Article 127 is concerned with 
vocational training. One of the main consequences of the Treaty, therefore, was that 
there would be separate and different legal bases for education and training. This 
meant that the EU no longer needed to base its education policy on its powers in 
relation to vocational training, as was the case with Erasmus or Lingua. Having a 
competence in education proper also removed, at least legally, the need for 
educational policy proposals to be focused exclusively on their economic 
implications. As we shall see in the following section, however, the division between 
education and vocational training turned out to be not as clear-cut as the new Treaty 
provisions might have implied.
83 The exception is the LINGUA programme where secondary education institutions could participate 
to a limited degree.
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Article 126
1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.
2. Community action shall be aimed at:
-  developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the 
teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States;
-  encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia, by encouraging 
the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study;
-  promoting cooperation between educational establishments;
-  developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to 
the education systems of the Member States;
-  encouraging the development of youth exchanges and the exchange of 
socio-educational instructors;
-  encouraging the development of distance learning;
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third 
countries and the competent international organisations in the field of 
education, in particular the Council of Europe
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this 
Article, the Council:
-  acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b, after 
consulting the economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States;
-  acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall 
adopt recommendations.
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Another notable feature of Article 126 is the principle of subsidiarity. As in the case 
of cultural provisions, the Maastricht Treaty confirmed the primacy of the member 
states’ sovereignty in making clear that the primary responsibility for the organisation 
and content of education remains with the member states. The role of the EU is to 
support and supplement their actions instead of harmonisation or regulations of 
national education systems. Although its field of operation was enlarged to include 
sectors of education which were in no sense forms of vocational training (pre-school, 
primary and liberal adult education), the EU’s competence did not extend beyond the 
provision of incentives to member states to co-operate with each other. Thus, despite 
its symbolic importance in formally recognising the EU’s competence in the field of 
general education, the Treaty mostly served to confirm the status quo, merely 
acknowledging what had already been taking place (Barnard, 1995). On the other 
hand, however, Article 126 introduced the qualified majority voting procedure in the 
Council, which may reduce instances where the Council can block proposals from 
the Commission.
The Maastricht Treaty may not have significantly changed the development of 
EU education policy, but it did provide a new framework along which the 
Commission could restructure its action programmes. One of the main results of the 
Maastricht Treaty was the designation of a separate Directorate-General within the 
Commission for education, training and youth (DG XXII). Compared to the previous 
arrangement where educational policy was somewhat subordinated to the wider 
social policy concerns of DG V, this new institutional arrangement has given the 
Commission greater room for manoeuvre. The new DG XXII grouped its education 
and training programmes into two overarching frameworks broadly corresponding to 
the competences granted in Articles 126 and 127 of the Treaty.
On the strength of the inclusion of school-level education into the EU’s legal 
mandate, the Commission in 1993 published a Green Paper on the European 
dimension in education. Accepting that most of the consequent decisions lay with the 
member states, the Green Paper argued that the ‘added value’ of action at the EU 
level should contribute to three main objectives: a European citizenship based on the 
shared values of interdependence, democracy, equality of opportunity and mutual 
respect; extending the opportunities for improving the quality of education; helping 
pupils towards social integration and a better transition to working life (CEC,
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1993d:5). Nevertheless, the Green Paper also reflected the shift in the Commission’s 
thinking, in which the ‘European dimension’ has come to be conceived of as just 
another label for educational exchanges instead of something that involves curricular 
or content-related changes (Theiler, 1999). Thus the Green Paper suggested that the 
EU might focus on developing partnerships between schools with a shared interest in 
specific areas such as languages, environment or cultural heritage, and cooperation 
between teacher training institutions in order to familiarise teachers with aspects of 
the EU. As its authors acknowledged themselves, the Green Paper lacked detail and 
offered no specific proposal.
The Commission’s concern with introducing the European dimension in 
schools was partly incorporated in a more tangible form of the post-Maastricht 
restructuring of educational programmes. The new framework programme for 
education, SOCRATES, was adopted in 1995 for the period between 1995 to 1999. 
SOCRATES was effectively a collection of the existing programmes (Erasmus, 
Lingua, Arion and Youth for Europe).84 This meant that, although the Maastricht 
Treaty has given a legal mandate in general education, the EU’s programme on 
education proper continued to have significant vocational elements. Therefore, the 
decision which established the SOCRATES programmes was based on both Articles 
126 (education) and 127 (training). The only new elements added to this new 
framework was a small-scale programme for primary- and secondary-level education 
and cooperation in adult education. The former, named COMENIUS, has 
incorporated suggestions contained in the Green Paper on European Dimension, and 
was designed to support school partnerships for developing activities related to 
Europe (i.e. language teaching, exchange of teaching materials, etc.). The budget 
allocation within the SOCRATES framework confirms the continuing emphasis on 
higher education (an area covered by Erasmus). Of the total budget earmarked for the 
period 1995-1997, 55 per cent was allocated to the area of higher education, 10 per 
cent to school education (Comenius) and 25 per cent to ‘horizontal action’ such as 
LINGUA and open and distance learning.
If SOCRATES incorporated very little novel features, its equivalent in the 
area of vocational training was even less innovative. The programme, called
84 Decision 95/336/EC, Official Journal L87, 1995.
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LEONARDO DA VINCI, was adopted in 1994 and covered activities previously 
supported by the EU under PETRA, FORCE, EUROTECNET and COMETT.85 One 
notable feature that differentiated LEONARDO from its predecessors was that its 
objectives had a greater focus on the use of new technologies and the social 
integration of disadvantaged groups. In short, the post-Maastricht restructuring of 
education/training programmes hardly represented a change in the direction of 
Community policy in education. Even after the inclusion of educational provision in 
the Treaty, the EU’s basic approach in this area was to follow a pragmatic course, 
whereby primacy was given to actions with vocational emphasis. One way of 
explaining this is to say that the Maastricht Treaty has permanently blocked actions 
in culturally sensitive areas of education by enshrining the subsidiarity principle, 
under which the responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of 
education systems is left with the member states (Koslowski, 1999). However, 
subsequent developments demonstrate that the EU’s persistent emphasis on the 
vocational aspects of education policy is not just because of its circumscribed legal 
competence, but also due to its overwhelming concern with the EU’s overall 
economic growth for which all the policy instruments available, including education, 
are to be mobilised.
Growth, competitiveness and employment
Within months of launching the two new framework programmes, the EU was 
already reviewing its policy towards this area. If the developments of the EU 
education since the mid-1990s can be characterised as being dominated by EU 
policy-makers’ preoccupation with human resources strategy, such concern is 
probably best captured in the Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness 
and Employment (CEC, 1994d). Drafted in 1993 under the direct supervision of the 
then President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, the Growth White Paper 
portrayed a bleak picture of the state of the European economy. It identified a number 
of external factors which have been shaping the global economy and their 
acceleration since the 1970s, namely, the emergence of new technologically
85 Decision 94/819/EC, Official Journal L340, 1994,
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advanced rival economic spaces, the end of Communism, the new skills revolution, 
the shift to a knowledge-based economy and growing market interdependence. 
Against this background, it was suggested that Europe was losing its competitive 
edge against the US, Japan and increasingly, the countries of Asia-Pacific region, 
because ‘while we have changed, the rest of the world has changed even faster’. In 
order to redress the chronic unemployment situation within the EU, the White Paper 
argued, it is imperative that Europe should overcome this crisis of competitiveness 
and increase its growth rate. In this context, education and training were thought to 
be one of the crucial conditions for the development of more employment-intensive 
growth: ‘In a society based far more on the production, transfer and sharing of 
knowledge than on trade in goods, access to theoretical and practical knowledge must 
necessarily play a major role’ (CEC, 1994d: 133). By employing the ‘discourse of 
crisis’, the Commission has given a sense of inevitability to its diagnosis that 
education and training systems must be reworked so as to fit the agenda of intensive 
investment in human capital (Field, 1998).
Such discourse of crisis and social change had a profound influence on how 
the EU education policy was conceptualised. The idea that severe economic pressures 
in the global market place presented a fundamental challenge to EU education policy 
had been aired since the 1980s (see, for example, CEC, 1988a; CEC, 1989b). But this 
theme surfaced more clearly in the 1995 White Paper on ‘Teaching and Leaning: 
Towards the Learning Society’. Elaborating on the idea contained in the Growth 
White Paper, the Commission began its argument in the 1995 White Paper by 
identifying three ‘factors of upheaval’ which have ‘transformed the context of 
economic activity and the way our societies function in a radical and lasting manner’: 
the onset of the information society; the internationalisation of the economy; and the 
impact of scientific and technological knowledge (CEC, 1995b: 5). Since they have 
fundamentally transformed work organisation and the skills learned, new 
opportunities arising from these upheavals requires people to adapt, ‘particularly in 
assembling one’s own qualifications on the basis of ‘building blocks’ of knowledge 
acquired at different times and in various situations’ (CEC, 1995b: 2). A new 
principle of post-industrial social structure, so the White Paper goes on, would be 
centred on the Teaming relationship’ which is determined by the ‘position of 
everyone in relation to their fellow citizens in the context of knowledge and skills’
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(CEC, 1995b: 2). This has increased uncertainty for all and for some has led to 
situations of exclusion, creating a serious risk of a rift in European society ‘between 
those who know and those who do not’. In response to this risk and uncertainty, the 
While Paper proclaimed an urgent need to adjust to the society of the future which 
will be a Teaming society’, as immaterial ‘investment and getting the best out of our 
human resources will improve competitiveness, boost jobs and safeguard social 
achievements’ (Ibid.).
Europe’s success for the future, therefore, was said to depend on the need to 
instil a broad knowledge base and developing everyone’s employability and capacity 
for economic life. This required everyone to constantly update their knowledge and 
skills throughout their working life. This ‘lifelong learning’ approach is contrasted 
with the traditional emphasis upon once-and-for-all qualifications gained at school or 
in initial training and lasting for almost a lifetime. In this context, the traditional 
distinctions between general education and vocational training are thought to 
disappear: ‘A broad knowledge base and training for employment are no longer two 
contradictory or separate things’, as there is ‘increasing recognition for the 
importance of general knowledge in using vocational skills’ (CEC, 1995b:23).
Following the extensive analysis of human resources issues across the EU, the 
White Paper then urged the pursuit of five general objectives: promoting the 
acquisition of new knowledge; bringing schools and business closer together; combat 
exclusion; proficiency in at least three Community languages; and treating capital 
investment and investment in training on an equal basis. The Paper also noted that 
the Commission can only fund new initiatives by reallocating existing funds for 
education and training. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in many cases action 
would have to be taken by member states, local government or trade unions and 
employers. Thus, while the White Paper contended that the creation of the learning 
society entails radical change, the measures proposed were far from adequate in 
pursuing the declared objectives. Furthermore, although it paid lip-service to the need 
for personal development and social learning, and even active citizenship, there was 
no sign that the Commission had any concrete proposals in these areas.
Of course, the Commission is not unique in making a direct connection 
between education/training and economic competitiveness. As the Commission made 
it clear in its own guideline for future actions in education, a wide consensus has long
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been established throughout the member states as well as the rest of the world that 
‘human or intangible capital’ is the most vital resource of advanced economies, 
without which their capacity to compete in the world market would dwindle (CEC, 
1993b: 2). The concept of a Teaming society’ as a central strategy to enhance the 
innovative capacity of the workforce was adopted by the US Government in the early 
1980s, which was then followed by the Confederation of British Industry and the 
British Government at the beginning of the 1990s (Moschonas, 1998: 87). Similarly, 
OECD’s report produced in 1992 upheld a view that the economic challenges faced 
by the advanced industrial societies require structural adjustments and rapid 
technological development wherein lifelong learning becomes pivotal to 
contemporary progress (OECD, 1992).
But the interesting point in the Commission’s approach exemplified by the 
1995 White Paper is that its concern with maintaining Europe’s competitive edge is 
such that the Commission has seemingly lost interest in the role education could play 
in the cultural and political aspects of European integration. In assessing the White 
Paper, the Education Ministers criticised the Commission’s assumption that there 
was a linear relationship between learning, economic development and employment 
growth. In their view, the framework for analysing education and training problems 
in Europe should avoid placing excessive emphasis on information technology and 
the globalisation of the economy, and should include other important factors such as 
democracy, environmental issues, multiculturalism and the problem of combating 
social marginalisation.86
Nevertheless, the basic thrust of the White Paper continued to shape the 
developments of the EU education policy in the latter half of 1990s. One of the 
concrete outcomes of the White Paper was the designation of the year 1996 as the
87European Year of Lifelong Learning. For this, the Commission organised activities 
to celebrate and promote lifelong education and continuing training throughout the 
year. The Commission further attempted to place education and training at the centre 
of the EU’s overall objectives with its memorandum ‘Towards a Europe of 
Knowledge’, declaring that ‘[r]eal wealth creation will ... depend first and foremost
86 Official Journal C l95, 06/07/1996.
87 Official Journal L256, 26/10/1995.
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on our efforts in the field of research, education and training and on our capacity to 
promote innovation’ (CEC, 1997b: 1). The growing interest in ‘knowledge policies’ 
as a key to Europe’s future developments has also affected the existing arrangements 
of education and training programmes. In implementing the second phase of 
SOCRATES and LEONARDO DA VINCI88, the Commission has once again 
highlighted the importance of an integrated approach spanning the boundaries 
between vocational and general learning for ‘a progressive construction of European 
educational space’ (CEC, 1998a: 2). Although the contents of those two programmes 
remain essentially the same, the previous provisions have been refocused so that they 
would contribute to the central objective of ‘the promotion of a Europe of 
knowledge’ characterised by the development of lifelong learning.
The predominance of the Commission’s growth-oriented agenda in the EU 
education policy was further confirmed by the heads of states of the member 
countries at a series of European Council meetings. The 1997 Luxembourg 
European Council on employment, for example, stressed that all Community policies 
must be harnessed in support of employment and must ‘help unleash the potential for
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dynamism and enterprise to be found in Europe’s economy’. In this context, 
lifelong education and training was identified as an important factor in enhancing 
employability, adaptability and the ‘culture of entrepreneurship’. Additionally, the 
Lisbon European Council in 2000 set a goal that Europe should become by 2010 ‘the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. 
This would require not only a ‘radical transformation of the European economy’ but 
also ‘a challenging programme for the modernisation of social welfare and education 
systems’, calling for ‘a substantial annual increase in per capita investment in human
> 90resources .
It is important to recognise that behind the rise of this growth-oriented 
education agenda lie interest groups representing European business. It is quite well 
known that the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT - mostly composed of
88 Decision 1999/382/EC (Leonardo da Vinci), Official Journal L146, 11/06/99; Decision 
253/2000/EC (Socrates), Official Journal L28, 03/02/2000.
89 Presidency Conclusions of Luxembourg Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment, 
downloaded from<http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=56855&from=LANG=l>
137
the CEOs of Europe’s biggest multinational companies) exerted strong pressure on 
the EU in the run-up to the completion of the single market (see for example Green 
Cowles, 1995). Their spheres of influence extend beyond purely economic or market 
issues, and it has been noted that big European businesses, including the ERT, have 
been lobbying both individual member states and the EU for convergence in 
European education systems in an attempt to create better labour market conditions 
(Sultana, 1995). In 1995, for example, ERT published a report entitled Education for 
Europeans: towards the Learning Society. Two years later, the EU released the 
aforementioned White Paper, Teaching and Learning: towards the Learning Society 
(Slowinski, 1998). In 1997, ERT published Investing in Knowledge: the Integration 
o f Technology and European Education, which was followed by a Commission 
document published in the same year, Towards a Europe o f Knowledge. This has 
eventually led to the adoption by the Council of ‘a multi-annual programme for the 
effective integration of information and communication technologies in education 
and training systems (eLearning programme)’.91 The convergence of agendas is more 
than a coincidence, and could be taken as a manifestation of a ‘tightly woven policy 
network that extends at all levels of education’ (Sultana, 2002: 122; van Apeldoom, 
2000).
From the Lisbon Council in 2000 onwards, EU education and training policy 
has gained a dynamic that is almost unprecedented. Between 2000 and 2004, the 
Commission produced numerous proposals, recommendations and consultation 
papers all citing the goals of ‘knowledge society’ set out in the Lisbon conclusions, 
which were mostly endorsed by the Council in the form of resolutions or 
declarations. In 2002, for instance, the Commission and the Council jointly adopted a 
detailed work programme on education and training for the period between 2002 and 
2004, organised around 13 objectives (developing skills for the knowledge society, 
ensuring access to information/communication technologies, increasing mobility and 
exchange, etc.) (CEC, 2002a). The work programme was approved at the Barcelona 
European Council later that year, where heads of the state/government declared their 
intention to make Europe’s education and training systems a world-wide reference by
90 Downloaded from <http://ue.eu.int/presid/conclusions.htm>, 01/03/03
91 Official Journal, L345. 31/12/2003.
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2010. Importantly, one of the factors that accounts for the fast pace at which the 
Commission drafted policy proposals and the member states readily accepted these 
proposals is a broad consensus that exists among the member governments regarding 
the role of education in the globalising economy.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this ‘Lisbon process’ is the chosen 
method by which to achieve the aforementioned objectives. The method, labelled as 
the ‘open method of coordination’ or ‘benchmarking’, basically entails appraising 
and comparing different policy practices of the member states, organised as mutual 
learning processes. The goal is not to establish a single common framework or to 
impose harmonisation measures, but to share knowledge and to encourage the spread 
of best practice (H. Wallace, 2000). The advantage of this method is that it offers a 
way to achieve coordination without appearing ‘too threatening’, as it is ‘a fully 
decentralised approach using variable forms of partnerships and designed to help 
Member States to develop their own policies progressively’ (CEC, 2002a: 10). As in 
other areas of EU policy reviewed in this thesis, the key components here are 
voluntary cooperation, decentred networking and the accumulation of expert 
knowledge (Novoa, 2002). The role of the EU is one of coordination rather than 
enforcement, establishing guidelines and norms that provide the context for further 
policy debate at both EU and national levels. The development of this new method 
also signals the growing influence of private business practices in EU policy making 
(Lawn, 2002). Concepts and practices that originated in business management such 
as ‘benchmarking’, ‘outputs’, ‘target-setting’, ‘flexible frameworks’, ‘knowledge 
investment’ and ‘efficiency’ now proliferate in EU education discourse, again 
attesting to the prevalence of neoliberal thinking in the public sector (recent 
examples include Commission reports entitled ‘Investing efficiently in education and 
training: an imperative for Europe’ (CEC, 2002d), ‘European Benchmarks in 
Education and Training’ (CEC, 2002c)).
While the EU has come to place such a high priority upon human resources 
issues, it is also becoming apparent that there is a growing gap between the EU’s 
policy thinking and its actual capacity to implement such thinking (Field, 1998). The 
far-reaching goal of the creation of ‘a European education area’ or a ‘learning 
society’ in response to the perceived crisis of European competitiveness would 
require Europe-wide convergence of education policy. Yet, the ambition of this
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strategy clearly exceeds the limits of the EU’s Treaty competences. In contrast to the 
ever-increasing significance of education in the EU’s diagnosis for the future, the 
actual achievements in education and training initiatives so far remain very much 
limited.92
From the EU’s education discourse there emerges a picture of a ‘good 
European citizen’ conceived around the notion of labour mobility and 
competitiveness. Being part of Europe now means having the right knowledge and 
skills that enable people to survive and thrive in the knowledge-based, globalising 
economy. The notion of European identity in this context is more focused on 
individual competence in transnational labour markets instead of qualities normally 
associated with collective identity such as feeling of belongingness and rootedness. 
The close connection forged between education and employment also means that 
unemployment is now seen as a problem of uneducated people. The problem of 
unemployment in the social or economic sphere has therefore become the problem of 
employability of each individual (Novoa, 2002: 141). The corollary of this argument 
could be that the responsibility for solving the crisis of the welfare state and 
ultimately the European social model is being passed onto the citizens, who are 
invited to reinvent themselves by ‘constantly updating their knowledge both in order 
to enhance employability, by acquiring skills attuned to developments in the nature 
and organization of work, and also in order to serve as a framework for the process of 
consolidating European citizenship’ (CEC, 1997b).
Conclusion
This chapter argued that the education initiatives of the Community are expressions 
of a dual necessity: to foster economic competitiveness through improvement in the 
qualities of human capital; and to create a sense of identity, of a shared European 
citizenship among young people. However, the possibility for an EU-wide education 
policy designed to fulfil both of these needs has been conditioned by two factors.
92 Some authors argue that the Europeanisation of education in the cultural sense is occurring outside 
the institutional framework of the EU, often organised under the auspices of the Council of Europe or 
UNESCO. There are initiatives devised by semi- or non-governmental bodies such as teacher
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Firstly, the original legal provisions of the Community excluded general education 
from its jurisdiction. The Maastricht Treaty, while providing the space for EU 
intervention in this area, also limited its scope of action by the subsidiarity principle. 
Secondly, the primary nature of the EU as an economic entity means that supporting 
economic growth still remains a strong priority in the Union’s overall strategy for 
development. Consequently, this technocratic, growth-oriented agenda has also 
reinforced a utilitarian approach to education and training in the EU.
Throughout the short history of EU education policy, therefore, the cultural 
dimensions of education have been sidelined by economic concerns. This is evident 
both at the level of policy discourse and in its actual implementation. The rise of 
education in the EU agenda has been to a large extent a direct response to perceived 
economic challenges. In the 1970s, it was the necessity to remedy youth 
unemployment that drew policy makers’ attention to education and training. From the 
mid-1980s to 1992, despite the move towards the ‘People’s Europe’, education 
tended to be viewed mainly in terms of its contribution to achieving the single 
market. After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has adopted an even 
more functional approach seeking to promote the concept of the learning society as a 
way of adjusting to the global market place. As for the contents of education policy, 
the EU’s action programmes have been consistently vocational, utilitarian and 
instrumental in orientation. The cultural function of education remains an area where 
the responsibility has been left entirely with the member states. While this ‘dual’ 
approach to education may represent an outcome of a consensus among the member 
states and EU institutions, it leaves open the question of overarching identity 
underpinning political integration. In so far as the EU has some influence in shaping 
an educational policy agenda both at national and European levels, Sultana argues, 
‘there is a very real danger of peripheralising countries, belief systems, languages, 
rendering invisible the histories and concerns of the politically and economically 
weak regions’ (1995:126).
associations, local school boards, or even individual schools or teachers, forming informal networks 
that constitute a part of a wider European political arena (see for example Soysal, 2002).
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CHAPTER 5 
Representations of European History and Europe’s ‘Other’
In the previous chapter on education, we have seen that the EU came to prioritise the 
function of education for its contribution to European economic competitiveness 
rather than as an instrument for forging European (cultural) identity. However, this 
does not mean that EU officials have entirely abandoned the quest for common 
cultural roots, and the preoccupation with ‘cultural heritage’ or ‘shared civilisation’ 
is nowhere more obvious than in EU discourse on history. Studies show how 
common it is for nationalism to search for origins to legitimate present claims of 
belonging to a common lineage and cultural heritage and to a specific territory. If the 
‘subjective perception and understanding of the communal past by each generation of 
a given cultural unit of population ... is a defining element in the concept of cultural 
identity’ (Smith, 1997: 321), representations of a European history take on great 
symbolic significance.
In this chapter, I will look at how the official representations of European 
history are constructed and what kind of implications these representations have for 
drawing the boundaries of European identity and its corollary of demarcating 
Europe’s ‘Others’. The focus of analysis is on what many authors term ‘Euro- 
nationalist’ history writings which have acquired in the EU the status of a semi­
official version of European history. In particular, I will examine Jean-Baptiste 
Duroselle’s Europe: a History o f its Peoples as a representative of such Euro- 
nationalist discourse. Duroselle’s book was supported by the European Commission, 
and its significance lies in the fact that it is the only major piece of history writing 
officially funded by the EU or its predecessors. His book is also important because it 
exemplifies the Commission’s and the Parliament’s approach to culture in the pre- 
Maastricht period when the goal of EU cultural measures was heavily geared towards 
the achievement of internal cultural unity based on a reified notion of ‘common 
European heritage’. In the last section, I will argue that the EU’s boundary-drawing 
exercises and the resulting ingroup-outgroup dynamics have recently acquired 
particular salience through the Europeanisation of immigration issues.
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European integration as a future-oriented project
Looking at the EU official statements from the early periods, one striking feature that 
emerges is that the meaning of the European project is frequently located in the 
future rather than its assumed historical unity (Howe, 1995). In the Preamble of the 
treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the Community is 
depicted as marking the beginning of an ‘organised Europe’, equipped with 
‘institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared’. Similarly, 
the Rome Treaty in 1957 portrays European integration as a forward-looking, 
ongoing process, and its Preamble states that the objective of the Member States in 
creating the common market is ‘to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe’. Because ‘ever closer union among the people of Europe’ did 
not exist prior to these treaties, the images of Europe in this sense belong to the 
future and not to the past, ‘to the world of “ought” rather than that of “is”, expressing 
the future state of things which the act is designed to achieve’ (De Witte, 1989: 132).
The wording of the treaties thus incorporated a tension between a short-term, 
utilitarian image of Europe as a common market and an ambitious long-term goal 
that points towards ‘an ever closer union’ without defining what this exactly entails. 
The absence of clearly defined goals did not seem to bother the ‘founding fathers’ as 
the practical problems and short-term objectives were pressing enough to occupy 
their attention. It could even be argued that the functionalist method of integration 
relied on this particular set of myths which directed people’s attention to a vague, 
neutral future and which therefore enabled the labelling of the integration process as 
non-political, rational and technocratic (Hansen and Williams, 1999).
These future-oriented images of Europe reflect how the European elites 
perceive the European past and also its relation to the EU. Altiero Spinelli, a 
federalist MEP who drew up a draft European constitution in the 1980s, wrote: ‘The 
Community is not primarily a continuation of a past: it is a resolution for the future, 
or it is nothing’ (quoted in CEC, 1973: 28). This view is shared by Jacques Delors, 
who describes the Treaty of Rome as a ‘birth certificate of a revolution’ (Delors, 
1992: 5). The underlying image here is the idea of a newly created community bom 
out of a resolution of the Europeans, a community whose development is to be 
catalysed by possible future events that might in time promote solidarity among
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Europeans. So, the Europeans can leave their pasts as a moral lesson in the savagery 
and futility of war, and start a wholly new project based on a thriving economic 
partnership (Delors, 1992: 22). This idea also finds a strong echo in 
recommendations put forward by one of the consultants on educational policy: ‘part 
of teaching in Europe should be prospectively turned towards the future and its 
virtualities, taking into account the European framework and spreading integration’ 
(CEC, 1973: 28).
To illustrate this point further, I would like to say something about the 
symbolism of Euro banknotes. After a design competition launched by the European 
Monetary Institute (the forerunner of the ECB), the winning designs of Euro 
banknotes were selected at the Dublin European Council in December 1996. The 
most noticeable aspect of the banknotes, especially compared to most national 
currencies, is the conspicuous absence of historical figures or identifiable cultural 
heritage. In fact, the design that features abstract architectural themes -  doors, arches, 
windows and bridges -  was chosen precisely because it does not represent an existing 
monument (Shore, 2000: 111-118). Rather than referring back to people or events 
in the past, these symbols represent something unspecified. Because we do not see 
where these bridges, windows, doors, etc. are leading, they can also be taken to 
signify a state of transition, an opening to somewhere unknown.
What these representations of Europe imply is an interest on the part of 
European leaders in stressing a break with the past. They aim to build a ‘broader and 
deeper community among peoples’, but this community cannot be founded on a view 
of history in which conflicts and wars between states take a central role. Thus, 
European integration is presented as ‘progress’, a process to correct the past plagued 
with ignorance and prejudices. The construction of ‘Europe’ as a break from the past 
is a familiar theme in German political discourse, in which ‘Europe’s Other’ is 
understood as Germany’s own past of wars and nationalist excesses (Risse, 2001).
However, one of the problems of presenting the EU as a forward-looking 
creation is that none of the treaties, declarations or any officially adopted texts 
specifically states what constitutes the substance of this ‘shared destiny’, despite their
93 However, the design on seven denominations are meant to represent, respectively, a specific period 
of Europe’s architectural history -  Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo, 
the nineteenth-century iron and glass architecture, and modem twentieth-century architecture.
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repeated emphasis on an ambitious, permanently moving image of integration. At the 
time when the EEC was established, a short-term, practical goal of a common market 
may have sufficed as a guiding image for the future. As de Witte argues, contrary to 
the expectations of neofunctionalism, the integration ‘mechanism could not, as had 
been hoped, set the agenda for future activity by its own motion, but had to be 
embedded within some broader purpose of action’ (1989: 133). This is where the 
problem of European history comes in, as the concept of identity entered into EU 
vocabulary in the 1970s against the backdrop of a rising sense of legitimacy crisis 
among EU elites.
European history and Euro-nationalism
Although the EU’s interest in European identity and history arose fairly recently, the 
idea of European unity based on shared cultural heritage is far from new. There is no 
shortage of literature charting the history of the ‘idea of Europe’ (recent examples 
include Heater, 1992; Pagden, 2002), although a detailed examination of such history 
cannot be provided here.94 I would simply note that the idea of Europe gained strong 
momentum in the pan-European movements in the inter-war period and then in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The movement for European unity after 1945 is 
characterised by efforts to remove nationalistic bias from history writing, often 
supported by organisations such as the Council of Europe (Davies, 1997). Denis de 
Rougemont was one of the most prolific writers on the topic, and his book The 
Meaning o f Europe (1965) is dedicated to determining what Europe was and in what 
ways it was distinct from its neighbours.
The pursuit of common European characteristics is also revealed in numerous 
post-war writings, which, on the basis of such purportedly distinctive traits, justify 
the promotion of ‘the’ European identity and culture (Varenne, 1993). It was perhaps 
ironic that, despite their alleged aim of transcending nationalism, the conceptions of 
European identity and European-ness articulated by those intellectuals are framed in 
a nationalistic language, drawing on a Herderian understanding of culture as a 
bounded, coherent whole (Wilterdink, 1993: 120-125). Their common assumption is
94 A critical reflection of the idea of Europe is provided by Delanty (1995).
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that, on the one hand, Europe has an actual, unique substance which is based on long­
standing, uninterrupted cultural traditions, and which is somewhat superior to other 
cultures and thus should be preserved and protected. On the other hand, they are also 
acutely aware of discrepancies between their belief in the existence of cultural 
distinctiveness and the lack of its manifestation in reality, so they strive for 
confirmation and activation of an allegedly distinct European identity.
To appreciate the significance of these ‘Euro-nationalist’ writings, we need to 
relate such post-war efforts to the changing position of Europe since the Second 
World War -  loss of power by the Western European states, coupled with an increase 
in power for the United States and the Soviet Union, plus a dissolution of the 
European colonial empires. So the post-war undertakings to achieve unity in Europe, 
whether it is on the level of idea (as in history writings) or institutions (as in the 
establishment of the ECSC and the EEC), were also founded upon power 
considerations of a defensive nature. As Wilterdink observes, ‘As Europe had 
weakened itself by raising the internal difference to disastrous proportions, so it 
could strengthen itself by achieving unity’ (1993: 124).
These ‘Euro-nationalist’ views also feature heavily in EU discourse on 
European identity. Even though the EU has not officially defined the term ‘Europe’ 
or ‘European’, EU institutions -  particularly the Commission and the Parliament -  do 
insist upon the existence of a single European identity (however weak it might be) 
which is supposedly founded on cultural commonality underlined by historical 
continuity:
A community of culture in Europe is already an undeniable fact. Beneath the 
surface diversity of languages, tastes and artistic styles, there is a likeliness, a 
kinship, a European dimension or identity based on a common cultural 
heritage. The contributions of different individuals, ideas, styles and values 
have, over the centuries, created our common civilisation (CEC, 1985c: 3).
Elsewhere the Commission’s official statements speak of the existence of essential 
European identity which is yet to be awoken: ‘European identity is the result of 
centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values. But
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awareness of it can be strengthened by symbolic action, consciousness-raising 
campaigns and the growing convergence of European ambitions’ (CEC, 1988b: 7).
Instead of presenting the present state of Europe as a break with the past and 
therefore legitimising it by directing our attention towards the future, these official 
documents explicitly state that there is a fundamental unity and that it has deep 
historical roots. Yet, on the other hand, there is the belief that this unity is still 
insufficiently realised. Thus, as in the case of the ‘Euro-nationalist’ writings of the 
post-war period, ‘a discrepancy between essence and manifestation, between the 
essential unity and the empirical reality of the moment is assumed, and this implies a 
summons to achieve, and justifies the pursuit of, further unity’ (Wilterdink, 1993: 
122). The effect of all this is that EU discourse on history implicitly gives a de facto 
definition of European-ness, by reifying the notion of European identity as an 
expression of historically rooted cultural unity (Pieterse, 1991; Shore, 2000). Such a 
definition follows a path that has now become quite familiar: ancient Greece and 
Rome, the spread of Christianity, the Renaissance and the scientific revolution, the 
Enlightenment, the French Revolution, inevitably culminating in the post-war 
integration.
A European history project
Although the EU was advised by its own cultural experts not to present an authorised 
version of a European history, for fear ‘it might lead to distortions or wrong 
interpretations’ (CEC, 1992a, Annex B), the Commission gave financial support to 
history project called ‘An Adventure in Understanding’ which consisted in three 
parts: a 500-page survey of European history, a school textbook and a 10-part 
television series (Davies, 1997). The project did not originate in the EU, but was in 
fact a product of a personal venture conceived by Frederic Delouche, a 
French/Norwegian banker educated in Britain, whose determination to challenge 
nationalist bias in history-writing attracted interest from Jacques Delors among 
others.
The one-volume history of Europe, Europe: a History o f its Peoples, was 
written by a French historian, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. To ensure that the book would 
be free of Gallic bias, a committee of historians from other European countries met
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regularly to review each section as it was completed. Despite such efforts, however, 
the book became the subject of a huge controversy even before it was published. For 
a start, Duroselle hardly took any account of Eastern Europe, an omission which led 
one reviewer to call the book ‘half truths about half of Europe’ (Guardian, 25 Oct. 
1991). But the most outraged criticisms came from the Greeks, who claimed that the 
book paid insufficient attention to the contributions of ancient Greece and the 
Byzantine Empire. The Greek EC Commissioner, members of the Athens Academy, 
the Archbishop of Athens and several Greek politicians all sent angry letters to the 
then President of the Commission Jacques Delors, while a major Greek publisher 
refused to publish the book unless an extra chapter was inserted outlining Greek 
influence on Europe (Financial Times, 25 April 1990). Amidst the disputes, the 
Commission retracted its official endorsement, dissociating itself from the project, 
although Duroselle’s book was published in 1990 simultaneously in eight European 
languages (but not in Greek).
The textbook version of the history book, entitled Illustrated History o f 
Europe: a Unique Guide to Europe’s Heritage, was composed by twelve school 
teachers and historians from twelve different European countries. Each of them wrote 
one chapter which was then submitted to joint scrutiny, with Delouche acting as the 
general editor. It was published in 1992 with the aim to ‘encourage parents, teachers, 
pupils, educationalists ... to consider taking a view wider than that obtained from a 
primarily national standpoint’ (Delouche, 1992: 6). However, to date no EU member 
states have prescribed the book as an official history textbook.
After the troubles caused by Duroselle’s book the Commission has not 
officially promoted any attempts to present a definitive account of European history. 
The European Parliament, however, has been consistent in advocating the 
Europeanisation of national histories, and recently passed a resolution urging the 
Commission to draw up a school textbook on European history which, followed by 
the Council’s approval, would be recommended for study in all the member states.95 
The EP’s proposition has not been taken up by the Commission.
Europe: a History o f its Peoples by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle was published in 
1990, originally in French, but simultaneously translated into eight European
95 Official Journal, C55, 24/02/97.
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languages. To the extent that it propagates the essential unity and continuity of 
Europe, Duroselle’s book represents the Commission’s and the Parliament’s 
approach to culture in the pre-Maastricht, ‘People’s Europe’ phase of integration (the 
1980s) in which the design of EU cultural measures largely followed the ‘nation- 
building’ model of cultural policy. Despite the controversy caused by the book, 
Duroselle is confident about the non-biased nature of this book and, in its epilogue, 
stresses its historical objectivity:
Our task has been historical in the sense that the historian’s humble and 
exacting role is to seek the truth....for past events are immutable. ...the 
genuine historian is not engaged in propaganda. There can be no such thing as
‘committed history’ (the author and his colleagues) have done their best to
write nothing but the truth (1990: 410).
The approach that presupposes a fixed existence called ‘the past’ which is 
waiting to be recovered is frequently adopted by conventional national 
historiography. Duroselle’s work is not exception in this respect, and derives its 
meaning by presenting a particular representation of European history as unalterable 
and self-evident, while at the same time relegating alternative accounts to the sphere 
of the marginal or even the invisible. Thus, in order to analyse this text it is necessary 
not only to question its underlying presuppositions but also to examine the absence of 
other possible representations and reconstitute an alternative account.
Europe and the Other
If a particular representation of Europe can only be established at the expense of 
other possibilities, the notion of Europe employed in Duroselle’s study of history can 
also be delineated by what is not ‘Europe’. Indeed, from the very beginning of this 
book which deals with the pre-historic period, ‘Europe’ is regarded as one single unit 
and is contrasted with its Other, as though ‘Europe’ and the other parts of the world 
had always been in competition ever since the dawn of humanity. Defining 
‘Europeans’ in racial terms, Duroselle writes that ‘the original inhabitants of western
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Europe were white-skinned, barely touched by the Mongol invasions -  or by Asian 
and African immigration until after the end of World War IF (1990: 5).
According to Duroselle, ‘around 12,000 or 13,000 BC western Europe 
appears to have been in the forefront of human progress’ but ‘Europe’ is ‘outstripped 
by the Neolithic revolution in the Middle East’ and as a consequence, ‘the west lags 
behind’ (Ibid., 28-29) while ‘their Middle Eastern contemporaries were far more 
advanced’ (Ibid. 31). But with the coming of the Hallstatt Iron Age, Europe started to 
catch up with the east: ‘If a name had to be found for the eighth to the fifth centuries 
BC, it might well be “The Awakening of the West’” (Ibid. 42). Here, a conceptual 
demarcation that distinguishes Europe from the Other is already drawn through a 
discourse of West-East dualism with its corresponding us/them polarity. It does not 
matter whether the concept of Europe or the Middle East existed in the Neolithic 
period, but the opposition of East versus West which clearly excludes the Middle 
East from the notion of ‘Europe’ is retrospectively imposed by using the metaphors 
of competition.
Throughout the book, the theme of the Other contrasted with Europe appears 
recurrently, even though what, or who, is signified by the Other changes constantly. 
Whether ‘Europe’ is juxtaposed with Islam, ‘colonial’ peoples in the New World, 
communism, or America, the fundamental division of East-West remains a focal 
point in the discursive construction of Europe. The separation of ‘Europe’ from the 
rest of the world is kept intact by minimal contribution to the supposedly European 
elements from those of the Other. Until the age of Antiquity, ‘with the exception of 
south-east Europe, which was marginally influenced by Middle Eastern civilisation, 
western Europe remained isolated’ (Ibid. 29, my emphasis). Despite some emphasis 
on Greek heritage in Europe, no mention is made of the Egyptian or Phoenician 
influence which constitutes an important part in the Greek civilisation (See Delanty, 
1995: 17-23). The (controversial) ‘fabrication’ thesis of Martin Bernal demonstrates 
that the Ancient Greeks recognised themselves as the successor of the ancient Orient, 
and that it was the nineteenth-century European intellectuals who invented a cultural 
tradition whose roots lay in a purified ancient Greece that bore no recognition of its 
roots in the Orient (Bemal, 1987). Duroselle’s historical narrative belongs to this 
intellectual tradition that extracts Greece from the ancient Mediterranean world in
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which it developed and annexes it to Europe as the principal factor in the 
maintenance of European cultural continuity (Amin, 1989).
As for the treatments of outside influence in the later periods in history, they 
simply serve to enhance the division between Europe and non-Europe, the most 
recurrent representation of which is the Islamic world:
‘When the Prophet Mohammed founded Islam, the West took little notice of 
what seemed a distant, Oriental phenomenon.... [Islam was] generally 
unpopular in the West.’ (Duroselle, 1990: 111)
‘Many Europeans naturally hoped .. .to recover the lands lost to the Saracens. 
But other Christians had to live with the invaders of Spain and southern Italy’ 
(Ibid. 114)
‘There were several possible reactions to the Turkish threat...Should they be 
resisted at all costs? Or should Europeans flee before them...?’ (Ibid. 200)
Muslim influence, therefore, is presented either as negligible, or, where it is thought 
to encroach on the ‘European’ territory, as something negative which is to be 
avoided, feared, or defended against. In this discourse that stresses the adversarial 
nature of the relationship between Europe and Islam, the so-called essence of Europe 
is reified, and is written into the text as if it has a concrete existence. The Arabs, ‘like 
the Arabs of Spain’, the text goes, ‘have remained influential but largely separate’ 
(Ibid. 20), and their contribution in transmitting the ancient Greek texts and their 
impact on science and trade, which are integral to the components of ‘European 
progress’, are acknowledged only in passing (Ibid. 114 and 180). The tendency to 
ignore or undervalue the Other is justified because ‘This is not the place to discuss 
countries outside Europe’ (Ibid. 299).
The fact that Duroselle’s book was largely written before the fall of 
communism may explain why there is hardly any mention of Eastern Europe, except 
when the Byzantine empire is differentiated from ‘western Christendom’ as the 
‘Orient’. ‘Europe’ throughout this text is used almost interchangeably with western 
Europe. At the beginning of the book, Duroselle draws a chronological list of ‘phases 
of shared experience’ in Europe, which clearly indicates that his account is 
concentrated on the West: the megalith phase; the Celtic phase; the western Roman
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Empire; the Germanic centuries; the Carolingian Empire; western Christianity and 
the schism with Greece; the age of the Gothic cathedrals; the Renaissance including 
the divisive effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; the Imperial Age 
(Ibid. 20). Having reviewed more than 5000 years of European history, the author 
finally concedes that Europe ‘for the moment means Western Europe’ (Ibid. 414). 
The same kind of ambiguity is evident in the treatment of Russia: ‘Only the future 
can decide whether Russia will be European’ (Ibid. 392).
Eurocentrism
The Other plays a significant role in consolidating and reifying the boundaries that 
distinguishes ‘Europe’. However, what is significant in the European myth- 
construction is less the division between Europe and the rest of the world than the 
accompanying value judgement it entails. Eurocentrism is an implicit but recurring 
theme throughout Duroselle’s book. One of the components that is attributed to 
European moral superiority is Christianity. Incredibly, Duroselle claims that 
Christianity, through such principles as equality and tolerance, helped, among other 
things, to diminish the savagery of wars and improve the status of women. Therefore, 
the ‘two centuries that were the apogee of western Christendom.... were also marked 
by the growth of certain values making for an improvement to human life’ (Ibid. 
158). That which does not conform to this ideal Christian type is usually ascribed to 
the Other. For example, Emperor Frederick was described as:
‘Bom near Ancona, ...and brought up in Sicily, Frederick had been much 
influenced by Islam. Insanely proud, and indifferent to ethics, he seemed less 
like a Christian king than an Oriental despot living in sybaritic luxury. There 
was nothing German about him.’ (Ibid. 139)
But, as Amin argues, one of the main sources of Eurocentrism lies in the 
development of capitalism coupled with the advance of technology which enabled 
European powers to conquer others, and, the self-granted right to represent and judge 
non-Europeans and, perhaps most importantly, to impose these representations on
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them (1989). In the text, European conquests are represented as if they were an 
inevitable outcome following the logic of Social Darwinism:
‘For four and a half centuries, Europe’s military superiority had enabled her to 
dominate other peoples of the world. Perhaps it was inevitable that she should. 
Weak, ill-protected areas attract powerful invaders, who tell themselves that 
someone else will march in if they do not.’ (Duroselle, 1990: 392)
Indeed, the idea of Europe as being the repository of civilisation and progress 
provided a major legitimation of imperialism and the extermination of other cultures 
(Delanty, 1995: 95). Clearly, this sense of mission civilisatrice, although less 
explicitly than before, still permeates Duroselle’s account of European history. With 
regard to the strength of the European civilisation, the author endorses without any 
reservation a quote from Charles Moraze: ‘Having mastered the world, Europe 
developed a civilisation which carried within it the seeds of progress. ...And this 
progress in human behavior, in science, in society, and in education was Europe’s 
gift to the world...’ (Duroselle, 1990: 283). It is not surprising to find the recurrent 
theme of progress in a work which views history as a continuous movement toward 
the realisation of the present. For example;
Without making invidious or complacent comparisons with other parts of the 
world, it is nevertheless possible to discern in Europe’s history a general if 
halting growth in compassion, humanity, and equality (Ibid. 21).
In this type of discourse which celebrates European progress, darker sides of 
Europe tend to pass unacknowledged, and Duroselle’s text is no exception. Poverty 
and oppression among the peasants and, later, the industrial working class are barely 
mentioned. A brief reference is made to the savage nature of the Crusades which 
targeted the Jews as well as the Muslims but only in connection with its diminishing 
savagery in the later periods. In the same vein, brutality by Europeans in the New 
World is acknowledged, but its textual effects are marginalised by the emphasis on 
the early navigators’ spiritual quality:
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Europeans were neither totally surprised nor wholly fascinated by what they 
found. .. .What is striking about this cool, inquisitive, dispassionate observer of 
humanity is his sense of relativity. People being what they were, and climate 
and society acting upon them (Ibid. 198).
The topic of the New World is treated here as if there had been a more or less equal 
exchange between Europeans and the indigenous population. The author goes further 
by refusing to describe the relationship between Europe and the colonised world as 
imperialism: ‘It is worth pointing out that the theory of “economic imperialism”... is 
not confirmed by history’ (Ibid. 292-293). Accordingly, the word ‘imperialism’ never 
appears anywhere else except for this passage. And terms such as ‘racist’ or ‘racism’, 
the concept of which is closely associated with imperialism, are used only in relation 
to Nazism.
The myth of European unity
While the emphasis on division between Europe and its Other establishes the 
superior and essential existence of ‘Europe’, the discursive strategy of historical unity 
in Europe points to the affirmation of internal coherence and continuity. The focal 
point of this discourse is cultural heritage. Whenever the political situation produces 
discords and divisions, cultural and spiritual continuity is invoked. On the decay of 
the Carolingian empire: ‘This was the end of what the poet had called “the kingdom 
of Europe”, and the beginning of political anarchy. But intellectual culture lived 
on...’ (Ibid. 108). During the period when Christians were attacked by Muslims, 
Vikings and Hungarians, ‘as always in Europe, individual reactions...remained 
distinct from politics’ (Ibid. 132). And therefore, in the ‘midst of these troubled three 
centuries, the intellectual and spiritual unity of Europe was marked by the ... 
development of the new monastic orders’ (Ibid. 133). From this narrative, 
Christendom emerges as ‘the’ Europe: ‘These [appeals for a crusade by Europe 
against the Muslims] expressed the conviction -repeated here and there and since the 
time of Charlemagne- that Christendom was Europe’ (Ibid.200).
In the later periods of a secularised world, this idea of Europe is also 
secularised and effectively inherited by the peace movements of philosophers and
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intellectuals. Duroselle lists such advocates of the European idea as Kant, the Abbe 
de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mazzini, Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset, Ernest 
Renan, Romain Rolland and so on. It must be noted that some of them did not pursue 
the unity of Europe as such, but regarded European unity as a means to achieve either 
the consolidation of national strength or simply as a step towards universal peace. 
The key to establishing the continuity from Christendom to the modem age is the 
rhetoric of ‘the European idea’. Duroselle’s account of European history virtually 
strips Europe of various negative meanings associated with it, while privileging the 
notions which represent anything that resembles the peaceful unity of Europe as 
embodying the ultimate European idea (see Delanty, 1995). The effect of this is a 
vision of Europe characterised by an uninterrupted, linear progress towards a 
peaceful harmony. The culmination of this quest is, as can be expected, the post-war 
process of European integration, which is seen as the first step towards a genuinely 
united Europe (Duroselle, 1990: 409).
Just as Europe is placed in opposition to the external Other to reinforce the 
boundary, certain images of Europe are also juxtaposed with supposedly negative 
features in European history. The enemy of purified Europe is not just foreigners 
beyond the boundaries of Europe, but also ‘unfortunate’ historical developments 
inside Europe -  nationalism, religious strife, fascism, etc. The picture portrayed by 
these formulations is the opposition between a Europe of harmonious unity on one 
side, and internal strife, national divisions and wars on the other. Major 
developments in European history such as the nation-state, the consequences of the 
French Revolution, or Fascism are presented as though they are somehow not 
‘European’ in a real sense, as aberrations from the long history of European ideals. 
The same principle applies to the historical forms of unity which were achieved by 
force or were dominated by a single country, in other words the political reality 
which cannot be accommodated within this notion of ‘Europe’. Therefore, Europe’s 
cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth century, with its accompanying French 
predominance, is equated with ‘the False Europe’ (Ibid. 239); Napoleon’s empire is a 
‘universal empire’ and not ‘European’ (Ibid. 275-76); and the Concert of Europe is 
called ‘an imperfect vision of Europe’ (Ibid. 317).
As a principal stumbling block in the road to unification, the influence of 
nationalism is underplayed as much as possible: ‘nationalism has declined,
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accompanied by the growth of a “European” awareness which is no longer 
unconscious and historical, but conscious and purposive.’ (Ibid. 21); ‘Nationalism, 
and the fragmentation of Europe into nation-states, are relatively recent phenomena: 
they may be temporary...people...(began) to rise above their nationalistic instincts’ 
(Ibid.413).
If, as Delanty (1995) argues, the European idea postulated as peaceful unity 
and harmony is not compatible with the political reality of Europe, a certain form of 
European history has to be constructed, so that the present project of integration 
appears to be ‘natural, realistic, and legitimate’ (Duroselle, 1990: 413). The discourse 
constructed accordingly searches for the things that reconcile and overcome the 
negative image of a divided Europe, and these are found in ‘high culture’ 
(Wilterdink, 1993: 123). This is a process whereby themes such as European culture 
or intellectual thoughts are detached from the very milieu of their development, 
condensed into the concept of unity, and then appropriated as the embodiment of 
European essence. Brands points out that this type of history designates normative 
nature, ‘namely all those so-called definitions of what Europe ought to be if it were 
best’, which he calls ‘the Sunday clothes of European culture’ (1987: 73). It is an 
image of European culture which overshadows the political notion of Europe and 
which incorporates only a small section of society and excludes all the others.
After a lengthy examination of more than 5000 years of Europe’s history to 
enquire if a united Europe is possible at all, Duroselle concludes that European 
unification ‘is natural, realistic, and legitimate, because there has long been a 
community of Europe -  embryonic at first, but growing with time’ (Duroselle, 1990: 
413). And this long historical evolution has given Europe ‘a unique personality of its 
own, distinct from the other great regions for the world’ (Ibid. 409). Despite 
Duroselle’s claim to have tried to avoid any partisanship, his account of European 
history is widely regarded as ‘a programmatic attempt to rewrite Europe’s history in 
order to deliver the mythical foundations for a political project of unity’ (Riekmann, 
1997: 64). Those in favour of promoting the rewriting of history books from a 
‘European’ perspective typically justify such endeavour on the grounds that this is 
necessary to combat the hegemony of nationalist ideology. The result, however, is 
that nationalist ideology is simply replaced by a new ideology of ‘Europeanism’ 
(Shore, 2000: 58). Duroselle’s attempt, like de Rougemont’s much earlier, is also a
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highly elitist project. It is a selective view of history which centres on the ‘high 
culture’ of the ruling class and intellectuals, and it does not take into account of the 
perspective of minority peoples or of the periphery (Bloomfield, 1993: 265-266). It 
can also be seen as an attempt to re-Christianise European history, which was also 
one of the hallmarks of Euro-nationalist history writing since 1945 (Bands, 1987).
Characteristically, this semi-official symbolism of Europe leaves out one 
particular element which has been central to the formation of national identity. 
Whereas conventional national symbolism draws much of its evocative power from 
specific battles, war heroes and accompanying virtues, European symbolism focuses 
much more on culture and civilisation. More specifically, cultural traditions are 
identified to a high degree with principled intellectual and artistic movements. This 
selection is not coincidental because European integration is to be achieved through a 
peaceful process, overcoming hostility and differences between the member states. 
This makes a strong contrast with many national independence movements where the 
means of violence were openly justified. Thus, the EU ‘cannot accommodate a view 
of history in which conflicts between states take a central role, on the contrary, it 
searches for the things that reconcile and overcome national differences, and these 
are found in culture or civilisation’ (Wilterdink, 1993: 123).
This emphasis on cultural unity in the official representations of Europe is 
related to another problem concerning European identity. To the extent that drawing 
of group boundaries is simultaneously the exclusion of ‘others’ outside the group, the 
formation of collective identities always involve some elements of negation. In other 
words, identity is constructed through difference, in contradistinction to others 
(Billig, 1995b). This is particularly true in the case of the nation-state where national 
unity and autonomy have usually been won from external or internal enemies. In 
consequence, ‘the discourses about the national ingroup -  its history, its culture, its 
interest -  are not innocent’ but ‘they are both an affirmation of “us” and also a 
negation of otherness’ (Billig, 1995b: 98). Pieterse comments on this exclusionary 
aspect of the EU’s representation of European history:
It is wrong as regards the origins of European culture; it is wrong in so 
representing European culture that European regional cultures and subcultures 
are overlooked; it is wrong in representing elite culture as culture tout court and
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in denying popular culture; it is wrong in defining European culture in terms of 
the past... and in totally ignoring Europe’s contemporary multicultural realities 
(1991:4).
The ‘Other’ and EU immigration discourse
If, as Delanty (1995) argues, most of ‘the history of Europe’ is only retrospectively 
European and results from the attempt of the European elites striving to see unity 
even where there never was any, it is easy to dismiss these officially formulated 
representations of the European past as nothing more than trivial attempts of the 
European elites. However, these elites’ representations as a whole open up the 
possibility for a new discourse on Europe, and the new systems of conceptual 
ordering through which the rhetoric of European solidarity and identity emerges 
(Shore, 1996). In fact, it is not so much the existence of internal unity or coherence as 
attempts to differentiate ‘Europeans’ from non-Europeans which find strong 
expressions in the EU institutional sphere, and which have become the basis for 
much of the articulation of European identity. After all, the aim of protecting 
‘European culture’ from external forces could appear less controversial than trying to 
construct and impose uniformity at the inside (Theiler, 2001). This is where Europe’s 
historic frontier of confrontations with the outside world, especially Islam, is being 
reactivated (Pieterse, 1991).
Van Ham suggests that Europe has three external points of reference, three 
principal Others that have a bearing on its self-understanding, and those are the US, 
Russia and Islam (2001). As we shall see in the chapters on European heritage and 
EU audiovisual policies, the rhetoric of ‘cultural war’ between the alleged unique 
diversity of Europe and the homogeneity of American cultural influence (which is 
often equated with globalisation) forms a strong basis in EU policy discourse for 
portraying European identity ‘under threat’. Fears of cultural Americanisation have a 
relatively long history in many European countries, with many cultural elites 
bemoaning the alleged vulgarity of American mass cultural imports long before the 
Second World War. But what is at stake here is not just a matter of aesthetics or 
cultural refinement. The general European concept of culture assumes a distinct 
relation between national culture, identity and the state. If Americans seem willing to
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follow the market logic as the centre of their self-constitution, the European model of 
society posits the moral responsibilities of public service provisions which include 
culture. While such a dichotomy between American and European culture may be too 
simplistic, fears about the excessive marketisation of culture and society in general 
have undoubtedly fuelled lingering cultural resentment among European and national 
elites. Thus the EU was able to mobilise these fears in their construction of the anti- 
Americanisation rhetoric for the purpose of bolstering its own cultural ambitions in 
the project of Europeanisation.
Although the idea of Europe existed for centuries, it was within the confines 
of the Cold War politics that European integration as an idea acquired an institutional 
framework (Delanty, 1995). To the extent that fear of the Soviet Union provided one 
of the fundamental rationales for post-war integration efforts, Russia constituted a 
symbol of that which Western Europe is not. This East-West divide has also offered 
Western European states an opportunity to accentuate and reinforce the political, 
economic and cultural qualities that they supposedly have in common. Since the 
collapse of communism, however, the ‘Othering’ of Russia took on a different 
meaning. Rather than being a principal security threat to the ‘West’, Russia now 
features as the ultimate Asian Other in many debates about Europe and enlargement 
in Central European countries (van Ham, 2001: 207).
It can be argued that the demise of the Cold War and the communist threat 
left a perceived ‘threat vacuum’ in Europe, which, particularly in the post-9/11 
context, is now filled by an abstraction called ‘Islam’ (van Ham, 2000: 210). On a 
more concrete level, the EU’s discursive construction of Islam as the ultimate ‘Other’ 
crystallises in its troubled relationship with Turkey. Turkey applied for Community 
membership as long ago as 1959, but as a predominantly Muslim country, its 
application was simply deemed invalid. Turkey made a formal bid for full integration 
in 1987, but was again rejected by the European Commission two years later. In 
December 1999, the EU finally agreed to start discussions on Turkish membership 
which might eventually evolve into official accession negotiations. Although Turkey 
has reacted with enthusiasm to these new EU moves, there remains frustration that it 
has had to wait so long and is still at the end of a queue, being ‘skipped over’ by 
many Eastern European countries (van Ham, 2000; Hansen, 2004). In the autumn of 
2002, just a few weeks before the EU’s Copenhagen Summit was due to take up once
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again the question of Turkish membership, the former French president and the 
Chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, 
caused alarm in some quarters by publicly proclaiming that if Turkey, which in his 
view is not a European country, became a member of the EU, ‘it would be the end of 
Europe’.96 Although several high-ranking EU officials voiced their disapproval of 
this remark, his claim has created another setback in the process of building a bridge 
toward the Islamic Other.
Giscard d’Estaing is not alone in speaking of an essential Europe whose 
historical anchoring lies in the Christian heritage. Although frequently overshadowed 
by an emphasis on the pragmatism and technocratic rationality of the ‘Monnet 
method’, the ‘founding fathers’ of the EC had a tacit understanding that the idea 
underlying Europe was Christian. Schumann’s vision of European integration was 
based on Christian moral values, which were shared by the Christian democratic 
founders of the Community including Monnet (Bloomfield, 1993: 264). The current 
President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, refers to a ‘reunification’ of Europe, 
the original unified Europe, according to Prodi, being Charlemagne’s empire. Prodi’s 
formulation of a ‘European soul’ alarmingly echoes Euro-nationalist discourse:
Europe’s destiny is not inherently Eurocentric, but one of universality. It should 
therefore reassert its role as the ‘beacon for world civilization’. This is possible 
and sustainable as long as its historical memory goes back beyond the ideals of 
the last few centuries and ... rediscovers its religious roots. Such a role could 
eventually revive the Christian soul of Europe which is the basis for unity 
(2000: 46).
The ‘objective’ reason for excluding Turkey is that it does not fulfil the EU’s criteria 
for accession, including respect for human rights and international law. However, 
objections to Turkish membership are often read as expressions of thinly-disguised 
anti-Islamic sentiments, and this feeling seems to be shared not just in Turkey but in 
countries on Europe’s Islamic periphery in general (van Ham, 2000: 213). From 
across the Mediterranean, therefore, European integration could look like an
96 New York Times, 9 November 2002.
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exclusionary fortress-building exercise, the ultimate purpose of which is to keep the 
Islamic Other at bay.97
This connects our debate to the issue of immigration as a concrete 
manifestation of the EU’s boundary-drawing process. Since the 1970s, it has become 
common in (west) European states to link international crime with immigration as 
signifying threats and security problems, and therefore something which the citizens 
need to be protected from (Geddes, 2003). But with the acceleration of integration 
since the 1990s, issues regarding immigration are increasingly perceived as a 
problem that requires a ‘European’ solution. The underlying assumption is that a 
space of free movement would necessarily provide improved opportunities for 
terrorists, international criminals, asylum seekers, and immigrates to develop their 
illegal and criminal activities. The Treaty of Amsterdam virtually sealed this 
Europeanisation process by moving the sections of the intergovernmental ‘third 
pillar’ of the EU relating to immigration, asylum and refugees to the ‘first pillar’ -
Q O
i.e. within the competence of the Community (Huysmans, 2001).
Significantly, EU policy statements consistently conflate issues about 
immigrants, foreigners and border controls with fears about terrorism, drugs and 
crime (Shore, 2000). The result is that while national barriers within Europe have 
come down, the walls separating the EU from its ‘Others’ -  both internal and 
external -  have grown higher. What seems to be happening in this process is that the 
very same people who do not conform to the definitions of ‘Europeans’ propagated 
by authors such as Duroselle are sometimes also labelled as ‘problems’, ‘burdens’, or 
even ‘threats’ (Hansen, 2004). The idea of erecting a ‘Fortress Europe’ is further 
highlighted by the development of what has been termed a ‘two-tier human rights 
system’ -  one that grants EU citizens the most sophisticated protection from human 
rights abuses but excludes from full human rights protection ‘unwanted aliens’ 
(Gowlland-Debbas, 2001: 222). While EU officials dismiss the notion of an ‘official’
97 Morocco also applied for EC/EU membership in 1986 but was resolutely turned down on the 
grounds that the organisation was only open to Europeans and that Morocco was unambiguously 
judged to be ‘non-European’ (Hansen, 2004).
98 Contrary to the rapid development of EU immigration and asylum policies in the 1990s, the EU has 
neglected its responsibility in the areas of anti-discrimination law, minority rights and measures against 
racism and xenophobia (Geddes, 2003). The Treaty of Rome has not provisions on forms of 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity or religion, although it specifically prohibits nationality or 
gender-based discrimination.
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category of ‘European’, we can observe the emergence of a de facto definition 
through the administrative process of establishing directives and regulations 
governing the statuses of immigrants and refugees (Holms, 2000: 31). It is in this 
process that the terms ‘non-EU nationals’, ‘third countries’ and ‘non-European’ take 
on a concrete meaning and become entangled in immigration debates often framed as 
a defence against unwanted outsiders based on the exclusive, ethno-cultural model of 
community.
Of course this is not to suggest that EU officials have any intentions of trying 
to fuel hostilities towards people bom outside of the ethno-culturally defined Europe. 
My point is that there are some parallels between the way in which EU immigration 
policies came to differentiate ‘Europeans’ and ‘non-Europeans’ on the one hand and 
Euro-nationalist discourse on history which embraces the essentialised definitions of 
what should constitute its ‘natural’ citizenry on the other, even though blatant Euro- 
nationalist themes have almost disappeared from the cultural policy sphere at least 
since the mid-1990s. Having reorganised its post-Maastricht cultural priorities 
around the idea of citizens’ voluntary participation in a networked space, the EU’s 
attempts to achieve some sort of cultural cohesion within Europe seem to have 
acquired an external focus, whereby the terms of debate have shifted from the 
question of how to create internal unity and commonality to that of how to determine 
those who do not belong to Europe. As such, these ethno-cultural elements in EU 
immigration discourse are at variance with the overall direction of recent policy 
developments evident in specific cultural programmes, and therefore represent an 
earlier stage of EU cultural politics when the overwhelming concern of cultural 
measures lay in the engineering of a ‘European consciousness’ based on essential 
cultural qualities.
On a more positive note, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a new Article 13 
that established, for the first time in the EU, a legal basis for action to combat 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and religion, as well as on gender, age, 
disability and sexual orientation. This was followed in 2000 by the Council’s 
adoption of two Directives on race equality, partly as the member states’ reaction 
against the entry into the Austrian coalition of Haider’s Freedom Party (Geddes, 
2003). These legal frameworks may in time come to offer a new platform for pro­
migrant mobilisation. In addition, a more recent tendency of general EU discourse on
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identity is to invoke abstract, diffuse civic ideals such as liberal democracy and 
respect for human rights without relying on the notion of a bounded, exclusive 
cultural community. This is a more open, inclusive articulation of European ideals, 
not dissimilar to Habermas’s idea of constitutional patriotism, which can hardly be 
affixed specifically to Europe or to the member states (Soysal, 2002).
Conclusion
The images of the European past constructed by the elites enfold a fundamental 
dilemma in articulating a cultural model for a Europe-wide community. On the one 
hand European elites aim to break away from the past and to mark a wholly new 
beginning. On the other hand they also long for common historical roots and dig into 
the past in the hope of finding a unifying theme. The main topic of this chapter was 
that Euro-nationalist writing represented by Duroselle’s book put forward an 
essentialised view on European unity and history in which a distinctive, bounded 
cultural community is set apart form others by race, religion, language or habitat. 
This way of delineating European identity is also laden with ethnocentric and elitist 
assumptions about what constitutes Europe’s ‘cultural heritage’. I have also tried to 
show that this type of ethno-cultural discourse on European identity has implicitly 
become enmeshed in exclusionary practices whereby ‘extra-Europeans’, be they 
Muslims, immigrants from the ‘Third World’, or non-White people in general, are 
not only branded as ‘unwanted’ but often targeted as potential security threats. 
Although the EU has recently come to reconceive European cultures as plural and 
non-homogeneous, based on reciprocal interaction and exchange, immigration is an 
(only) area where holistic conceptions of unity still retain strong influence in EU 
policy thinking. In this sense, the construction of European identity and Europe’s 
‘Other’ poses a serious problem in today’s multiethnic, multicultural Europe.
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CHAPTER 6 
Conservation of Heritage in the European Union
In the previous chapter, we have seen the way in which reified notions of European 
culture and identity are constructed in the representations of European history. In 
such a view on culture, ‘European heritage* is regarded as an exemplary expression 
of European distinctiveness rooted in history and collective memory. In EU 
documents, speeches and declarations concerning culture, the representation of the 
European heritage as a locus of European identity is used to activate the rhetoric of 
antithesis between European particularity and the homogenising thrust of global 
market forces, which normally leads to the conclusion that there is an utmost need to 
protect and promote the European heritage ‘under threat*. Despite this rhetoric 
formulated by EU officials, however, the actual practices of the EU programmes 
concerning cultural heritage suggest that the EU’s policy agenda prioritises the 
economic dimension of heritage over its cultural contents. Thus, in setting the 
operational framework of its heritage conservation policies, the EU tends to adopt a 
technicist and economistic outlook on culture rather than relying on an essentialist 
definition of Europeanness.
This chapter looks at those two contradictory representations of culture which 
are being articulated around the EU policy on cultural heritage. My argument here is 
that both of the two opposing representations of culture can be seen as part of the 
EU’s strategies to survive in a world increasingly dominated by market forces. In the 
first part, I will briefly sketch the development and structure of the EU programmes 
on cultural heritage which should highlight the EU’s pragmatic stance towards 
culture. This is followed by an analysis of the relationship between ‘European 
culture’ as the locus of collective identity on the one hand, and ‘European culture’ as 
a vehicle for economic growth on the other in the context of globalisation.
Conserving Europe’s cultural heritage
Conservation of the cultural heritage is one of the first areas of cultural activities in 
the EU. The European Parliament, the most enthusiastic advocate of European
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cultural policies among the EU institutions, passed a resolution as early as 1974 to 
press the Commission for measures to protect the European cultural heritage." In 
1976, the Commission introduced scholarships for training and for the development 
of new techniques in the field of conservation, and then in 1980, Community grants 
were introduced to contribute towards financing specific conservation projects. 
Under this heading, the 1980 appropriation went to the Market Street Building in 
Edinburgh, a nineteenth century building that was turned into a cultural centre.100 
These grants were made on an ad hoc basis until 1984, when an annual scheme for 
pilot projects was launched. With the introduction of this new scheme, Community 
action in this field was reorganised into four categories: specific conservation 
projects; financial support for the restoration of European monuments and sites of 
special historical significance; grants for training in restoration techniques; and 
sponsoring events (exhibitions, conferences, etc.) on the theme of cultural 
conservation.
a) Specific conservation projects
This annual scheme, implemented from 1984 to 1995, was intended to support 
exemplary projects, as much for the artistic and historical value of the monument as 
for the cultural and technical quality of the work carried out.101 It is a direct successor 
to the Community grants launched in 1980, but with a significant budgetary increase 
and new selection criteria. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the funds allocated 
to this scheme accounted for almost half of the total cultural budget of the EU. 
Unlike the grants before 1984 when there was no publicity about the programme, a 
notice for call for applications for these grants was published every year in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. Projects were chosen first by national 
or regional bodies responsible for historic monuments and sites, and then submitted 
to the Commission who made its final decision with an independent panel of experts.
99 Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ), 1974, C62, p.5
100 OJ C99, 1986, p.21 Subsequently, grants were awarded to the following sites: Milos, Greece 
(museum and site) in 1982; Parthenon restoration project in Athens, Rainsford Street Hops Store in 
Dublin, Kerkom Castle (Belgium), Palazzo della Corgna and Palazze dei Consoli (Italy), and the East 
Indiaman ‘Amsterdam’ (Netherlands) in 1983. No explanation was given as to why these sites were 
chosen.
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This selection process was repeatedly criticised, especially by the members of the 
European Parliament, for lacking transparency and openness, since even a list of
109selected projects was not made available for the general public. It was in response 
to such criticism that the Commission started a public awareness campaign in 1992 
through travelling exhibitions of selected projects, although it is hard to establish 
how far this form of publicity has improved the transparency and visibility of the 
scheme.
In 1989, for a more efficient use of the Community’s resources, the Commission 
decided to concentrate its effort on an annual theme highlighting certain aspects of 
problems involved in conservation work. Under those themes, around 30 to 50 
projects were selected each year:
1989: Emerging civil and religious monuments/sites (monuments and sites, 
archaeological sites, historic gardens which are of exceptional interest due to their 
historical message or their architectural value)
1990: Historic buildings which define and characterise an urban or rural pattern 
1991: Buildings and sites bearing witness to human activities in industry, agriculture 
and crafts
1992: Integrated upgrading of public spaces in historic centres (to restore the link 
between historical buildings and public spaces while adapting their social use to their 
character)
1993: Conservation projects for gardens of historic interest
1994: Historic buildings and sites related to entertainment and the performing arts
1
1995: Religious monuments (still serving their original religious purposes)
b) Financial support for the restoration of European monuments and sites of special 
historical significance
101 Support for pilot projects to conserve the Community’s architectural heritage, OJ Cl 11, 1984, p.5
102 See, for example, questions by MEPs to the European Commission, in OJ C269, 1985, p.20, OJ 
C60, 1997, p.93
103 OJ C308, 1988, p.3, OJ C275, 1993, OJ C283,1994
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At the initiative of the European Parliament, the Commission has also given financial 
support for several years for the restoration of following major European 
monuments: the Parthenon and the Acropolis in Athens; the monasteries of Mount 
Athos; the historic quarter of the Chiado in Lisbon; Trinity College in Coimbra; and 
several monuments located on the route to Saint James, Santiago de Compostella 
(CEC, 1992a:7).104 It is not clear why these particular monuments/sites were chosen 
as no explanation was given for this selection. In addition to the above, emergency 
aid has been allotted due to some catastrophe such as fire or bombing, and the Uffizi 
Gallery in Florence, the Liceo Theatre in Barcelona, the Brittany Parliament building 
in Rennes, the site of Delphi and the theatre of Fenice in Venice, have all received 
Community aid.
c) Grants for training in restoration techniques
From the outset, the Commission linked the problem of heritage conservation to that 
of providing vocational training in restoration techniques. Thus, the Commission has 
been allocating a lump sum to the following international institutions specialising in 
restoration, which then use these funds to award grants to those undertaking training 
courses: ICCROM (Rome); Centre for the Conservation of Historic Towns and 
Buildings (Leuven); Centre for Conservation Studies (York); Pro Venetia Viva 
Foundation (Venice); Institute of Archaeology Conservation Summer School, UCL 
(London); and Centro Universitario Europeo per i Beni Culturali (Ravello) (CEC, 
1992a).
In hindsight, it makes sense that it was ‘cultural heritage’ that was first chosen from 
the broad spectrum of possible arts and cultural fields, because the cultural heritage is 
a sector that was easily linked to the improvement of the tourist infrastructure and 
with employment policy measures. Moreover, it turned out that the technical aspects 
of heritage conservation needed injections from latest technological developments, 
which also coincided with the concerns of the EU research and development policies.
104 Parliament resolution on economic aid to Mount Athos, OJ C144, 1981, Parliament resolution on 
aid for the reconstruction of the Chiado district, OJ C262, 1988
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In evaluating policy developments in the cultural field, the Commission commented 
in 1992: ‘The feeling was that, in addition to the intrinsic value of this irreplaceable 
heritage, Community action was also justified by the social and economic benefits of 
conservation, in terms of jobs, training, research, new technology, regional 
development, the tourist and environment industries and quality of life’ (CEC, 
1992a:4). Because the EU did not have a legal mandate in the cultural field before 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission was often prompted to disguise its cultural 
aspirations under socio-economic objectives. But it can also be argued that, as part of 
the general dynamics of European integration where more and more areas of human 
activities are dominated by transnational market forces, ‘European heritage’ is also 
transformed through the EU cultural policy from cultural assets that have intrinsic 
values into something that generates profits, a strategy which was not so evident in 
the pre-Maastricht period but which came to constitute a key theme in EU 
approaches to the cultural heritage at a later stage. As one MEP put it rather crudely, 
‘conservation brings in more money than it costs’ (EP, 1988b: 14).
Thus, in selecting conservation projects eligible for support, the ‘European 
dimension’ is defined not as some supposed ‘Europeanness’ that certain monuments 
or sites symbolise. Rather, the emphasis is on the ‘multifaceted importance’ attached 
to those projects in European economic and social, as well as cultural, terms. The 
pilot projects were thus ‘designed to reinforce the bonds of interdependence existing 
between these three sectors by bringing to the fore the effect that investment in 
Europe’s past can have upon its future cultural, social and economic 
development’.105 This justification explains to a certain degree the seemingly random 
and incoherent support given to some heritage sites during the initial period, as the 
beneficiaries of EU support seemed to concentrate in poorer areas and countries 
among the member states. But this apparent randomness also goes hand in hand with 
the EU’s inability to give a concrete expression to the concept of the European 
heritage. The Commission has so far evaded disseminating certain sets of images as 
‘European heritage’ or imposing a unified definition of what constitutes common 
features of European heritage. Indeed, when questioned about the possibility of
105 OJC308, 1988, p.3
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designating specific sites as being ‘European heritage’, a Commission spokesman 
specified that it does not have the competence to do so.106
‘RAPHAEL’ Programme
Following the introduction of the ‘cultural clause’ in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Commission adopted a proposal for the programme ‘Raphael’ to give a new impetus 
to Community activities in the field of cultural heritage. The centrality of promoting 
and preserving cultural heritage within the overall EU cultural policies is highlighted 
by the fact that Article 128 (Article 151 as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty) 
specifically identifies cultural heritage as one of the priority fields of action. 
Although the programme was initially designed for a five-year period from 1996 to 
2000, disagreements between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament on its 
operational details delayed its actual implementation until 1998, and EU support for 
conservation projects continued in the form of a ‘preparatory framework for Raphael’ 
during the ‘in-between’ period.
In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the operational framework of 
Raphael was intended to support and supplement, but not to supersede, the action 
taken by the member states in the field of the preservation of cultural heritage. Its 
types of actions were divided into three categories:107
1) Conservation, safeguarding and development of the European cultural heritage 
through European cultural cooperation 
This line of action aimed to encourage the conservation, safeguarding and 
enhancement of the European cultural heritage by promoting the pooling of skills and 
the development of best practice. As in the previous scheme for pilot projects, 
priority was given to projects with a multiplier effect in cultural, technical and socio­
economic terms, involving highly qualified labour and/or new technologies and 
services.
106 Question by Ian White to the European Commission, OJ C l50, 1991, p.32
107 OJ C97, 1998, p. 10, OJ C342, 1998, p.38
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a) Support for projects for the conservation and safeguarding of the cultural 
heritage which qualify as ‘European heritage laboratories’ for its historical, 
architectural or artistic importance. Particular attention was given to projects 
that addressed complex conservation problems from the scientific or technical 
point of view. These projects must be submitted by the competent authorities in 
the Member States.108
b) Support for the establishment and activities of cooperation networks aimed at 
studying, protecting and enhancing heritage in line with common themes 
determined every year by the Commission (the 1998 theme: non-movable 
heritage, the 1999 theme: movable heritage). The heritage in question must 
concern a group of buildings or cultural sites distributed over or preserved in at 
least three countries.
2) Cooperation for the exchange of experiences and the development of techniques
applied to the heritage
a) Support for projects aiming at the mobility and training of professionals, 
especially in the field of new technologies, advanced information and 
communication services
b) Support for the exchanges of experience and information to develop best 
conservation practices, including seminars and events that employ advanced 
information communication technology
3) Public access to, participation in and awareness of the cultural heritage
a) Support for transnational cooperation projects between museums and 
institutions for the enhancement of and accessibility to the heritage using 
interactive, multimedia systems and multilingual presentations
108 In 1998, the following ten projects were selected: the site of the battle of Waterloo (Belgium); the 
Acropolis (Greece); the Camino de Santiago (Spain); ‘AREA’ (safeguard of archives in European 
archaeology, France); archaeological park in Boyne Valley (Ireland); the tower of Pisa (Italy); the 
development of long-term durability of marble coated facades (Finland); ‘Tanum’ site with prehistoric 
engravings (Sweden); the proactive earthwork management of Hadrian’s Wall (UK); and Nidaros 
Cathedral (Norway). The programme was also open to the EEA countries.
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b) Support for innovative events to raise public awareness of the cultural heritage 
with the use of new technologies (virtual exhibitions, use of multimedia, 
transnational cultural itineraries, etc.)
4) Cooperation with third countries and international organisations, in particular the 
Council of Europe and UNESCO
Between 1997 and 1999, the overall budget was ECU 30 million, and support was 
given to 222 projects and 18 ‘European heritage laboratories’ (CEC, 2004a:6).109 
Compared to previous schemes for the conservation of the cultural heritage, three 
features stand out in particular. First, the definition of ‘heritage’ was significantly 
broadened. Whereas earlier support schemes were limited to the restoration of built 
heritage, Raphael covered movable and immovable heritage (museums and 
collections, libraries and archives including photographic, cinematographic and 
sound archives), archaeological and underwater heritage, assemblages and cultural 
landscapes, as well as architectural heritage. Similarly, support became available to 
any activities that contribute to better knowledge, management, conservation, 
restoration, presentation and accessibility of cultural heritage.
Second, and closely related to the first point, Raphael explicitly placed the 
promotion and preservation of ‘cultural heritage’ within the overall project of growth, 
competitiveness and employment, whereas in the earlier stage the link between 
heritage conservation and its wider socio-economic significance was more implicit. 
The Commission’s proposal for Raphael listed various benefits that heritage 
conservation is expected to generate (CEC, 1995a). The heritage sector is not just a 
source of new jobs, but can also ‘contribute significantly to the 
research/growth/employment dynamism in that it is a sector where the results of 
research could be exploited more effectively’ by a highly-skilled workforce required 
at the level of both management and practical implementation of heritage projects 
(1995a: 2). Moreover, heritage projects are ‘increasingly integrated in regional
109 Some examples of the selected projects are: a web page on European arctic heritage; seminars and 
workshops on the promotion of traditional crafts; virtual itineraries for textile heritage; the restoration 
of baroque altars; and electronic networking of archives and museums. ‘European heritage 
laboratories’ included financial support for Acropolis.
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development policies, particularly in schemes to encourage urban renewal and 
combat depopulation’ (Ibid.). Despite this economic focus, the Commission proposal 
still continued to pay lip service to the cultural dimension of the programme, 
although this time the stress was on the dual (or plural) nature of European cultural 
identity: ‘Europe’s cultural heritage ... displays certain common characteristics that 
transcend national or regional difference. This interplay of diversity and constancy 
perfectly illustrates the regional, national and European roots of Europe’s citizens’ 
(CEC, 1995a: 1).
Third, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, Raphael placed a considerable 
emphasis on the creation of trans-national ties between cultural operators and 
professionals. We have already seen that the EU’s post-Maastricht cultural 
programmes are typically organised around the concepts of transnational networks, 
partnerships and exchanges, and Raphael is no exception. According to Ellmeier, one 
of the characteristics of EU policies in general is that their structure distinguishes 
itself in ‘building, stabilising and intensifying connections, consciously refraining 
from establishing centres but increasing the frequency of movements between nodal 
points and bases, to a certain extent establishing a new, flexible system of co­
operation’ (Ellmeier, 1998: 124). Apart from the action lines 1(a) and 2(a), the 
eligibility criteria of Raphael required that projects applying for support had to 
involve technical and financial participation of professionals or organisations from at 
least three Member States. What is meant by ‘European dimension’ with this regard 
is simply European collaboration, different nationalities working together on 
common cultural projects, rather than the realisation of projects having a ‘European 
theme’. So, while the European cultural heritage is purported to symbolise the 
interplay of diversity and commonality, the Commission has resorted to presenting 
the issue of heritage conservation not as a matter of cultural or symbolic contents, but 
as a technical problem needing solution through an injection of new technologies or 
transnational cooperation. The technical, objective criteria set out by the Raphael 
programme allow a European dimension to be claimed without having to single out 
what constitutes the ‘common cultural heritage’. Raphael thus replicates the basic 
dilemma that characterises many of the EU’s cultural measures: the existence of 
differences and overarching unity are both underlined, but this dual theme crucially 
lacks a clear vision about what would constitute this unity. The basic meaning of
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‘heritage’ as ‘something in common ownership received from the past’ (Comer and 
Harvey, 1991: 50) seems to lose much of its significance in the practical context of 
policy implementation.
Although the main target population of the Raphael programme was cultural 
professionals and organisations, the projects supported under Action 3 specifically 
aimed to improve public access to cultural heritage so as to raise their awareness of 
shared features as well as diversity in European heritage. Here, as in other line of 
actions in the programme, special attention was given to the use of multimedia 
systems and products. As the Commission proposal for this programme stated, 
‘cultural heritage is a priority area for the development of applications and standards 
of advanced information and communication technology and services...The likely 
benefits of such work will not be solely in terms of growth, competitiveness or 
employment.. .the general public will benefit from a whole range of new and 
sophisticated cultural products and services’ (CEC, 1995a: 2-3).
In this formula, the cultural heritage is no longer that which merely needs to 
be protected and preserved as an embodiment of the past. Rather, it is conceived as 
something that needs to be packaged and marketed and also as a vehicle for 
advancing communication technologies. Accessibility to cultural heritage, therefore, 
is expected to improve through a presentation that is more technologically 
sophisticated. In other words, once cultural heritage is attractively packaged with the 
help of multimedia systems, it would appeal to the contemporary consumers who are 
in turn believed to increase their European awareness through the consumption of 
those technology-oriented ‘products and services’. In his discussion on EU 
audiovisual policy, Schlesinger asks whether the EU may be advocating a vision of 
‘techno-utopia’, where differences and divisions are overcome through new 
developments in information technology and where citizens are held together by 
technology-driven consumption (Schlesinger, 1997). This observation has a direct 
relevance to the approach the EU has adopted in relation to ‘European heritage’.
Heritage, tourism and information technologies
The Raphael programme was later integrated, together with other cultural 
programmes (Kaleidoscope and Ariane), into the Culture 2000 programme. But the
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conservation of cultural heritage features prominently in this framework programme, 
with approximately 34% of Culture 2000 earmarked for cultural heritage. This new 
framework was adopted in order to redress the problem of public access to and 
participation in culture by offering a comprehensive and transparent structure, since 
previous programmes were seen as fragmented and ‘can be detrimental to the 
Community’s image among the European public, who are unaware that such efforts 
are being made to preserve and promote their cultures or that the cultural dimension 
is taken into account in furthering European integration’ (CEC, 1998c: 5). In its 
policy statement, the Commission once again employed the rhetoric of culture as a 
basis of European identity: ‘If citizens give their full support to, and participate fully 
in, European integration, greater emphasis should be placed on their common cultural 
values and roots as a key element of their identity’.110 Nevertheless, apart from the 
fact that it now includes cultural activities aimed at social integration of the young 
and the socially disadvantaged, the basic approach of the Culture 2000 programme 
does not differ from that of ‘Raphael’. European cultural heritage, through the 
operational structure of this programme, is again constructed as a strategic site 
through which transnational, technology-led production and consumption patterns 
can develop.
In addition to the above programmes, the EU has a range of other measures 
that are relevant to the heritage sector outside the narrowly-defined scope of its 
cultural activities. There are two policy areas that deserve mention here, not only 
because they directly concern cultural heritage conservation, but also the scope and 
the impact of these policy areas far exceeds that of the Raphael (and Culture 2000) 
programme. They also demonstrate the extent to which the agendas of different 
Commission DGs converge on a particular interpretation of ‘European culture’ and 
‘cultural heritage’. This is an important point as EU institutions have repeatedly 
stressed the centrality of enhancing ‘synergetic effects’ between culture and other 
relevant areas and activities of the EU (see Chapter 3).111
110 OJ L63, 2000, p.l
111 See for instance, the Council’s recent resolution on ‘the horizontal aspects of culture: increasing 
synergies with other sectors and Community actions and exchanging good practices in relation to the 
social and economic dimensions of culture’, Official Journal C136, 11/06/2003.
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The first of such areas is tourism. The EU does not have ‘tourism policy’ as 
such, but its activities in various fields are directly related to tourism. Most EU 
funding for tourism is channelled through structural funds, the most important of 
which is the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). ERDF has a category 
dedicated to projects on cultural heritage sites and monuments where these contribute 
to the development of the region in which they are located.112 The European Social 
Fund, another major component of the structural funds, also supports heritage 
conservation where it is relevant for training or resettlement of unemployed workers. 
I have noted in Chapter 3 that more than 80% of overall EU support for cultural 
activities comes from the structural funds. It is estimated that between 1989 and 1993 
ECU 400 million was allocated through the structural funds to projects with a 
cultural dimension (excluding tourism), and the figure would be ten times this 
amount if the tourism sector is included (EP, 1998: 24).
Interestingly, it is European cultural diversity, not unity, which makes the link 
between culture, tourism and cohesion so valuable. According to the Commission 
document ‘Cohesion Policy and Culture’, ‘The diversity of cultural heritage in 
Europe is one of the most valuable assets. It forms a major part of the continent’s 
identity. As yet, however, the full potential of this asset remains under-exploited, as 
do opportunities for further innovation’ (CEC, 1996c: 2). Simply put, culture is an 
economic asset for poor regions (Delgado-Moreira, 2000: 462). The broadening of 
the definition of cultural heritage under the Raphael programme needs to be 
understood in this context. ‘Cultural heritage’, if we follow the EU’s definition, now 
includes movable and immovable heritage, archaeological and architectural heritage, 
natural heritage, linguistic and gastronomic heritage and traditional crafts and 
occupations. Because every region has a culture to offer for tourist consumption, 
tourism, and more specifically cultural tourism, came to be seen as a convenient way 
of enticing tourists to as yet ‘undiscovered’ (and therefore underdeveloped) regions
and areas of Europe, thereby contributing to the EU’s economic and social
1 1 ^  •cohesion. In this process, local, regional or national cultures and heritage become
112 OJ C99, 1986, p.22
113 For example, ERDF has given financial support to the restoration of Byzantine architecture and the 
construction of a vast museum complex in the Greek town of Mystras. ERDF support was also given
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crucial as ‘unique’ or ‘authentic’ elements of culture are mobilised to accentuate 
place-specific differences and enhance the distinctive qualities of a region or locality 
(Richards, 1996).
Another policy strand that has a particular bearing on the cultural heritage is 
the area of Research and Development. The Information Society programme that has 
been running under the 5th (1998-2002) and the 6th (2002-2006) research and 
development frameworks has several research strands with cultural heritage themes. 
For example, within the key action ‘The City of Tomorrow and Cultural Heritage’ 
(1998-2002), the EU encouraged industrial participation, particularly high-tech 
companies, in the development of methodologies for protecting cultural heritage 
through research networking and technology transfer.114 In another research domain, 
the DigiCult (Digital Heritage and Cultural Content) programme was designed to 
ensure that institutions holding cultural heritage resources (libraries, museums, 
archives, universities, etc.) fully exploit the opportunities offered by digital 
technologies for preserving them for the future as well as for providing quality access 
to European citizens.115
Recently, the EU has introduced a more market-oriented programme called 
eContent, with a budget of EUR 100 million for the period between 2001 and 2005. 
It aims to promote the commercial use of cultural contents (heritage, art, archives, 
etc.) that can be distributed via multimedia products and digital networks. Again, it is 
the diversity of European cultural heritage that constitutes the focal point here. The 
underlying assumption is that, because of Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity, 
European firms are better positioned to develop diversified services tailored to the 
customer’s needs. In announcing the launch of eContent, Erkki Liikanen, the 
Commissioner responsible for enterprise and Information Society, noted: ‘We should 
turn Europe’s rich content base into a competitive advantage in the Information 
Society ... the customers are not likely to be willing to pay for content unless it is 
available in a culturally customised format and in their own language’.116
to the COAST network which aims to preserve, revitalise and commercialise the cultural heritage of 
coastal regions.
114 Press release downloaded from <http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/2000/pr201 len.html>
115 Available at <http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka3/digicult/>.
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European heritage and cultural identity in a post-industrial world
In contrast to what the above analysis of the EU policy programme suggests, Vivian 
Reding, European Commissioner responsible for education and culture, stresses the 
identity-conferring qualities of cultural heritage: ‘In the field of safeguarding and 
promoting heritage of European importance, the European Community recognises the 
value of the foundations of Europe, more precisely; the cultural roots and trends 
which are common to Europeans. In this respect heritage is an irreplaceable means of 
increasing European awareness and of spreading knowledge about our culture.’117 
This view, which regards culture as an embodiment of the collective memories of 
Europeans and therefore a guarantee for the uniqueness of Europe, often appears in 
the EU discourse as part of a critique of globalisation. Commissioner Reding thus 
continues: ‘[o]ur action should be continued not only in order to protect heritage 
against the ravages of time and environmental damage, but also in order to counteract 
the erosion of cultural identity by globalisation and because we have a responsibility
1 1 o
to hand this heritage down to future generations’. This is a somewhat ironic 
argument when European integration represents for many people a homogenising 
force which threatens national or regional cultures and identities. If globalisation 
means de-nationalisation, European integration is indeed part of this broader process.
According to Alain Touraine, the most important aspect of the process of de­
nationalisation is:
the dissociation between mass production and the diffusion of material and 
cultural goods on the one hand, and the cultural meanings that are created by 
memory, education, self image and the material presence of the past in 
landscape, monuments and language on the other. The new Europe is becoming 
“postmodern”, if this expression is taken to mean such a separation 
between....markets and values.’ (1994:15-16)
116 Available at <http://www.cordis.lu/econtent/release.htm>
117 Available at <http://www.europa.eulint/comm/culture/artiredeuropanostra en.html>, 06/06/01
118 Ibid.
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Once the centre of both economic activity and a particularistic cultural life, the nation
state is losing its power to hold these two universes together as the gap between them
grow bigger and bigger. People participate in flows of money or information, but
these activities are not easily transformed into value orientations. In such cases,
Touraine argues, individuals and groups tend to become inwardly oriented, and often
seek refuge in defensive identities.
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This separation between globalising economic activities and localised cultural 
meanings in a (post)modem society is formulated somewhat differently by Giddens. 
For him, the core of globalisation is, simply put, the stretching of social relations 
across time and space beyond the constrictions of face-to face interactions in the 
localities of pre-modem times (Giddens, 1990). So the link between our mundane 
cultural experience and our location is transformed at every level: ‘the very tissue of 
spatial experience alters, conjoining proximity and distance in ways that have few 
parallels in prior ages’ (1990: 140).
However, he argues against the familiar claim that modernity means the loss 
of the existential comforts and assurances of local communal experience in the face 
of distant social forces which increasingly structure our lives. Rather, he maintains 
that we retain a sense of familiarity in our day-to-day experience of local contexts, 
but that this familiarity no longer derives from the particularities of localised place. 
So people may still feel ‘at home’ in their localities but they are at some level aware 
that these are what he calls ‘phantasmagoric places’ in which familiar features are 
often not unique to that locale and part of its ‘organic development’ but, rather, 
features that have been ‘placed into’ the locale by distanciated forces. This 
experience -‘dis-placement’ in Giddens’ terminology- means that people ‘own’ their 
local places phenomenologically in a sort of provisional sense, recognising the absent 
forces which structure this ownership. And this perception is linked to the reality of a 
steadily declining local ownership of public space in a direct material sense linked to 
the globalisation of capital.
Seen in this context, the EU’s attempts to promote European cultural heritage 
can be described as reclaiming of ‘ownership’ of localities in a phenomenological 
sense by asserting supposedly distinct characteristics of European culture. The EU’s 
promotional booklet entitled ‘Investing in Culture: an Asset for all Regions’ alarms
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the reader that the ‘European way of life’ - identity rooted in particularities of place - 
is now under threat due to globalisation:
At a time of increasing internationalisation, the Internet and the global village, 
the disappearance of certain local cultures is a genuine fear. Even national 
cultures seem threatened, as well as the distinctive character of European 
culture as a whole... What we do, what we buy and how we live: is there 
anything typically European about these? The answer is not self-evident. So, 
coming up to the end of this century, does Europe still have the means to 
defend its own identity, or is it on the point of merging for good with the great 
Western identity? (CEC, 1998g:4)
Considering that the EU attaches so much importance to border-transcending 
communication technologies as a means to heighten European awareness among the 
general public, this dichotomy between globalising and homogenising ‘Western’ 
identity and European identity seems rather misplaced. But the Commission tries to 
assure us of the EU’s role as a guarantor of local particularities: ‘(the) European 
Union preserves the identities and the cultural rights of each community; the public 
need not consider the Union as something which dilutes their cultural identities, but 
rather as something which guarantees the existence and flowering of their cultures’ 
(CEC, 1998c: 3). It should be noted here that when a term such as ‘the cultural rights 
of each community’ appears in the EU discourse on culture, ‘European culture’ is 
typically placed on the same level as national or local cultures as something that 
gives people assurance of communal experience as opposed to the ‘false’ or 
‘phantasmagoric’ familiarity generated by globalisation.
Where once Europe symbolised dominance and expansionism, the present 
invocation of ‘European heritage’ is filled with elitist nostalgia, in which Europe 
retreats into the images of ‘the past grandeur as a bastion against future uncertainties’ 
(Morley and Robins, 1995:88). This makes a stark contrast with the insularity and 
certainty of European identity and continuity, a picture of Europe which authors such 
as Duroselle are at pains to portray. The EU officials thus draw on ‘classical’ images 
in their quest to revive the past ‘golden age’, as can be seen in the targeting of the 
Acropolis and Mount Athos as two of the largest EU-funded projects within its
179
programmes to support heritage conservation. As Morley and Robins argue, such an 
effort amounts to a ‘retrenchment of Europe’ (1995: 88), signifying the defensive 
nature inherent in the present construction of European identity.
Thus, in the context of the ‘new Europe’, the past glory is being revived as a 
shield against uncertainties brought about by globalisation, in a manner that echoes 
the British obsession with heritage during the 1970s and 1980s (Hewison, 1987). The 
‘heritage mania’ in Britain, according to Wright, had an ideological function for the 
Neo-Conservative government whose strategy to counter the destabilising effects of 
transitional periods was to ‘freeze the whole of social life over, raising a highly 
selective image of British particularity to the level of Absolute Spirit and presenting 
it as the essential identity of the betrayed nation to which we must all return’ 
(1985:26). Heritage provided a convenient rhetorical mediation which allowed 
Thatcher governments to pursue the economic logic of international business and 
finance while still retaining the idea of the historical nation (Comer and Harvey,
1991). However, if ‘heritage’ functioned as a compensatory mechanism in relation to 
the undertones of destabilisation and fragmentation carried by the neoliberal 
imperative, it is the connections between the celebration and marketing of a selective 
past and economic and commercial expansion which are more apparent in the 1990s 
(see below). In the case of ‘European heritage’, EU policy makers have so far failed 
to give substance to the arguably vacuous concept of the ‘European heritage’, despite 
their desire to lay claim to the communal ownership of ‘European home’. Regardless 
of a nostalgic image promoted by the EU’s rhetoric of anti-globalisation and cultural 
protectionism, the notion of ‘European heritage’ prevalent in the context of concrete 
policy measures seems to embrace and reinforce, but not to counteract, the 
predominance of neoliberal discourse.
The EU’s ambivalence toward European culture and heritage may be seen as 
a direct reflection of general tendencies in a contemporary world which is 
characterised by ‘the intersection of manifest technical possibility with a low point 
in cultural-political confidence’ (Tomlinson, 1999:99). It is against this background 
that ‘heritage industries’ have come to proliferate in post-industrial nation states, and 
it is one approach to culture that clearly prioritises economic logic over cultural 
contents. A common feature of those heritage industries lies in their belief that 
conservation pays. As heritage sites and public museums are increasingly required to
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perform like private businesses, they have begun to adopt pro-active visitor 
strategies, charging for admission or marketing their commodities in gift shops. 
Another issue is that, because the museum’s role in representing the past is now 
shared to a much greater extent with the modem visual media, the rationale for public 
museum has become more problematical. One way of responding to this twin 
challenge is to embrace the technological advancements, a trend which gave rise to 
the ‘multimedia museum’ (Lumley, 1988). Thus they use the images of the past to 
create, employing all the technologies available, a spectacle, or an environment that 
is different but remains somewhat familiar and safe so as to provide an experience of 
particular localities to the consumers of those images (Walsh, 1992). As a form of 
leisure and entertainment, these images of the past are manipulated to produce the 
most attractive package, which sometimes results in a complete re-stylisation of 
historical elements involved (Hewison, 1991). From interactive museums to theme 
parks with a computer simulated ‘trip’ to the past, the heritage industry channels a 
sense of dislocation and dis-embeddednes in modem times into leisurely 
consumption, thereby transforming the images of past into just another element 
within an expanding realm of flexible capital. However, as Walsh points out, while 
the number of museums and heritage sites have increased and attendance has risen as 
a result of the flourishing heritage industry, it is mostly the professional managerial 
‘service class’ who benefited from these commodified packages of the past (Walsh,
1992).
Clearly, the EU has adopted, at least in part, this ‘heritage industry approach’ 
in relation to its cultural heritage, while still retaining the essentialist definition of 
European culture which is counterposed to the ‘anti-culture’ of globalisation. After 
all, the strongest impetus behind European integration lies in the sphere of market, 
rather than in culture or politics. J. G. A. Pocock argues that the entity presently 
being shaped by Europeanisation is not a political community but ‘a set of 
arrangements for ensuring the surrender by states of their power to control the 
movement of economic forces which exercise the ultimate authority in human 
affairs’ (1997: 311). In this ‘empire of the market’, the boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion are redrawn, and the new European ‘other’ would be ‘those 
populations who do not achieve the sophistication without which the global market 
has little for them and less need for them’ (1997: 314).
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Conclusion
The EU policy on the conservation of cultural heritage represents two conflicting 
views on culture. In various documents, speeches or press releases emanating from 
Brussels, ‘European culture’ or ‘European cultural heritage’ is characteristically 
regarded as the expression of distinct European values and practices which must be 
protected from the distant social and economic forces of globalisation. On the other 
hand, at the level of actual policy management, culture is increasingly seen not in 
terms of its symbolic values but of its capacity to generate economic profits. Does 
‘Europeanisation’ means the creation of a ‘Europe’ which is filled with essentialised 
cultural contents, or is it based on the dominance of the market mechanism and 
growth in European competitiveness in a global market? As far as EU cultural 
programmes such as ‘Raphael’ can give us any indication, the EU seems to be 
veering towards the latter path. At the same time, while EU policy regarding cultural 
heritage, at least at the level of practical policy implementation, have moved away 
from a monolithic concept of European culture and has increasingly stressed the 
multiple character of European cultures, the EU is still entangled in conceptual 
confusion by trying to fit them into some sort of unity. And perhaps this is why the 
EU has not yet been able to establish a political framework which could guarantee 
cultural pluralism.
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CHAPTER 7 
European City of Culture
Since its launch in 1985, the European City of Culture programme has developed 
over the years from an extended summer festival to a year-long event with an impact 
that extends beyond the sphere of culture. But the evolution of this programme also 
meant that different approaches adopted by cities have tended to divert from the 
original aims of this scheme. This was marked by a shift in the functions of the 
European City of Culture event. From being a mere accessory to places with an 
established cultural reputation, it has come to be used as an instrument for solving 
urban problems that lie outside the immediate realm of the arts. This shift was also 
accompanied by the broadening of the definition of culture that encompasses wide 
areas including tourism, leisure, sport and the media.
This chapter thus focuses on the discrepancy between the official objectives 
of European City of Culture and its actual implementation, and investigates why this 
event has become a tool of cultural policy capable of achieving multiple goals. This 
will be examined in the context of overall structural changes in Europe’s economy 
and society. Since it is almost impossible as well as impractical to collect the detailed 
data of all the Cities of Culture to date and to present it within the space of one 
chapter, I will concentrate my analysis on the case of Glasgow in 1990. I chose 
Glasgow not only because it represents a shift in the way in which the designation 
has been handled by local policy-makers, but also because it is the best documented 
case of all the European City of Culture events so far. The organisation of the event 
by other cities will be also reviewed briefly where relevant.
Legal framework of the European City of Culture programme
An idea to designate each year a ‘European City of Culture’ arose from a suggestion 
by the then Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri, at the first meeting of 
Culture Ministers of the European Community in November 1983. This was in 
response to the ‘Solemn Declaration of European Union’ made by the EC Heads of 
State in June 1983, which had invited member states to promote European awareness
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and to undertake joint action in a number of cultural areas (Myerscough, 1994). The 
City of Culture event was thus designed to ‘help bring the peoples of the Member 
States closer together’ through ‘the expression of a culture which, in its historical 
emergence and contemporary development, is characterized by having both common 
elements and a richness bom of diversity’.119 In view of the fact that the proposal 
came from Greece, Athens was nominated the first City of Culture in 1985. Since 
then, the event has rotated around the member states of the EU, with a different city 
being awarded the title every year. The first cycle of 12 EC member states was 
completed in 1996, after which non-member states in Europe were also given 
eligibility to host the European City of Culture event as long as they base ‘themselves 
on the principles of democracy, pluralism and the rule of law’.120 Recognising the 
growing interest in holding the event inside and outside the Community, the 
Ministers for Culture also launched in 1990 a further cultural event, the European 
Cultural Month which in principle only lasts for a month, as an alternative to the 
European City of Culture.
Although this event has frequently been cited as a part of the Commission’s 
‘consciousness-raising campaign’ (see Bamet, 2001; Shore, 2000), the European City 
of Culture was until recently not formally a Commission programme. In fact, all 
decisions concerning the designation of the cities until 2004 were taken on an 
intergovernmental basis by representatives of member states (the ministers for 
culture) meeting within the Council.121 The Commission provides limited financial 
support to organise the event once the selection has been made, but as the former 
Commissioner for the DGX (now the Directorate-General for education and culture) 
has emphasised, no Council decision designating the cities refers to any Community
1 99support. Between 1985 and 1994, the Commission’s financial contribution to the 
European Cities of Culture averaged less than one per cent of the total budget 
(Myerscough, 1994). Furthermore, applications for the title are made by national
119 Resolution of the Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, meeting within the Council, of 13 June 
1985 concerning the annual even ‘European City of Culture’, Official Journal C 153.
120 Conclusions of the Ministers of Culture Meeting within the Council of 18 May 1990 of future 
eligibility for the European City of Culture and on a special European Cultural Month Event, Official 
Journal C l62.
121 In a strict legal sense, the decisions of ministers ‘meeting within the Council’ are taken by ministers 
acting in the capacity of national representatives and not by the Council itself as a collective body.
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governments on behalf of candidate cities, and the member state in which the 
designated city is situated appoints the body which would be solely responsible for 
the actual organisation and financing of the event.123 This means that, despite the fact 
that it is an intergovernmental scheme initiated by the Council of Ministers, the cities 
have been given freedom of action with minimal institutional input from the EU, the 
content of the project being left to the particular city in question according to its own 
needs. This may account for growing popularity of this event among national and 
local authorities, which is evidenced by increasing number of candidates for the 
nomination. The large number of applications, as well as the particular symbolism of 
the beginning of the new millennium, has led the Council to select nine cities as 
European City of Culture for the year 2000. For the years between 2001 and 2004, 
the total of 13 nominations were submitted to the Council.124
In 1999, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a decision125 to 
appropriate ‘European City of Culture’ as a Community action, for the cultural 
competence assigned to the EU by the Maastricht Treaty required that this initiative 
be moved from the domain of intergovernmental decisions to a programme within 
the Community framework (CEC, 1997a).126 The Decision introduces a selection 
system of automatic rotation between the member states, the order of which is 
determined by where the office of President of the Council is held, and under which a 
different member state nominates one city (or cities) for each year for the period of 
2005 to 2019. (See below) The nomination or nominations are notified to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Committee of the 
Regions by the member state concerned. The Commission then each year forms a
122 Answer given by M. Oreja to the question no. 2604/96 by D. Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Official 
Journal C83, 1997.
123 Council Resolution of 13 June 1985, Official Journal, C153.
124 These nominations are: Basle, Genoa, Lille, Porto, Riga, Rotterdam and Valencia for 2001; Bruges 
and Salamanca for 2002; Graz, Granada and St Petersburg for 2003; and Barcelona for 2004. 
Common Position adopted by the Council on 24 July 1998 with a view to the adoption of Decision 
establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2005 to 2019, 
Official Journal C285.
125 Decision 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council o f 25 May 1999 
establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2005 to 2019, 
Official Journal L166, 01/07/1999 p.l
126 With this Decision, the title of the event was changed from European ‘City’ of Culture to European 
‘Capital’ of Culture in line with current practice in a number of the member states. However, 
throughout this chapter I refer to the event as ‘European City of Culture’ for the sake of coherence and 
clarity.
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selection panel which will judge the nomination(s) against the objectives and 
characteristics of this programme, after which the European Parliament may forward 
its opinion to the Commission. The selection panel is composed of seven ‘leading 
figures who are experts on the cultural sector’, of whom two will be appointed by the 
European Parliament, two by the Council, two by the Commission and one by the 
Committee of the Regions. Then the Council, ‘acting on a recommendation from the 
Commission drawn up in the light of the opinion of the European Parliament and of 
the selection panel’s report, officially designates the city in question for the year for 
which it has been nominated’. Currently, EU support for the City of Culture event 
is financed through the Culture 2000 programme in the category of ‘emblematic 
action’.
Table 2: Order of Entitlement to Nominate a European City of Culture128
2005 Ireland (Cork)* 2013 France
2006..Greece (Patras)** 2014 Sweden
2007 Luxembourg 2015 Belgium
2008 United Kingdom 2016 Spain
2009 Austria 2017 Denmark
2010 Germany 2018 Netherlands**
2011 Finland 2019 Italy
2012 Portugal
* The cities for the years 2005 and 2006 have already been selected
** The Netherlands was originally the host country in 2006 but swapped places with
Greece with mutual agreement
127 Council Decision 1419/99/EC, Official Journal L166, 01/07/1999
128 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm./culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/cap_future_en.html
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Therefore, even though the Decision is intended to place this event within a 
Community framework, it is still the member states who nominate a city which will 
then be formally designated as the City of Culture by the Council. This was despite 
the Parliament’s attempt to centralise, or ‘Europeanise’, the selection process as well 
as the planning of the event programmes. As early as 1990, the Parliament was 
pressing for a significant increase in financial support from the Commission and 
greater involvement of the Parliament both in the choice and nomination of the city 
and in the event itself (EP, 1990b:5,9). In the process leading up to the adoption of 
the above Decision, it insisted that each year ECU 2 million129 should be provided as 
the direct contribution from the EU to the European City of Culture programme.130 
As for the contents of the event programmes, a conclusion was made from the 
Parliament’s own survey of the past Cities of Culture that more effort has to be made 
by the cities ‘to encourage cooperation and the sharing of culture and ideas between 
Member States’, because ‘[c]ultural integration has often been sacrificed for the sake 
of the city’s promotion’ (EP, 1990b:9).
The Decision also sets out for the first time a list of criteria that a selected city 
should satisfy, ‘in order to maintain the cultural value of the action’.131 A designated 
city’s programme must first of all include ‘a cultural project of European dimension’ 
that highlights ‘the city’s own culture and cultural heritage as well as its place in the 
common cultural heritage, and involving people concerned with cultural activities 
from other European countries with a view to establishing lasting cooperation’.132 
For this objective, the following elements have to be taken into account by the 
planners of the event:
1. Promotion of shared artistic movements and styles in the development of which 
the city has played a particular role
2. Organisation of artistic events (music, dance, theatre, visual arts, cinema, etc.) 
and improvement of the promotion and management of the arts
1291ECU corresponds to 1 EURO.
130 Legislative Resolution embodying Parliament’s opinion on the proposal establishing a Community 
initiative for the European City of Culture events, Official Journal C l52.
131 Common Position adopted by the Council on 24 July 1998, Official Journal C285.
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3. Promotion of European public awareness of the figures and events which have 
marked the history and culture of the city
4. Organisation of specific activities designed to encourage artistic innovation and 
to generate new forms of cultural action and dialogue
5. Organisation of measures to increase access to and awareness of fixed and 
movable artistic assets and artistic productions specific to the city
6. Organisation of specific cultural projects designed to bring young people to the 
arts
7. Organisation of specific cultural projects designed to increase social cohesion
8. Taking the planned activities to a wider public, particularly through the use of 
multimedia and audiovisual means and a multilingual approach
9. Contribution to the development of economic activity, particularly, in terms of 
employment and tourism
10. Need to develop high-quality and innovative cultural tourism with due allowance 
being made for the importance in this connection of managing the cultural 
heritage on a sustainable basis and reconciling the wishes of visitors with those 
of the local population
11. Organisation of projects designed to encourage the development of links between 
the architectural heritage and strategies for new urban development
12. Joint organisation of initiatives designed to promote dialogue between the 
cultures of Europe and the cultures of other parts of the world.133
It should be noted here that some of the above criteria do not easily fit into the 
nominal objective of this scheme which is inherently cultural: ‘the purpose [of the 
European City of Culture] ... is to highlight the cultural wealth and diversity of the 
cities of Europe whilst emphasising their shared cultural heritage and the vitality of 
the arts.’ (CEC, 1997a) In other words, it is not enough that a designated city 
promote culture in its ‘unity in diversity’ so that European citizens can reaffirm their 
cultural identity as ‘Europeans’. Its programme is expected to serve a number of
132 Decision 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2005 to 2019. 
Official Journal L166, 01/07/1999.
133 Ibid.
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other objectives including social cohesion, creation of employment, urban 
development, promotion of tourism and the development of economic activity. In 
fact, by setting out a list of elements that focuses not only on cultural aims but also 
on economic and social benefits that could be generated from cultural activities, this 
criterion effectively validates the actual practices of the Cities of Culture in seeking 
multiple utility of culture for their own ends rather than, as advocated by the 
Parliament, aiming to rectify a current imbalance between European cultural 
dimension and city promotion.
TABLE 3: European Cultural Months
Year City Country
1992 Cracow Poland
1993 Graz Austria
1994 Budapest Hungary
1995 Nicosia Cyprus
1996 St. Petersburg Russia
1997 Ljubljana Slovenia
1998 Linz Austria
1999 Plodiv Bulgaria
2001 Riga Latvia
Basel Switzerland
2003 St. Petersburg Russia
TABLE 4: European Cities of Culture and their budgets
Year City Country Budget EU contribution
(MECU) (thoudsand ECU)
1985 Athens Greece 7.7 108
1986 Florence Italy 24.4 136
1987 Amsterdam Netherlands 3.3 137
1988 Berlin (West) Germany 27.0 200
1989 Paris France 0.6 120
1990 Glasgow UK 60.0 120
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1991 Dublin Ireland 8.6 120
1992 Madrid Spain 57.9 200
1993 Antwerp Belgium 17.6 300
1994 Lisbon Portugal 55.0 400
1995 Luxembourg Luxembourg 24.0 400
1996 Copenhagen Denmark 100.0 600
1997 Thessaloniki Greece 295.0 400
1998 Stockholm Sweden 50.0 600
1999 Weimar Germany 32.0 600
2000 Brussels Belgium 30 *
Santiago de Compostella Spain 34.8 *
Bologna Italy 33.89 *
Avignon France 21 *
Bergen Norway 13.53 ♦
Cracow Poland 12.29 ♦
Helsinki Finland 58 *
Prague Czech Republic 18.8 *
Reykjavik Iceland 7.9 *
2001 Rotterdam Netherlands 22.0 *
Porto Portugal 36.0 *
2002 Brugge Belgium * *
Salamanca Spain * *
2003 Graz Austria * ♦
2004 Genoa Italy * *
Lille France * ♦
Source: Myerscough, 1994; Cogliandro, 2001 
* : data not available
Early examples
The only comprehensive study to date of the European City of Culture event is one 
by John Myerscough published in 1994. The study, carried out at the request of and 
with financial subsidy from the Commission, reviews the organisation and the impact
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of the event since its inception and highlights the way in which different cities treated 
the designation. For instance, Athens, the first City of Culture, focused on ‘high 
culture’ and brought some improvements to the physical infrastructure for cultural 
activities in the city. Florence interpreted the designation as an opportunity to 
reinforce its widely-perceived cultural reputation, while Amsterdam assembled a 
programme that centred around professional art and studiously avoided ‘populism’. 
West Berlin sought to create a meeting point for artists from both West and East 
Europe, while in Paris the event, with no extra programming, was totally 
overshadowed by the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution 
(Myerscough, 1994). Despite these differences in approach, the common feature of 
those first five Cities of Culture is that they were all already established cultural 
centres with a wealth of cultural facilities (Richards, 2000).
The turning point for the European City of Culture event came with the 
designation of Glasgow in 1990. Compared to the first five Cities, Glasgow was not a 
place normally associated with the word ‘culture’. And as will be examined in detail 
in the following sections, that was precisely the point which the planners of Glasgow 
1990 set out to change (Booth and Boyle, 1993; Ward, 1998). Unlike its predecessors 
where the nomination was not always at the request of the city concerned and where 
planning could be compromised by the short run-in times, the UK for the first time 
adopted an internal bidding process to select its candidate (Myerscough, 1994). This 
meant that the chosen city was able to formulate objectives reflecting its own needs 
and to give a thorough preliminary consideration to its organisation and 
implementation. Thus Glasgow was the first city to undertake a full 12 months 
programme, with a significantly larger number of performances and exhibitions 
presented throughout the year. It was also the first city to secure major sponsorship 
support from the private sector. This was in contrast to the earlier period (especially 
Athens and Florence) when the national authorities carried most of the financial 
responsibilities (Myerscough, 1994). After Glasgow, there was a shift to the 
partnership approach between the state, the local authorities and the private sector. 
Moreover, while it was West Berlin which first allocated a significant budget (ECU 
1.9 million) to promoting its event, Glasgow more than tripled this sum with a budget 
of ECU 6.55 million, and subsequently almost all cities made substantial provision 
for promotion and publicity in the range of 10 to 15 per cent of the project cost
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(Myerscough, 1994). Also in 1990, the organisers of former and forthcoming Cities 
of Culture set up a network called the Network of the European Cities of Culture and 
Cultural Months, with a main aim ‘to promote and extend cooperation and to 
encourage cooperation between member cities, organisations and people working in 
cultural and creative fields in those cities’ (quoted in Cogliandro, 2001:19).
Glasgow, therefore, represents a break from its predecessors in terms of 
scope, scale, programme components and what it entails to be designated as the City 
of Culture. One of the benefits accrued from hosting the event in 1990 was a greater 
exposure of the city to the outside world, with marked increase in visitor numbers 
and press coverage, giving a strong boost for the city’s tourism industry 
(Myerscough, 1994). The event was also widely judged an economic success, 
producing a net economic benefit to the city of between £10 million and £14 million, 
mainly as a result of tourist expenditure (Myerscough, 1991). Still hailed as one of 
the most successful example of European City of Culture (See Sjoholt, 1999; DCMS, 
2001), Glasgow inspired other cities to capitalise on the potential presented by this 
scheme. Since Glasgow, many of the designated European Cities of Culture were 
cities which do not conform to the traditional category of ‘cultural centres’, such as 
Antwerp (1993), Thessaloniki (1997), Bergen (2000), Reykjavik (2000), Rotterdam 
(2001), Porto (2001), Genoa (2004) and Lille (2004). The entry of such not-so- 
cultural cities into the European City of Culture scheme has tended to emphasise 
economic and social aspects of the event while still retaining a cultural focus 
(Richards, 1996). As a consequence, the overall function of the scheme has changed 
over time, from merely reinforcing already established cultural profile of cities to 
utilising culture as a tool for economic and urban development. This is also reflected 
in a marked increase in EU support since 1991 as the event came to touch upon not 
just the direct policy concerns of the DG X (networking, cultural sponsorship, etc.) 
but also several other areas of Commission competence such as urban regeneration, 
training and tourism.
However, this is not to say that all the designated cities since Glasgow placed 
economic targets at the centre of their objectives. There are cases where the primary 
concern of the event organisers lay somewhere else, although they were also mindful 
of the incidental economic benefits success might bring. Madrid (1992), for example, 
set a broadly political objective, namely to establish the democratic credentials of the
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city and of Spain as a whole by reasserting the capital’s own cultural claims to be a 
European city of first rank (Myerscough, 1994). Thus the event was used as a part of 
a wider Spanish image-building campaign as a fully democratic and prosperous state, 
which included EXPO 92 in Seville and the Olympic games in Barcelona in the same 
year. Similarly, the designation of Weimar (1999) was important for symbolising the 
integration of East and West Europe as well as for contributing to the physical 
transformation and restoration of the city (Roth and Frank, 2000). Therefore, without 
making an over-generalised statement about the centrality of economic goals in the 
organisation of these events, one may note at this point that European City of Culture 
has become a versatile tool capable of incorporating multiple objectives rather than a 
purely cultural manifestation. In order to examine this shift, we now need to go back 
to the case Glasgow 1990 in detail as it reflects broader change in the nature and 
functions of a city in relation to its culture in today’s Europe.
The case of Glasgow 1990
It is well known that many places in advanced capitalist world have in the past 
decades suffered enormous losses of manufacturing employment resulting from de­
industrialisation. In Glasgow, this problem presented itself in more acute forms than 
in any other cities in Britain due to its over-reliance on metal manufacturing, in 
particular ship building and mechanical engineering (Ward, 1998). Those traditional 
heavy industries fell into a decline in the course of the 1960s, and with its economic 
core in crisis, Glasgow’s entire manufacturing base was drawn into the downward 
spiral. Between 1971 and 1983, the city’s manufacturing employment dropped by no 
less than 45 per cent. From the ‘second city of the empire’, Glasgow came to be 
known in some quarters as the ‘cancer of the empire’ (Boyle and Hughes, 1991: 219). 
Glasgow was one of the first European cities to fall a victim to de-industrialisation 
and its severe consequences, with population, employment, income and the level of 
services in the area falling into a fast decline (Van der Borg et al., 1995: 108). Thus 
the local authorities of Glasgow found themselves faced with the task of reversing 
that downward development in both economic and social terms.
The difficulty in Glasgow, as in many other de-industrialising cities, was that 
the growth of the service sector could not compensate for the loss of industrial job
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opportunities. After years of futile attempts to regenerate the city, the recognition of 
this shift in the economic base had brought about the development of post-industrial 
policy in the early 1980s, led by the Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow District 
Council and the Greater Glasgow Tourist Board (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Central to 
this new policy orientation was the strategy of attracting capital investment from 
external sources. A major obstacle in pursuing this objective, however, was the 
negative images of Glasgow, traditionally perceived as ‘hard, dirty and violent, a 
seemingly unstormable stronghold of the left’ (Ward, 1998: 191). It was against this 
background that Glasgow District Council launched a campaign for the city’s image 
building and self-promotion. Deeply impressed by New York’s city marketing 
campaign in the 1970s which was credited with rescuing the city from the brink of 
bankruptcy, Lord Provost (Mayor) Michael Kelly initiated the ‘Glasgow’s Miles 
Better’ campaign in 1983 with the support of the city business and institutional 
interests. Advertisements of this city were placed in the underground and railway 
stations as well as in the national and international press, proclaiming that Glasgow 
had transformed itself into a vibrant post-industrial city (Ward, 1998).
Although dismissed by many as no more than just self-congratulatoiy hype, 
this campaign was built on a strong belief of those local policy makers in Glasgow’s 
unrealised potential, a belief that Glasgow did have a rich artistic and cultural 
heritage which could be used to its own advantage. Significant in this connection is 
the opening of a new museum that coincided with the ‘Mile’s Better’ campaign, to 
house the internationally renowned Burrell Collection, a 8,000 piece accumulation of 
art works initially built up by a major Glasgow shipowner. Hence Glasgow’s existing 
cultural resources, such as Scottish Opera, the National Orchestra and the Citizens’ 
Theatre, together with the newly-opened Burrell Collection, ‘became part of the 
marketing literature, joining references to the city parks, access to outdoor recreation, 
and the proximity to the Scottish Highlands, promoting the city for tourism, for 
inward investors, for business’ (Booth and Boyle, 1993: 31). Also fundamentally tied 
to this strategy was Mayfest International, an annual arts festival, and the Glasgow 
Garden Festival organised by the Scottish Development Agency in 1988. With major 
property developments such as the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre and 
the upmarket retail complex of Prince’s Square, those events and facilities have 
formed cultural attractions to draw in the right types of people and investment. Thus
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by the mid-1980s, the importance of urban cultural life in Glasgow was rediscovered 
and then re-positioned at the centre of the city’s economic renewal programmes. In 
this way, ‘culture’ began to be developed as a marketable commodity aimed at 
potential business investors, high-income consumers and tourists. Seen in this 
context, the European City of Culture event in 1990 represents another way of 
extending a series of those rigorous city marketing campaigns designed to fuse 
culture and economic regeneration.
The submission for consideration as European City of Culture was made by 
Glasgow District Council in April 1986. The British Minister for the Arts invited 
local bids for the title to be held in 1990, and the resultant shortlist included 
Edinburgh, Cardiff, Swansea, Bristol, Bath, Cambridge, Leeds and Liverpool, as well 
as Glasgow (Ward, 1998: 204). The bid documents for Glasgow identified the 
objectives of hosting the event as follows:
1. To maintain momentum already generated by the image building initiatives and 
the marketing effort
2. To provide a corporate marketing platform for the city’s various artistic activities
3. To utilise and build upon the existing organisational experience and co-operative 
effort within the city
4. To stimulate increased awareness, participation and cultural developments in 
Glasgow (Glasgow District Council, 1987: 2-3)
The bids clearly stressed the need for Glasgow to improve its international profile by 
demonstrating its renewed cultural image. One of the main benefits expected of this 
event was economic developments directly through the attraction of tourists and 
indirectly through supporting an attractive image that might invite inward investment 
and relocated business headquarters. Strong emphasis was also placed on the city’s 
history of successful initiatives in culture-led urban regeneration programmes and on 
the prospect for securing commercial sponsorship. This approach fitted the UK 
government’s emphasis on entrepreneurial initiatives and public-private sector 
partnership (Richards, 2000), and in October 1986 Glasgow was nominated as City 
of Culture. The choice of Glasgow came as a surprise to many, but those with a 
vested interest in raising the city’s cultural reputation were determined to exploit this
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opportunity as much as possible (Ward, 1998). With the mounting pressure to 
achieve those ambitious goals, the task of co-ordinating the event was delegated to 
the Festivals Office established within Glasgow District Council in the summer of 
1987.
An additional and timely contribution to Glasgow’s approach to urban 
renewal appeared in 1988, the publication of a study by the Policy Studies Institute 
on the economic importance of the arts in Glasgow (Myerscough, 1988). The study, 
which was commissioned by Glasgow District Council, the Greater Glasgow Tourist 
Board, Glasgow Action134 and the Scottish Arts Council, assessed the economic 
potential of the arts within a regional economy and examined its productive qualities 
in terms of employment, income generation and cultural tourism. It estimated, for 
instance, that thirty-six per cent of attendance at the arts in Glasgow was by tourists 
whose cultural and related activities generated some four hundred jobs. Moreover, 
the cultural industries, broadly defined as publishing, design, broadcasting, film, 
music and video, created £174 million income. Altogether, it was concluded that the 
arts in Glasgow was a £204 million industry and employed 2.25 per cent of the 
working population either directly or indirectly. This report clearly substantiated in 
quantifiable terms the logic of promoting culture as a direct agent of urban 
regeneration. Tessa Jackson, the Visual Arts Officer at the Festivals Office, 
commented on how the idea underlying this report dominated the thinking behind the 
organisation of the year 1990:
The proactive Festivals Office found itself being established almost 
simultaneously with this form of philosophy. Although direct Government 
funding of 1990 was minimal, more substantial funds were made available 
through the Scottish Development Agency, in the form of area improvement 
grants or job creation projects. In all, the objectives of 1990 were clear - they 
were related to longer-term cultural, social and economic benefits for Glasgow. 
Therefore the political and economic pressures on the Festivals Office were to 
ensure that it was not simply a fireworks party. (Jackson, 1991: 15)
134 A branch of the Scottish Development Agency set up to undertake promotional activities for 
Glasgow.
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The programming of the event therefore was seen not as an end in itself but as a 
means by which other objectives could be achieved. To start with, a major 
advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi was employed to market the event through the 
projection of image that Glasgow was now a dynamic and sophisticated metropolis 
buzzing with enthusiasm for the arts (Boyle and Hughes, 1991). Saatchi and Saatchi 
came up with the logo of ‘There’s a lot of Glasgowing on in 1990’ in a distinctive 
typeface which was derived from the style of Glasgow’s famous architect/designer, 
Charles Rennie Mackintosh. Although this slogan was taken by some as a symbol 
that the year would be turned into un-Glaswegian spectacles with shallow 
commercial techniques (Jackson, 1991), the whole point of this publicity exercise 
was to construct a sense of cultural vibrancy by retaining the humorous approach that 
characterised the Miles Better campaign and by mixing it with ‘high’ culture of 
international standing (Ward, 1998: 223).
Given the need for city promotion, it was inevitable that the Festivals Office 
used a series of ‘blockbuster’ events which specifically targeted wider populations in 
Europe and beyond. Some of the highlights of such programming included concerts 
by Luciano Pavarotti, Frank Sinatra and the Rolling Stones, the staging of Peter 
Brook’s ‘La Tempete’, and ‘The Age of Van Gogh’ exhibition at the Burrell 
Collection. The intention of the organisers, however, was to address both the local 
and the universal. Thus the implementation of the programme had two strands: to 
stage a series of events that would raise the international profile of the city and to 
strengthen existing cultural frameworks by supporting local artists and organisations 
on their own terms (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Underlying this broad scope in the 
programme was an all-encompassing interpretation of culture. To quote again the 
words of the Visual Arts Officer of the Festivals Office: ‘T S Eliot’s well known 
statement that ‘Culture is not merely the sum of several activities but a way of life’ 
reflected the way ‘culture’ in the 1990 title was interpreted’ (Jackson, 1991: 16). This 
led to the inclusion in the events programme of not only conventional forms of 
artistic works but also activities involving engineering, education, design, history, 
religion and sport (Myerscough, 1994). For example, the ‘Keeping Glasgow in 
Stitches’ project invited ordinary residents to attend to sewing sessions to produce 
large-scale sewn textiles which had been designed in pieces by Scottish artists to
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represent the spirit of Glasgow captured in its everyday life. With a similar focus on 
the local community, the Scottish Trades Union Congress commissioned locally- 
based artists to create its banners, to be presented as part of the City of Culture 
programme, which would reflect the role of trade unions in Glasgow’s cultural life 
(See Jackson and Guest, 1991).
Whilst the Festivals Office developed an extensive range of cultural activities, 
the Glasgow District Council endeavoured to meet the further requirement of the 
year, namely, to strengthen infrastructures which would have longer-term positive 
impacts on Glasgow’s culture, economic and social environment. In the years 
preceding 1990, the District Council invested in projects such as the opening of the 
new Glasgow Royal Concert Hall (£27 million) or the refurbishment of the McLellan 
Galleries (£3.6 million), to coincide with the European City of Culture event (van 
den Berg, 1995). 135 Other physical improvements to the city included extensive 
stone cleaning and lighting undertaken to reveal its fine older buildings (Ward, 
1998).
However, these systematic attempts to re-fashion Glasgow as a European 
cultural centre provoked strong reactions in some quarters. One of the main 
criticisms that the organisers of 1990 attracted was the way in which the events 
programme failed to relate to the local citizens, even though the programme included 
a large number of community-oriented events as mentioned above. The fact that 
Saatchi and Saatchi was appointed to undertake the publicity of the year was itself 
enough to cause distrust that the event would only amount to superficial displays 
without substance (Jackson, 1991). The decision by the Festivals Office to include 
concerts by Pavarotti or Sinatra, for example, likewise provoked interminable debates 
about commercialism and exploitation (Palmer, 1991: 11). In particular, one group 
called Workers City, consisting of some forty or so Left wing activists, maintained 
that ‘yuppie’ contents of the 1990 programme had little relevance to the working- 
class cultural heritage of Glasgow, and that the money could have been better spent 
on basic services such as housing (Boyle and Hughes, 1991). Furthermore, it was 
argued that developments in local cultural industries and production were largely 
overshadowed by the promotion of commercial and high-profile culture.
135 These costs are not part of the European City of Culture budget.
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These criticisms aside, a broad consensus existed throughout from the 
planning stage to the end of 1990 about the District Council’s role in the City of 
Culture event. The District Council’s ability to deliver the necessary resources for the 
event was mainly due to amicable relations between the Council and the public, 
between the different agencies in the city and between the Council and the private 
sector (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Of the total expenditure for the 1990 events, 
Glasgow District Council contributed £35 million (£15m from a special arts fund 
established for 1990), with other contributions from Strathclyde Regional Council 
(£12m), private sectors (£5.5m) and UK office for Arts and Libraries (£0.5m). The 
short-term indicators for the impact of the 1990 event suggest that this investment 
has generated the desired benefits. There were 81 per cent more visitors to (pre­
existing) art performances and attractions in 1990 than in the last-measured previous 
year, 1986 (van den Berg, 1995). The city attracted considerable numbers of 
additional tourists in 1990, with accommodation bookings through the city-centre 
bureau increasing by 80 per cent compared to the figures in 1989 (Booth and Boyle, 
1993). As a strategy to boost cultural tourism, therefore, the event was deemed to be 
highly successful, although the growth in tourism sector has not been consistent after 
1990. The net economic return of Glasgow 1990 to the regional economy has been 
estimated at £10 - 14 million, and net extra jobs at 5,350 to 5,580 person years, and 
both arose mainly from tourism-related activities (Myerscough, 1994).
The long-term impact of 1990 is hard to measure, as Glasgow was already 
physically improving through a series of regeneration initiatives and the economy of 
the central city was being reinforced by vigorous investment in property development 
well before 1990 (Booth and Boyle, 1993). Nevertheless, the extensive programme of 
cultural events, along with improved infrastructure of arts venues have further 
strengthened the cultural and international profile of the city, and if this improved 
image can be sustained the city has a potential of attracting more tourists and inward 
investment. A survey of the social impact of the year shows that residents in Glasgow 
almost unanimously agreed that the event had improved the external image of 
Glasgow. About 61 per cent were even of the opinion that the cultural programme 
had made the city a better place to live in (van den Berg, 1995). It may be said that 
Glasgow used the year 1990 to market the city to the outside world, and to a certain 
extent it succeeded in achieving this aim. What is clear from the above discussion is
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that the theme of ‘European culture’ or ‘cultural integration’ never gained 
prominence at any stage of the event’s planning and was totally marginalised by local 
concerns over its economic and social effects.
European City of Culture and urban entrepreneurialism
In Glasgow, therefore, the year of European City of Culture was about ‘the title 
bringing the status to the city rather than the status of the city bringing the title’ 
(Booth and Boyle, 1993: 32). And as the list of cities designated for European City of 
Culture suggests, Glasgow is not an isolated case in this respect. The fact that this 
event has been utilised by other cities in a manner similar to Glasgow manifests itself 
in a number of ways. First of all, many cities designated after Glasgow are ones 
which have suffered the negative consequences of de-industrialisation, with the 
corollary of high unemployment rates and the impoverishment of some urban areas. 
This has led their respective national and local authorities to diversify their local 
economic base, and one of the means to achieve this policy goal was to promote 
cultural events and activities to attract tourists and affluent consumers. Antwerp 
(1993) and Rotterdam (2001) have been particularly active in this regard, with their 
comprehensive projects to transform the waterfront as a cultural attraction and to 
shake off the negative image of ‘a drab town of docks and industries’ (van den Berg 
et al., 1995; Hitters, 2001). Although on a much smaller scale, other cities such as 
Lisbon, Dublin, or Porto have also put emphasis on cultural tourism as an important 
strand in their economic regeneration strategies (Richards, 1996; CEC, 1992c). 
Cultural events and festivals organised or hosted by these cities are promoted in the 
context of their policy agenda that encourages the use of cultural resources as a tool 
for dealing with economic restructuring. From that standpoint, European City of 
Culture derives its significance from its function to provide additional cultural 
attractions that help to make the city more attractive and noticeable in the eyes of 
potential visitors.
Secondly, and related to the above point, many cities saw the event as an 
occasion to bring forward building projects to improve their physical infrastructure. 
As has happened in Glasgow, winning a title such as ‘European City of Culture’ 
often helps to raise necessary funds to implement such schemes already in the
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pipeline, and triggers investments from both governmental and commercial sources. 
In Antwerp, a substantial facelift for the city was carried out for the event by the 
private and public sectors (Myerscough, 1994). Lisbon, where investment in culture 
is normally minimal compared to other EU capitals, was able to focus on its cultural 
infrastructure developments for the year of 1994 (Richards, 1996). Significantly, 
some of those urban projects carried out in connection with European City of Culture 
were partly financed by the EU’s structural funds whose aim is to ‘enable 
underprivileged regions to reduce the development gap separating them from the 
developed regions’ (CEC, 1996a: 32). A notable example of this is Dublin’s Temple 
Bar urban regeneration scheme designed to transform a derelict inner-city area into a 
cultural district consisting of retail outlets, restaurants and hotels as well as galleries 
and artists’ studios (CEC, 1996c; Dawson, 1994). The project, carried out between 
1991 and 1995, received substantial financial support from the DG XVI (now the 
Directorate-General for Regional Policy) which linked this grant to Dublin 1991 
(Myerscough, 1994). What this indicates is that, far from being a showcase for cities 
with existing cultural wealth, the European City of Culture event sometimes acts as a 
catalyst for rejuvenating, both economically and culturally, run-down areas which are 
often categorised as ‘underprivileged’ even in the EU’s own terms.
Thirdly, there is a symbolic importance attached to the title. For cities which 
tend to be perceived as ‘peripheral’ within the European urban system (e.g. 
Thessaloniki, Porto, Dublin), holding the title of ‘European City of Culture’ confers a 
symbolic credibility of being thoroughly ‘European’ (and therefore at the core) as 
opposed to ‘peripheral’ or ‘marginal’. Underlying this idea is the notion that there is 
a symbolic hierarchy between different locales in Europe. Thus Helsinki in 2000 
utilised the title to project the image and identity of ‘European’ city in order to 
overcome its reputation of being dull, dark and peripheral (Heikkinen, 2000). 
Similarly, the local authorities of both Glasgow and Rotterdam tried to show in their 
respective years the city’s international or ’European’ orientations hoping, at least 
rhetorically, to augment their status of being just a secondary provincial centre 
(Richards, 1996; Ward, 1998).
The common thread in those strategies adopted by various cities is that the 
European City of Culture event is used as part of wider city marketing operations 
targeting a particular section of population. To understand this it is important to
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appreciate the differences between the ‘selling’ and the ‘marketing’ of a city. Selling 
involves persuading the customer that they want or need what you already have, 
whereas marketing is a process in which the product for sale is shaped by some idea 
of what the consumer wants (Fretter, 1993; Hubbard, 1998). To market a city, 
therefore, is to re-shape the image of a place as closely as possible to the demands 
and desires of current or potential residents, investors and visitors (Holocomb, 1993). 
This entails that city marketing does not necessarily stop at the level of extolling the 
existing virtues of the city, but seeks to fashion a new identity for the city, selectively 
weaving specific place myths and erasing any negative images associated with it. In 
this process, the physical spaces of the city are treated as belonging to this new urban 
imagery, and transformed accordingly within the capacity of each city by adding and 
improving urban activities and facilities (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). In these city 
marketing strategies, culture functions both as a complementary factor that enhances 
the appeal of a city and as a mask that conceals poverty, crime, and social conflicts 
within a city (Bianchini, 1993).
The tendency of the designated Cities of Culture to utilise the event for city 
promotion, and more generally, the rise of city marketing itself, can be explained as 
part of broader economic, political and social shifts affecting many parts of Europe. 
Lash and Urry (1994) identify six key factors in this trend. The first change is, as has 
been mentioned, the striking decline in both the size and impact of the manufacturing 
sector and hence its employment in most localities. Second, the changes in 
communication technology and transport mean that producer services can now be 
located in a number of different places. The reduction of spatial barriers has induced 
an acute competition between localities and regions to attract those ‘footloose’ 
companies for their economic regeneration. Third, macro-economic pressures created 
by the recessions of 1973 and 1979 forced national governments to introduce public 
expenditure cutbacks, leaving many local governments to find their own sources of 
finance (Bianchini, 1999). Fourth, and as the corollary of the second and the third, 
the declining powers of the nation state to control multinational money flows has 
created a condition where investment increasingly takes the form of a negotiation 
between international capital and local powers (Harvey, 1989). Fifth, the attraction of 
such multinational/transnational firms into a locality significantly depends upon the 
‘quality of life’ - translated as the provision of high quality leisure, cultural and
202
consumer services which appeal to managerial and professional personnel (Lash and 
Urry, 1994; Bianchini, 1993). Finally, the increased mobility of people means that the 
ability of a locality to attract temporary visitors plays a crucial role in its economic 
development. This forges strong interconnections between tourism, 
leisure/entertainment services and economic development strategies.
These inter-related changes are also accompanied by shifts in the ways in 
which cities are being run, a phenomenon which some theorists term as ‘urban 
entrepreneurialism’ (see Harvey, 1989; Hubbard and Hall, 1998):
This reorientation of urban government is characterised by a shift from the 
local provision of welfare and services to more outward-oriented policies 
designed to foster and encourage local growth and economic development. 
Furthermore, these policies are supported and financed by a diverse array of 
new agencies and institutions, as public agencies struggle to promote economic 
growth at the local level on their own terms. (Hubbard and Hall, 1998: 2)
Central to this is the mobilisation of culture to the cause of city-marketing, designed 
to attract mobile international capital, specialised personnel and affluent visitors. 
Cultural facilities and resources may not be regarded by local policy-makers as more 
important in determining a city’s appeal to investors than other factors such as local 
educational and skills levels, the quality of local schooling or the local environment. 
But they have become increasingly important complementary factors in the 
competition between cities possessing similar advantages (Bianchini, 1993).
As a component of local economic development, cultural regeneration is thus 
designed to assert the uniqueness and distinctiveness of a city. More and more local 
governments are organising prestigious arts festivals, major sports competitions and 
other high-profile cultural events. Greater attention is now paid to the arts and 
cultural sector and its related areas including tourism, sports, and leisure as a source 
of employment (O’Connor, 1998). Furthermore, to supplement these cultural 
activities, local governments are allocating increasingly high budgets for the 
advertising and promotion of the city to enhance its cultural image in the hope that it 
would stimulate investment. While the principal aim of such conscious manipulation 
of city image is to make the city more attractive to external investors and visitors, it
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has also been argued that it plays an internal role in galvanising local support and 
fostering civic pride, with a potential to generate urban unification (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998).
The irony, however, is that many of the innovations and investments designed 
to make particular localities attractive as cultural and consumer centres have quickly 
been imitated elsewhere, thus rendering any competitive advantage within a system 
of cities ephemeral (Harvey, 1989; Philo and Kearns, 1993). The result is the more or 
less same marketing package being promoted everywhere, which typically centres 
around the image of a city with a lively, vibrant urban culture and populated by a 
harmonious and cosmopolitan citizenry (Ward, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998). As 
Kevin Robins argues, with its emphasis on art, culture and consumption, the values 
and interests articulated in this new urban imagery are above all those of the high 
income middle classes (Robins, 1993). To the extent that such constructed images 
are being pursued by local policy-makers at the expense of welfare provisions 
targeted at low income or marginalised groups, the strategy of city marketing 
exacerbates already existing social polarisation within a city, excluding those who 
simply cannot afford to participate in this ‘regenerated’ city life.
In drawing on the notion of the ‘entrepreneurial city’, however, care must be 
taken not to rely too much on this concept as the explanatory model for different 
cities’ approaches to the European City of Culture event. Much of the empirical 
literature on urban entrepreneurialism concentrates on American as well as British 
cities, and some commentators argue that a model derived from such studies cannot 
be applied directly to European cities which, compared to the American situation, 
tend to rely more on central governments and less on the market for their 
expenditures. It has been noted that, in contrast to what ‘entrepreneurialism’ 
literature normally suggests, local social policies have not necessarily been 
subordinated to economic growth strategies in most European cities (Le Gales, 
1998). Hall and Hubbard also points out that some theorists overgeneralise the 
mobility of capital at different scales, ignoring the fact that much capital is fixed (i.e. 
productive facilities and built environment) while human resources are inherently 
mobile. Therefore it would be more accurate to say that the possibility of 
hypermobile investment capital has made may local policy makers feel obliged to 
adopt precautionary measures, rather than the actuality of such mobile capital making
204
the path of entrepreneurialism inevitable (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). Some observers 
have also noted that explicit internationalisation strategies aimed at economic 
growth, which were prevalent in urban regeneration schemes in the 1980s and early 
1990s, have been toned down in recent years. And in some cases this has given way 
to a more community-oriented approach that focuses on the development of local 
crafts and cultural industries (Sjoholt, 1999; Landry, 1996).
There are so many different elements involved in the organisation and 
implementation of the City of Culture event, and not all the designated cities 
explicitly set economic development as their primary objective. Likewise, different 
cities hosted the event under different circumstances, which means that the case of 
Glasgow cannot be generalised to produce a model to which all the designated cities 
would conform. Nevertheless, the way in which a number of different cities dealt 
with their designations exhibits the principal characteristics of the ‘entrepreneurial’ 
city: the fact that many of such cities were in need of economic and urban 
regeneration; their uses of cultural events both as an important source of employment 
and as attractions for tourists, visitors and investments; their reliance on private 
sector support in the form of business sponsorship; the allocation of significant 
budgets for the advertising and promotion of the event; their concern over raising the 
international profile of the city rather than stressing their local distinctiveness; and 
their analogous interest in promoting the image of urban cultural innovation and 
vibrancy.
Although it cannot be said that the cities such as Copenhagen or Stockholm,
with their relatively stable economy and established cultural reputation, saw their
respective years as a direct tool for economic regeneration, the general tendency of
the European Cities of Culture event can be loosely categorised as adopting an
1‘entrepreneurial’ approach. Whether this approach is pursued implicitly or 
explicitly, the local policy-makers of the designated cities have tended to use 
European City of Culture to promote goals that overshadowed the event’s original
136 In fact, one the main objectives of Copenhagen 96 was very much about improving the city’s image 
in the context of urban development. According to a study on Copenhagen 96, the event ‘was to 
portray a progressive city which founded its development and competitive edge on human qualities, on 
knowledge, art, creativity and communication. Reformulated, this objective means Copenhagen was 
set to improve its reputation in the international mass media and in international political and business
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aim which is to bring the European citizens together in the framework of cultural 
celebrations. A recent study on the nine Cities of Culture in 2000 confirms that, even 
though the EU specifically invited these cites to coordinate their activities and to 
organise a ‘European cultural space for the year 2000’, the real focus of attention was 
on the specificity of the city itself and on big events while the issue of having a 
‘European dimension’ was largely sidelined (Sassatelli, 2002). Judging from the fact 
that the EU does not involve itself in the organisation of the event even after this 
scheme had been placed under the Community competence, the EU institutions 
(excluding the Parliament) are implicitly endorsing these current practices. Inasmuch 
as that is the case, the EU support for European City of Culture can be interpreted as 
encouraging the pragmatic uses of culture in terms of city marketing, increased 
economic productivity, reducing regional disparities and greater cohesion within the 
single market.
Conclusion
In this chapter I examined how and why the European City of Culture programme has 
been used as a tool for city marketing by local policy-makers. My argument was that 
their pragmatic outlook on culture can be explained as part of the globalising 
economic functions of the cities. The chapter also showed that an economic approach 
to the European City of Culture event adopted by different cities does not correspond 
to the original aims of this programme.
Manuel Castells argues that the future model of Europe is likely to be 
articulated around the two poles of economic internationalisation and cultural 
decentralisation. In such a model, cities present an ideal spatial scale where locally- 
oriented cultures and the globalising economy can be mediated. Cities thus play an 
increasingly important role as a locus of cultural identity (Castells, 1994 and 2000a). 
According to this understanding, the European City of Culture event can be viewed 
as an instance where local cultures and economic internationalisation are co­
ordinated through the initiatives of local governments.
circles, as well as Copenhagen being the target for the cultural tourists of the future’ (Friedberg and 
Koch-Nielsen, 1997:35).
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CHAPTER 8 
The audiovisual policy of the European Union
In this chapter, I will look at the relationship between European culture, economic 
globalisation and the role of public authority as embodied in the EU’s audiovisual 
policy. That the main motive for the EU audiovisual policy is economic seems to be 
widely recognised, yet some authors maintain that such seemingly economic logic 
masks the EU officials’ desire to use the audiovisual industry as an instrument to 
create a common European cultural identity, with the ultimate effect of achieving a 
congruence between economic and cultural space. This chapter argues that the EU 
policy agenda in the audiovisual sector is not so much a disguised attempt to recreate 
the cultural model of the nation-state as downright economic promotion mostly 
uninterested in cultural objectives.
The main focus of this chapter is on the film policy of the EU. However, 
because the EU policy documents seldom treat the film industries as distinct from 
television or other areas of the audiovisual sector, I will not try to separate different 
sections of the audiovisual industry unless my discussion specifically centres on film 
or television. The general usage of the ‘audiovisual industry’ or ‘audiovisual policy’ 
may be justified in view of the current interdependence of film and television 
industries.137 But to keep the scope of this chapter manageable, I will mostly leave 
out topics concerning the regulatory aspects of the audiovisual policy (such as the 
‘Television without Frontiers Directive’) and instead concentrate on the EU’s support 
mechanisms.
Audiovisual policy as economic policy
The EU’s audiovisual policy has the largest share of the budget allocated to its 
cultural activities. The centrality of this sector in the EU cultural policy can be 
explained by the apparent industrial aspect that characterises the production and 
circulation of audiovisual works. At least before the introduction of the cultural
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clause in the Maastricht Treaty, it was essential for the EU’s actions in respect of 
culture to be presented as an exercise of Community jurisdiction in the economic, 
rather than cultural, sphere. Nevertheless audiovisual policy was placed on the EU 
policy agenda later than areas of ‘traditional’ cultural activities such as the 
conservation of cultural heritage.
In its 1982 communication ‘Stronger Community action in the cultural 
sector’, the Commission pointed to the economic, social and cultural implications of 
the boom in audiovisual media, maintaining that the task to be accomplished by 
Community action in this area ‘hinges on the social implications, in other words on 
how audiovisual techniques will affect the earnings of creative artists and the jobs 
and incomes of performers’ (CEC, 1982: 16). To help improve the working 
conditions of those engaged in the audiovisual sector, the Commission proposed a 
feasibility study on measures including an European film festival and incentives to 
develop a European film distribution circuit, which were expected to widen the 
audience, thereby creating more job opportunities for cultural workers. This view on 
the audiovisual industry as a creator of jobs has been one of the most recurrent 
element in EU discourse on audiovisual policy.
If it is a socio-economic concern that was a driving impetus behind those 
developments, there was also a significant cultural dimension in the EU’s promotion 
of the audiovisual industry. Some theorists argue that the European agenda carries 
with it certain expectation of EU officials that new, European media market will 
‘improve mutual knowledge among the peoples of Europe and will increase their 
consciousness of the life and destiny they have in common’ (Morley and Robins, 
1995: 3). As a Community-wide audiovisual market reinforces Europe’s production
capacity, it is hoped, so will it come to promotejthe ideals of European cultural unity j 
What the EU is struggling to create is, according to this thesis, the nation-state model 
of congruence between economic, political and cultural spaces expanded to the level 
\of Europe (Morley and Robins, 1995:177-178; see also Shore, 2000). Others point 
out that the themes of a single market and a unified European culture prevalent in the 
1980s were replaced by the rhetoric of ‘diversity’ in the early 1990s. Collins, for
137 This is reflected in the fact that today the main outlet of films is not the cinema but television (and 
video). The bulk of the film revenue comes from the sale of broadcasting rights to television channels 
(CEC/DGX, 1997).
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example, stresses that the MEDIA programme was introduced to counter the 
perceived threat to cultural diversity posed by integrationist forces. Such a move has 
resulted in the proliferation in the EU discourse of the slogan ‘unity in diversity’ 
which offers a convenient rhetorical mediation between integration and pluralism 
(Collins, 1994). In what follows, I will try to show that neither of these accounts 
seems to offer an accurate depiction of developments in the EU audiovisual policy 
which have been taking place especially since the mid-1990s.
In the early 1980s, it was indeed a concern with the construction of European 
identity and legitimacy that provided a strong rationale for EU intervention in the 
audiovisual policy sector. For example, after the Parliament called upon the 
Commission to create the legal and political foundations for the establishment of a 
pan-European television service, the Commission took upon the proposal, arguing 
that ‘[the European channel] will become a powerful unifying factor... This sharing 
of pictures and information will be the most effective means of increasing mutual 
understanding among the peoples of Europe, and will give them a greater sense of 
belonging to a common cultural and social entity’ (CEC, 1983:22). Underlying this 
project for a pan-European television channel was the EU officials’ belief about the 
role of public broadcasting in shaping and maintaining collective identities, which is 
clearly based on the national public sector model (Ward, 2002). Despite much 
opposition from many quarters and the initial failure of a pilot project, the 
multilingual Europa channel was launched in October 1985, with the financial 
backing coming from the Commission, the Dutch government, several participant 
broadcasters and advertising revenue. After one year of transmitting to a small 
European audience, however, the Europa channel had to discontinue its broadcasting 
due to financial problems and internal disagreements.
Along with the pan-European television project, the European Parliament and 
the Commission also tried to make inroads into subsidy schemes for European 
audiovisual co-productions. In April 1985 the Commission, backed up by the 
Parliament, issued a proposal for a ‘Community aid scheme for non-documentary 
cinema and television co-productionsy with an objective to ‘increase the number of 
mass-audience cinema and television co-productions involving nationals of more 
than one Member State’ (CEC, 1985c: 1). This plan was vehemently opposed jby 
several national governments, most notably by Germany, Denmark and the UK,
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&TX' forcing the Commission to drop the proposal altogether (Theiler, 2001). To the extent 
that this scheme was designed to directly subsidise multilingual production process 
itself, it was regarded as an encroachment upon the realm of culture which was 
strictly outside the sphere of Community competence.
The failure of those two major policy initiatives in the audiovisual sector 
makes a sharp contrast with the Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF) 
adopted in 1989 after a prolonged dispute about some of the rules contained in the 
directive, particularly the quota system which the French negotiators were so keen to
include. The Green Paper on TVWF was published in 1984 in parallel with the
fJ  , 0 \  t
Commission’s proposal on pan-European television. Unlike the above measures 
whose central rationale was cultural and public policy concerns, the focus of TVWFo
/  vT
Green Paper lay in commercial audiovisual market which was explicitly situated 
within the framework of market integration: ‘Action on broadcasting is needed for 
two reasons. One is the Community’s brief to create a common market for this 
important branch of the economy. The other is the desire to facilitate cross-frontier 
broadcasting in the Community and to exploit its integrating effect’ (CEC, 1984: 37). 
TVWF was thus designed to promote the free and unhindered movement of 
television programming throughout the Community, although public interest 
objectives, including rules regarding advertising and the protection of minors, were 
( ^ also considered.
\ After the successive failure of culturally-oriented audiovisual initiatives^ the
Commission began to re-align its aspirations in the audiovisual sphere tyith the logic
\  ytAv\M / ~ —
of bverall market integrafion./The first sign of this shift, along with the TVWF Green
Paper, was the Commission’s 1986 concrete action plan which addressed the theme
■of strengthening the European audiovisual sector assa rt of industrial policy. 'The 
publication of the action programme was based on the Commission’s growing 
awareness of the increasing importance of the audiovisual industry as a strategic 
sector in the services economy in Europe. In this context, it advocated that ‘the 
opening of the market for audiovisual products to the scale of the whole of Europe is 
a positive reality which the Community must encourage and ensure its balanced 
development’ (CEC, 1986: 3). In order to establish a Community-wide market and to 
promote European programme industry, therefore, the Commission proposed 
measures which centred around three aspects of film and television: production,
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distribution and financing. In concrete terms, they consisted of projects such as 
encouraging the exploitation of multimedia distribution networks, rationalising the 
production process, and developing dubbing/subtitling systems to facilitate cross- 
border circulation of programmes and films. These proposals were taken up later to 
form a basis of pilot projects which lasted from 1988 to 1990. The pilot projects were 
subsequently incorporated into MEDIA, an acronym in French standing for 
‘measures to encourage the development of the audiovisual industry’.
GATT dispute on audiovisual services
Before moving on to the analysis of EU support mechanisms, it is important to 
emphasise once again that what the EU says it would do is quite different from what 
its policy programmes actually set out to do. The ‘official’ position of the EU is that 
it ensures the protection of public interests, and there is no better example for 
illustrating this aspect of the audiovisual policy than a dispute during the last round 
of negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Since its inception in the late 1940s, GATT’s remit had been limited to 
‘goods’ whereby cultural goods were excluded from the liberalisation process as an 
exception. However, with the massive expansion of the services sector over the 
recent decades, the emphasis in trade negotiations shifted from trade in goods to trade 
in services, and the Punta del Este Declaration at the beginning of the so-called 
Uruguay Round in 1986 put ‘services’ at the centre of GATT debates largely due to 
pressure from the US (Miller, 1996). ‘Trade in services’ was found to comprise, 
among other things, film, television, and broadcast advertising production and 
distribution. The round of negotiations which started in Uruguay in 1986 had to be 
agreed by a deadline of 15 December 1993, and the audiovisual sector, alongside 
agriculture, was to become one of the main outstanding issues threatening this 
deadline.
Audiovisual trade is a strategically important sector in the US economy, and 
its already huge surplus is growing even further in an expanding global market for 
films and television programmes. US sales of programming in Europe rose from 
$330 million in 1984 to $3.6 billion by 1992, with a steady rise in US-EU trade gap 
(Finney, 1996). For the US, GATT was the perfect mechanism through which to
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pressure for the removal of trade barriers such as media content quotas or state 
subsidies to film productions in order to create an environment even more favourable 
to US audiovisual exports. After the US failed to have audiovisual industries 
incorporated in the 1988 Free Trade Agreement with Canada, its trade officials were 
particularly at pains to convince its trade partners that state support for this sector 
contravened the free-trade principles enshrined in GATT. Although the US attempts 
to have the Uruguay Round derail such policies were almost universally opposed, 
with significant participation from India, Canada, Japan and Australia, it was a 
dispute between the US and Europe that developed into a crisis which nearly 
jeopardised the whole edifice of GATT (Miller, 1996). Given the fact that unifying 
Europe represents the most lucrative foreign market for US audiovisual products, and 
the growing preoccupation within both the EU and its member states about how best 
to ‘rescue’ the seemingly declining European audiovisual industry, it was hardly 
surprising that the negotiations triggered off a major row. /In particular, the dispute 
revolved around various national subsidies to the film industry, co-production treaties 1 
and other cooperation agreements made within the framework of the Council of 
Europe, and the EU’s 1989 ‘Television without Frontiers’ Directive which requires 
that 51 per cent of televised programmes broadcast in the member states be of j 
European origin (Hill, 1994). 138
During 1992 and 1993, having become aware of the danger in American 
insistence on opening European markets to the unrestricted circulation of audiovisual
productSj/French politicians and intellectuals launched a debate about the fate o f  the ] \ 
audiovisual sector not only in France, but in Europe as a whoky Their argument was 
that, because the US had excluded ‘cultural products’ in 1947 when GATT came into 
being, this cultural exemption should be maintained to cover audiovisual services 
(Palmer, 1996). At issue here was not just the survival of French (or European) 
audiovisual industry which owes its very existence to various forms of national and 
European aid schemes, but also the preservation of Europe’s cultural identities whose
138 It hardly mattered to the US that this particular ‘European quota’ provision in the TVWF Directive 
contains the phrase ‘if  practicable’. In effect, not all the EU member states have complied with the 
51% requirement. The compliance to the quota system suggests that the system is in reality nothing 
more than a symbolic token. Despite the Parliament’s repeated attempts to reinforce the quota system, 
the language o f the ‘where practical’ clause is retained even after the revision o f the TVWF Directive 
in 1997 (Ward, 2002).
distinct expressions are supposed to be found in audiovisual media. The then French 
TS^inister of Culture Jack Lang/ who in the early 1980s had launched the battle against 
American ‘cultural imperialism’ in the most virulent fashion, repeatedly defended 
cultural pluralism against the ‘perverse effects of globalization and cultural 
homogenization’ (Danan, 2000). Thus, the opposition against the deregulation of 
audiovisual trade became linked to issues of cultural identity and cultural 
sovereignty. The French president, Francis ^ Mitterand, Repressed this in his speech at 
Gdansk in Poland on 21 September 1993, defining the official French position in the 
GATT dispute on audiovisual services:
Creations of the spirit are not just commodities; the elements of culture are not 
pure business. Defending the pluralism of works of art and the freedom of the 
public to choose is a duty. What is at stake is the cultural identity of all our 
nation. It is the right of all peoples to their own culture. It is the freedom to 
create and choose our own images. A society which abandons to others the way 
of showing itself, that is to say the way of presenting itself to itself, is a society 
enslaved (quoted in Jeancolas, 1998: 55).
French politicians and audiovisual industry professionals succeeded in gaining the 
support of the EU, leading the Commission to adopt a protectionist stance that 
advocated for the inclusion of a ‘cultural specificity’ clause in the agreement] The 
European Parliament, on its part, adopted a resolution in July 1993 J^on the cultural 
aspects of GATT, pressing the Commission to ‘reject any concession which might rtf-f /
„  ^ i
jeopardize either the preservation or indeed the future development of the cultures of ^  f
1 1QEurope’ y . In contrast to such arguments, Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and an influential lobbyist, maintained that 
cultural activities would benefit from market liberalisation: ‘If a cinema/TV industry 
is to be healthy, it must be able to leap beyond its national borders to attract 
audiences from all over the world.... Competition so stirs the creative juices that film
.4*
(r
139 Resolution on the cultural aspects o f  GATT, Official Journal C255, 20/09/93.
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makers and TV programmers rise to the highest level to which the creative spirits can 
fly’ (quoted in Palmer, 1996:34).140
Thus, those engaged in the debate on both sides of the Atlantic were pursuing 
an argument based on entirely different premises. On the one hand, the position 
pursued by the Americans, including \lack Valenti ^nd the principal trade negotiator 
\Mickey_Kantor, \vas indicative of the neo-classical view of market economics in 
which the provision of culture is left to the market mechanism and is accordingly 
subject to a competitive environment of free trade and global capitalist growth (de 
Garzia, 1998: 3O)j0n the other hand, European nations, headed by successive French 
cultural ministerc Jack Langjjnd. Jacques Toubon,\ advanced a view that cultural 
products are public as well as private goods, with a historic and national significance 
which cannot be reduced to a matter of trade (Miller, 1996). Underlying this 
approach to culture is a long-standing French preoccupation with the role of state 
intervention in shaping national culture (Schlesinger, 1997:376). Because this 
particular approach came to be adopted as the European negotiating position in the 
Uruguay round, overriding differences in approach among the EU member states, 
discourses surrounding the trade disputes became couched in a simplistic 
counterposition between ‘American’ and ‘European’ culture, and between the refined 
and the vulgar, the cultural and the commercial, and the creative and superficial 
(Mommaas, 1996). More fundamentally, it was not just France or other individual 
states that had recourse to the rhetoric of cultural sovereignty in resisting American 
pressure to liberalise the audiovisual market. During the negotiation,\the EU itself 
acted as though it had a legitimate right to protect its culture (or cultures) and 
pursued an argument which was largely based on the traditional model of the nation­
state in its relation to national culture. In effect, as Schlesinger argues, the EU was 
advancing an argument about national culture translated to the level of Europe (1997: \  
377).
Just before the deadline in December 1993, and faced with the situation that 
was going nowhere, Mickey Kantor accepted continued state subvention in cultural
140 Since 1922, the MPAA has collectively defended and lobbied for the corporate interests of major 
Hollywood studios. In 1993, its members included: Buena Vista International; Sony Pictures A
Entertainment; Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer; Paramount Pictures; Twentieth Century Fox International; (
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products in Europe and elsewhere in the interests of settling the overall trade deal. In 
the end, Kantor and his EU counterpart Leon Brittan agreed to disagree, and a 
compromise was reached in which neither side achieved their objectives (Wheeler, 
2000). As a result, audiovisual sector neither enjoys any special cultural status nor is 
committed to the particular terms of liberalisation. Although this was initially hailed 
in France as a victory for Europe, the EU in fact failed to obtain a specific clause in 
the agreement endorsing the principle of cultural exemption (Palmer, 1996). This 
means that audiovisual services would be subject to subsequent rounds of 
negotiations. Not only will the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the GATT’s 
institutional legacy, address what was left undecided, but the advent of new cultural 
and communications technologies will further complicate the issue and make 
protectionism increasingly difficult to sustain.
A recognition among EU policy makers that the results of Uruguay Round 
negotiations would only offer a temporary respite constituted an important 
springboard for the formulation of a new strategy designed to give a boost to the 
audiovisual industry. Thus, in the post-GATT context, there was a shift in focus in 
the EU audiovisual policy, marked by documents such as the Commission’s Green 
Paper on ‘Strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry’ and a 
proposal for the MEDIA II programme. Nevertheless, externally, the EU has adhered 
to its cultural protectionist stance throughout subsequent trade negotiations, insisting 
that the promotion of culture should be pursued as public policy goals rather than as a 
means to achieve international competitiveness. A recent speech by Vivian Reding, 
the Commissioner for culture, illustrates this very clearly:
As a result of their political, social and cultural impact, audiovisual services 
and content play a crucial part in our representation of the world and in how we 
define our own identities in that world. From this point of view, the audiovisual 
industries and their undeniable economic dimension must be regarded as the 
tools of an essentially cultural form of expression.. .What the Community 
obtained as a result of the Uruguay Round is more than a vague exception
Universal International Films; and Warner Bros, a division of Time Warner Entertainment Company 
(Palmer, 1996).
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subject to the restrictive interpretation of a WTO panel of experts. It obtained 
the freedom to act, which is essential in order to maintain and develop national 
and Community policies in the audiovisual sector.141
MEDIA programmes
Despite a seemingly united front put on during the negotiations, the GATT affairs in 
fact served to expose how fragmented European states are in their approach to the 
audiovisual sector. While the French in particular talked about the defence of 
national culture, the British tended to talk about reviving a national film industry 
(Nowell-Smith, 1998: 11). Some, including Leon Brittan, the EU trade negotiator 
himself, were not so enthusiastic in supporting the French position since the 
economic stakes of the audiovisual sector were relatively minor when compared to 
other contentious areas such as agriculture, telecommunications or financial services 
(Jeancolas, 1998: 58; Palmer, 1996: 29). Regardless of these variations in approach, 
however, audiovisual industries in different European countries share the same set of 
problems, and the successive MEDIA programmes were specifically aimed at 
tackling these common European problems.
EU policy documents identify three main factors lying at the root of the 
current crisis of the audiovisual industry in Europe: fragmentation into national 
markets made up of a large number of undercapitalised, small and medium-sized 
firms; a low rate of cross-border programme circulation/distribution; and insufficient 
financial resources (CEC, 1990b: 1-3; 1994c: 4). This has engendered a ‘vicious 
circle’ of under-investment right from the conception of audiovisual works, and then 
at the production and distribution stage, resulting in low profitability of the works 
and hence a reduced investment capacity (CEC, 1999c: 4). Because of these 
weaknesses, European audiovisual industry is not keeping up with growing demands 
for audiovisual content created by the proliferation of new, digital dissemination 
techniques, leading to an ever-increasing domination of European markets by non- 
European programmes (mostly from Hollywood).
141 Position by Mrs Reding on cultural policy and WTO , 7 September 2001, downloaded from 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/legis/venise_en.pdfr>
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The Commission’s analysis portrays a bleak picture. In the space of ten years 
between 1984 to 1994, European films have lost two-thirds of cinema audiences in 
Europe, with their market share falling to less than 20%. European films have been 
the worst hit by the drop in overall cinema attendance (CEC, 1994c: 5). This decline 
was certainly not helped by the fact that European films seldom travel outside their 
country of origin. In addition, the number of hours of television broadcast by 
European stations has more than doubled from 1988 to 1994 without any 
corresponding increase in the production of European works. Although the film 
industry in particular started showing signs of a slow recovery since 1993 in terms of 
market share, the EU’s trade deficit towards the US in audiovisual products was still 
estimated at $6.3 billion in 1996 (CEC/DG X, 1997). Nonetheless, the audiovisual 
industry is one of the most dynamic sectors, and the estimates made in 1999 have 
predicted that the income from this sector would grow by 70% by 2005, which could 
be translated into more than 300,000 highly qualified jobs. So, the policy documents 
go, Europe needs urgent action to survive global competition and to benefit from the 
growth of the industry (CEC, 1999c: 2-4).
The EU’s response to such a situation was to introduce the MEDIA 
programme, whose objective was to improve the environment of audiovisual 
business without directly intervening in production by concentrating its support on 
the upstream (covering training and development or pre-production stage) and 
downstream (distribution, promotion and screening stage) of the audiovisual 
production chain. An important point to remember here is that the Commission and 
) the Parliament had already tried to introduce EU support for production process itself 
\ in the mid-1980s in an attempt to Europeanise the cultural contents of audiovisual 
productions. After this proposal was categorically rejected at the Council, the EU has 
re-organised its policy priorities in the audiovisual sector, and MEDIA schemes are 
not designed to deal with the actual content of programmes as such. Another crucial \ 
point is that, unlike the commonly-used forms of national support for the audiovisual 1 
sector, the programmes do not provide a system of subsidies. Instead, what they !
intend to do is to stimulate the market by injecting seed capital into the industry, 
which was expected to attract additional finance from private investors, professional *
organisations and various promotion bodies (CEC, 1990a: 8).
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After the experimental phase from 1987 to 1990 in which several pilot projects 
were launched, the first MEDIA programme entered into its main phase of operation 
in 1991, with a total budget of ECU 200 million for the period up to 1995.142 The 
overall direction of the programme was in line with the general drive at the beginning 
of the 1990s towards the completion of the single market, and it sought to create an 
‘European audiovisual area’ as part of the new, enlarged economic space (CEC, 
1990a: 12 and 14). This was also reflected in the fact that the decision to establish the 
first MEDIA programme was based on Article 235 of the EEC Treaty.143 The 
programme was expected to have the following effects:
-  To strengthen national industries through the distribution of their products 
on a Community scale, while creating collaborations between such 
industries
-  To decompartmentalise national markets by creating transfrontier 
cooperation networks of cultural and economic agents
-  To contribute to the restructuring of the audiovisual industry by giving 
priority to networks of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises)
-  To create a balance between ‘minor’ and ‘major’ national industries
-  To support networks which are as extensive as possible to generate effects 
of scale
(CEC, 1990a: 23-24)
The idea was that if a structure of long-term, cross-frontier networks could be 
established, the audiovisual sector would be able to reap full benefits from the 
unified European market which is large enough to sustain an economically viable 
audiovisual industry in Europe without the need to break into the US market. As its 
emphasis on networking suggests, the first MEDIA programme was less concerned
142 Council Decision concerning the implementation of an action programme to promote the 
development of the European audiovisual industry (Media 1991-1995), 90/685/EEC, Official Journal 
L380, 31/12/90.
143 Article 235 contains a provision for ‘implied powers’, which allows the Community to attain 
objectives mentioned in the Rome Treaty but not spelled out in any detail. In the present case, the 
completion of the common market was the Community priority objective but the Treaty does not 
specify the Community’s competence over the audiovisual sector.
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with forging a supranational industry than with complementing the member states’ 
respective policies by promoting national industries through measures to enhance 
their transnational dimension (Hill, 1994: 67).
Taking those objectives as a starting point, the Commission set up five lines 
of priority action: distribution, exhibition and promotion; improvement of production 
conditions (excluding production proper); stimulation of investment; training in 
business and marketing for professionals; and development of potential in countries 
with low production capacity144 or limited linguistic or geographical area. In a 
manner that often characterises bureaucratic administration, these were subdivided 
over time into smaller and smaller units with little co-ordination between them (Dale, 
1997: 209). By 1995, there were nineteen project structures and over twice as many 
mini-projects (see Annex I for the list of projects). In order to ensure an active 
commitment by the industry, it was decided that these structures be managed by 
associations of professionals specifically formed for the purpose, and involving more 
than 20,000 companies and institutions (CEC, 1993e: 4). From the outset, the 
funding granted to the projects over the five-year period was to enable them to 
become self-financing as they gained financial momentum (CEC, 1994c: 10). Thus, 
except for projects such as SCALE or BABEL, the principle of the funding was 
repayable loans covering up to 50% of overall project costs. Curiously for a 
programme aimed at generating an effect of scale, most of the nineteen projects were 
deliberately designed to help low-budget, experimental or ‘art’ works rather than 
‘mainstream’ films/programmes with a wider circulation potential. Indeed, few of the 
projects and films/programmes they supported succeeded in establishing themselves 
as viable commercial propositions (Jackel, 1996: 94). This caused confusion among 
applicants as to whether the overall priority of the programme lay in cultural or 
economic objectives (CEC, 1993c).
By the end of 1994, support had been given to over 5,000 professional 
initiatives launched within those structures. The Commission’s assessment report, 
drawn up on the basis of an independent audit report and consultation with industry
144 Countries where investment in feature-length production is less than ECU 40 million per year. 
Majority of the countries participating in MEDIA belongs to this category. They include Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden.
219
professionals, identified certain shortcomings of the programme. According to this 
report, the majority of those involved in the consultations felt that financial resources 
were insufficient to achieve the programme’s objectives and were spread too thinly 
over the whole range of 19 projects. They were also of the opinion that, because the 
scale of economic promotion varied from project to project, the programme should 
concentrate more on market requirements and large-scale activities in order to make a 
real structural difference (CEC, 1993c: 8-9). In the light of these comments, the 
Commission published a proposal to amend MEDIA, which called for an increased 
budget needed to deepen the ‘economic valorisation’ of the audiovisual sector by 
concentrating on projects with industry restructuring effects (CEC, 1993e: 1-3).
These recommendations were incorporated into the MEDIA II programme 
which was established as a successor to MEDIA for the duration of 1996 to 2000.145 
Another important background document to MEDIA II is the Green Paper on 
‘Strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry in the context of 
the audiovisual policy of the European Union’, which was drawn up, as has been 
mentioned, in the aftermath of the GATT affairs.146 After an extensive review of the 
current ‘crisis’ of the European programme industry, the Green Paper stressed an 
urgent need for Europe to adapt to the emergent digitised, multichannel, multimedia, 
convergent ‘information area’, for otherwise there would be a ‘risk of being sidelined 
into local markets and so missing out on the overall growth in the audiovisual sector’ 
(CEC, 1994a: 15). The prospects for digitalisation was thought to be particularly 
promising in Europe, since the capacity to offer a wide selection of programmes, one 
of the main results of the digital revolution, would enable the industry to cater for a 
wide range of requirements and types of user: ‘the cultural fragmentation of Europe 
has been a negative factor for the competitiveness of the European audiovisual 
industry: exploiting cultural diversity can be turned into an opportunity to be seized’ 
(Ibid.: 12). In order to make the most of these ‘market niches’, however, a pan- 
European approach was required, as ‘the narrower the target audience, the greater the
145 Council Decision 95/563/EC on the implementation of a programme encouraging the development 
and distribution of European audiovisual works (Media II - Development and distribution, 1996- 
2000), and Council Decision 95/564/EC on the implementation of a training programme for 
professionals in the European audiovisual programme industry (Media II - training), Official Journal 
L 31, 20/12/95
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need for broad geographical coverage’ (Ibid.: 20). Contradicting the cultural 
protectionist approach adopted during the GATT negotiations, the Green Paper went 
on to criticise national and regional subsidies which tend to pay little, if any, attention 
to market requirements, creating Tame duck mentalities’ in the European industry 
(Ibid: 7). It then advocated a more market-oriented approach and ‘an industrial 
structure of the critical size needed to secure the necessary financing, technology and 
enough market segments on which its profitability can be guaranteed’. Finally, it 
concluded that ‘only a genuine European industry, backed by its most powerful 
players, can be a match for the world’s communications giants’ (CEC, 1994a: 18).
Following the Green Paper, the Commission proposal for the MEDIA II 
programme was heavily geared towards industrial restructuring, with any cultural 
consideration that was left being pushed towards the margin of the overall agenda: ‘it 
is obvious that the radiation of the influence of national cultures is itself dependent to 
a considerable extent on the industry’s general competitiveness’ (CEC, 1994c: 7). 
The preoccupation with the industrial aspects of the audiovisual sector manifested 
itself in the decision to base MEDIA II on the new Article 130 of the EC Treaty on 
industrial policy rather than on Article 128 which defines the Community’s cultural 
competence, even though the responsibility for implementing the programme lay 
with the DG X (now the Directorate-General for culture, education and 
audiovisual).147 Together with the Green Paper on Strategy Options, MEDIA II 
marks a shift in emphasis in the post-GATT period from a micro-economic to a 
macro-economic approach (Schlesinger, 1997). Compared to its predecessor, MEDIA 
II was more ambitious, outward-looking and competition-oriented, with an eye to 
expand Europe’s market share not just within Europe but also on a global stage. 
Accordingly, its budget was 55 per cent higher than the previous MEDIA programme 
(ECU 310 million spread over five years) and its activities were refocused on three 
priority sectors - vocational training, development of projects and businesses, and
146 ‘Programme industry’ is used here to mean the industry producing cinema films and television 
programmes (CEC, 1994a: 13).
147 Article 130 of the EC Treaty, as inserted by the Maastricht Treaty, requires the Community to take 
steps aimed at ‘speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes’ by adopting specific 
measures to complement action taken by the member states in order to ensure the conditions necessary 
for the competitiveness of the Community’s industry. There are in fact two Treaty bases for MEDIA 
II, as the programme consists of two separate instruments - one for training and one for development
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transnational distribution of films and audiovisual products (see Annex II). Each of 
these action lines was co-ordinated by an Intermediary Organisation which 
technically assessed all the applications, and made recommendations to the jury of 
professionals appointed by the Commission. The Commission then made the final 
decision on the advice of the jury.
Training
In the area of training, the overall direction of the initiatives drew upon the lines 
already established by the Media Business School and EAVE. It aimed to help people 
in the audiovisual industry ‘adapt to the European and worldwide dimension of the 
market by promoting training on economic and commercial management, legal 
aspects and new technologies’ (CEC, 1994c: 22). The theme of enhancing general 
employability of the population was drawn from the Commission’s White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment which underlined the rapid expansion of 
employment opportunities in the audiovisual industry and its accompanying demand 
for highly skilled professionals. Potential beneficiaries were required to include a 
‘European dimension’, particularly in the choice of trainers and their openness to 
non-national European students. MEDIA training had access to ECU 45 million over 
a five-year period to the end of the year 2000, which went to beneficiaries in the form 
of non-returnable grants of up to 50 per cent of a project budget.
Development
The development wing of MEDIA II was structured to deal with three main 
components of the pre-production stage - screenplay writing, financial engineering 
and marketing strategy. Central concern in this area was that in Europe far less 
attention and resources are devoted to project development than in the US, although 
the preparation of the above three components largely determines the chances of
and distribution. The former is based on Article 127 (vocational training), and the latter on Article 
130.
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market success.148 Thus the aim of MEDIA Development was to encourage 
production companies to become more aware of projects’ profitability by paying 
attention to the tastes of European and international audiences. Emphasis was placed 
on two initiatives, consisting of project funding and company support. The former 
provided projects with likely appeal to global consumers with a loan of up to 35,000 
ECU per project. The latter provided a loan of between 50,000 and 150,000 ECU for 
companies’ structuring/diversification efforts ‘to consolidate the economic structures 
of production companies with growth potential on the European and world market’ 
(CEC, 1994c: 32).
- Distribution
With more than half of the whole budget at its disposal, distribution was the central 
pillar of MEDIA n. This is because distribution was perceived to be the weakest area 
by the European policy makers. Very few European distributors have maintained the 
capacity for pre-distribution investment in the form of advance buying of 
transmission/distribution rights which helps to finance productions. Subsequently 
access to the most commercially promising European works is increasingly difficult 
for European distributors. This means that they are unable to compile sufficiently 
attractive catalogues and therefore have difficulty finding distribution outlets. To 
remedy this situation, MEDIA distribution was intended to strengthen the link 
between production and distribution/transmission structures by encouraging 
distributors and broadcasters to involve themselves in financing works right from the 
production stage by purchasing in advance all or part of the rights. The expected 
spin-off of increased cooperation was the production and distribution in Europe of 
large-budget films, a market segment largely dominated by Hollywood.
Funding for distribution was divided into five categories: cinema distribution; 
cinema exhibition; distribution of television programmes; distribution of works on 
video; and promotion. Among those five, cinema distribution received the largest 
allocation. This sector took the place of EFDO, and was composed of two main
148 In Europe, investment in the development stage of projects represents 2 or 3% of the production 
budget, whereas in the US the figure if around 10%.
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funding systems: ‘selective’ and ‘automatic’. In the so-called ‘selective’ system, at 
least three distributors from three different countries had to join together in the 
application, with a plan to release one or more non-national European film(s). As 
with EFDO, ‘selective’ scheme focused on supporting the circulation of experimental 
or more ‘difficult’ works, but there was nonetheless considerable room for 
supporting bigger budget films. The ‘automatic’ distribution aid initiative was 
introduced in 1996 as an experiment. Under this system, grants were made to 
distributors proportional to the number of seats sold for non-domestic European 
films. The aid had to be reinvested in the acquisition, editing (copying, dubbing and 
subtitling), or promotion and publicity costs of non-domestic European films. By 
linking the aid mechanism with actual market success, the system was intended to 
encourage the circulation of films with commercial potential, as well as to strengthen 
the position of enterprising European companies on the market. Not surprisingly, this 
mechanism quickly gained the approval of those with a vested interest in increasing 
the profitability of the industry, and its initial experimental phase was extended to the 
end of the programme (CEC, 1999c).
The results of MEDIA II (Annex IE) indicate that the beneficiaries of the support 
tend to be relatively high-profile, large-scale projects, involving directors and casts 
with already-established names. Judging from the number of international awards 
those projects have received, it seems that they have achieved a certain level of 
visibility and media coverage which has a direct bearing on their market 
performance, although it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the EU support 
has actually contributed to their success149. Since the operational term of MEDIA II 
expired at the end of the year 2000, its structure was inherited by MEDIA Plus in 
2001.150 The programme’s basic objectives and implementing mechanism remain the 
same, except that MEDIA Plus puts even more weight on making an impact in the
1491 have not been able to obtain detailed data indicating the production costs, revenues or the level of 
EU support for all the projects that have received funding from the MEDIA programmes, so I cannot 
give an in-depth analysis here.
150 Council Decision 2000/821/EC on the implementation of a programme to encourage the 
development, distribution and promotion of European audiovisual works (Media Plus - Development, 
Distribution and Promotion) 2001-2005, Official Journal L336, 30/12/2000 and Decision 
163/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of a training
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global market. Mindful of the digital revolution and its accompanying proliferation of 
dissemination methods, the challenge facing the European audiovisual industry is 
now formulated as ‘defining marketing strategies developed at international level for 
the entire range of means of distribution’, since internationalisation is ‘no longer an 
option’ but ‘a vital necessity’ (CEC, 1999c: 4). In order to enable ‘the development 
of concerns capable of developing, financing, marketing of large volumes of 
European content’, more emphasis is now placed on ‘automatic’ support than 
‘selective’ support, on new, transnational forms of programme dissemination such as 
DVD, pay-per-view or Internet and also on promoting large-scale European 
film/television festivals to provide a ‘showcase’ to attract international audiences 
(CEC, 1998d).151
The approach represented by MEDIA II (and MEDIA Plus) and the Green 
Paper on Strategy Options met criticisms even within the EU institutions. 
Intersectoral conflicts are not an unusual feature in EU policy-making, and here the 
clash was between the proponents of marketisation/liberalisation and the sections that 
advocate social-democratic notions of public interest (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 131- 
132). The European Parliament criticised the Commission that ‘an approach 
excessively oriented to the demands of the world market will disregard European 
demands necessary for production of a local, regional and national character and for 
interest in avantgarde or creative productions’ (EP, 1995a). It also questioned the 
choice of the legal basis for MEDIA II (industrial policy) and anticipated that the 
programme would practically limit the scope of involvement and eligibility of 
professionals from states with limited production capacities or lesser-used languages 
as MEDIA n, unlike its predecessor, contained no explicit provision for such 
countries (EP, 1995b).152
programme for professionals in the European audiovisual programme industry (Media - Training) 
2001-2005, Official Journal, L26, 27/01/01.
151 Along with MEDIA Plus, some new schemes were introduced which are relevant to the 
development of new technology in the area of audiovisual production and distribution. These are 
eEurope (initiative for European information society), ‘Audiovisual i2i’ (the European Investment 
Bank’s finance mechanism for SMEs) and the Fifth Framework Programme for Research and 
Development.
152 The EP argued for a joint legal basis of Article 130 and 128 not just to emphasise the cultural focus 
of the programme but also because Article 128 would have given the EP greater degree of competence 
during the decision-making process.
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The strongest opposition, however, came from the Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) which attacked the Commission’s disregard for cohesion 
objectives and repercussions on the social and cultural front:
The Commission works on the premise that there is an inexorable world trend 
towards liberalization and deregulation of services, and that early and efficient 
action is needed to remove the barriers to the Single Market. Consequently it 
makes no attempt to look into the possible social consequences of the influence 
and pressure wielded by large international media groups, or of the foreseeable
1 C-1
increased competition in the audiovisual sector.
Furthermore, the ESC argued that the programmes proposed by the Commission 
would tackle the problems facing the audiovisual industry only in terms of its 
financial or organisational potential, leaving out the issues regarding the cultural 
content of the production: ‘It has long been an open secret that promoting such 
[competitive] programme industries from a purely commercial angle does nothing to 
advance cultural diversity, but leads to productions which promise the highest 
possible ratings and which are more and more alike’.154 The ESC therefore made it 
clear that the Commission’s policy orientations were inconsistent with the EU’s 
priority ‘to put our “European cultural identity” first’, a position which was widely 
accepted in December 1993 at the GATT trade negotiations.
Against such claims, the Commission has resorted to the principle of 
subsidiarity: ‘it is not the purpose of Community mechanisms to replace the 
mechanisms operated by the Member States to foster their national cultural identities’ 
(CEC, 1994c). The reason why the MEDIA schemes concentrate on pre-production 
and distribution stage of the audiovisual production is that those stages are better 
organised at European/international level, so MEDIA complements the traditional 
emphasis of national support mechanisms on the production process itself which are 
thought to be culturally specific. Thus, as far as the audiovisual policy is concerned,
153 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for MEDIA II, Official Journal 
C256, 02/10/1995.
154 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper Strategy Options, Official 
Journal, C393, 31/12/1994, p.25.
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the EU specialises in structural and industrial aspects, while a commitment to 
cultural creation is relegated to the domain of national and regional policy. Such 
‘complementarity’ was endorsed by the majority of the participants at the European 
Audiovisual Conference in Birmingham in 1998, organised by the Commission for 
the industry professionals and European policy-makers (CEC, 1999a: 7).
As for the EU’s own role in safeguarding cultural diversity, the Commission 
sees a direct correlation between the maintenance of cultural diversity and allocating 
support funds on a fair geographical basis. Thus MEDIA II allows ‘positive 
discrimination’ whereby priorities would be given to structurally disadvantaged 
states/regions. As a proof of this, the Commission notes that professionals in the 
countries with a low production capacity have received a third of the amounts 
allocated by MEDIA II whereas they represent only 13% of total investment in 
feature-length production in all the participating countries (CEC, 1999a: 12). 
However, it should not be forgotten that EU financial aids are designed to act as an 
incentive for professionals and companies to standardise their operating conditions 
by networking and/or intensifying their market dimensions, ultimately simulating a 
structure to match multinational media groups. The Commission seems to be 
working on an assumption that the presence of a production sector in local/national 
culture industries is a sufficient condition for the cultural expression of a population.
While it would be too simplistic to say that rationalising organisational 
structure of the industry automatically leads to the proliferation of homogenous, low- 
quality works, it is hard to deny a certain degree of interrelationship between how the 
work is produced and circulated and what goes into the work in terms of its style, 
aesthetics, and cultural content (for an example of this correlations in the national 
context, see below). The Commission even remarked that works which only appeal 
to a specific regional or national audience do not lend themselves to cross-border 
circulation and therefore hamper the competitiveness of the audiovisual industry 
(CEC, 1994c: 5). This does not entail, as some commentators have argued, that the 
EU is promoting the Europeanisation of both the audiovisual industry and its output 
so as to spread the idea of European cultural unity and common identity. The 
ultimate aim of the EU audiovisual policy is ‘to make the European programme 
industry a profit-making concern in an open and dynamic world market’, and to this 
end professionals in the audiovisual sector are encouraged to produce works tailored
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to the tastes of audiences not just in Europe but beyond (CEC, 1994c: 57). Thus, 
European cultures represent to the Commission both an obstacle and an asset, 
depending on what they signify. On the one hand, cultural specificity is conceived as 
a negative factor preventing European audiovisual industries from taking advantage 
of both the European and global market. On the other hand, as was indicated by the 
Green Paper on Strategy Options, Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity is valued 
when it can be manipulated to fit fragmented, ‘post-modern’ consumption patterns in 
the increasingly diversifying global market. Where cultural resources cannot be 
exploited to serve the growth of the industry, the task of managing them is passed 
onto national and regional authorities.
Notwithstanding the opposition from the advocates of public interest, the 
push towards marketisation remains the thrust of EU audiovisual policy. To illustrate 
this further, one could look at a related issue of pluralism and media concentration in 
Europe. Against the background of increasing concentration of media ownership, the 
European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions in defence of public 
interest and especially of public service broadcasting. As a response to repeated EP 
requests to regulate this trend, the Commission produced a Green Paper on Pluralism 
and Media Concentration in 1992. The Green Paper, while endorsing the respect for 
pluralism and for freedom of expression as fundamental requirements of a 
democratic society, identified the issue as outside the jurisdiction of the Community, 
again passing the responsibility to the member states (CEC, 1992b). Subsequently, 
freedom of expression became equated with freedom to provide audiovisual services, 
and the EU’s task concerning the issue of pluralism was accordingly reformulated as 
ensuring the maximum number of operators (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996; CEC, 1999b).
This is in contrast to a view expressed by the ‘High Level Group’ (consisting 
of industry professionals and national and European officials) on audiovisual policy 
that an essential element of European audiovisual policies has always been to educate 
and inform the audience/viewer ‘over and above purely commercial considerations’, 
and that EU policy needs to ensure ‘balance between the free play of market forces 
and the preservation of the general public interest’ (CEC, 1998f).155 However, a
155 The High Level Group was set up in 1997 by DG X as part of a general review of EU audiovisual 
policy. It was chaired by Commissioner for DG X, Marcelino Oreja.
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report published by DG X on the European film industry openly welcomes recent 
merger trends of large media groups:
After the big US mergers and acquisitions.. .came a wave of European mergers 
and agreements in late 1996 and 1997... These were just the most important 
moves in an industry which is busy adapting to this new and increasingly 
competitive global market. Companies from across the EU are having to join 
forces to produce the investment and economies of scale required in this 
capital-intensive industry (CEC DG X, 1997).156
Underpinning such thinking is the assumption that convergence on corporate terms is 
an inevitable and inescapable trend, and therefore that the EU’s role should be to 
allow European corporations to compete on equal terms with other companies in the 
global economy. This functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy: policy change is brought 
about by a perceived trend of globalisation, and at the same time is likely to 
accelerate the trend (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 132).
Commercialism, Hollywood and European culture
It may be clear by now that EU literature on audiovisual policy is very conscious of 
the American presence in the European market while at the same time looking 
increasingly towards the US as a model for how to organise a European audiovisual 
industry. Seen from this angle, the apparent incongruity between the GATT 
negotiating stand and EU policies inspired by neo-liberal market economy actually 
constitutes two sides of the same coin: a notion of cultural sovereignty underpins 
concerns vis-a-vis the US, but so too does support favouring large concerns and the 
larger states with bigger production capacity within the EU (Miller, 1996: 80). This 
type of defensive policy in the audiovisual sector is by no means unique to Europe. 
Audiovisual productions in other parts of the world have also been predominantly
156 The report was referring to companies such as Bertelsmann AG which merged with Audiofina SA, 
leading to the emergence of CLT-UFA, Canal Plus which merged with Nethold, Canal Plus and Pathe 
which concluded a distribution agreement, Kirch and CLT-UFA which agreed on the development of 
digital pay TV in Germany.
229
determined by Hollywood, in a sense that they have either tried to adopt the 
Hollywood model or resisted and rejected its example in favour of alternative 
aesthetics, systems of production and distribution, and ways of relating to an 
audience (Moran, 1996).
Such unrivalled global influence of Hollywood should be understood in 
connection with the fundamental nature of film/audiovisual industry (Aksoy and 
Robins, 1992). What distinguishes the audiovisual industry is the high level of risk 
attached to the product. Due to its dependence on creative talent, it is very difficult to 
achieve control over the economic performance of the resulting output, and the vast 
majority of investments end up in failures. Added to this, developing, producing and 
marketing a film (and to a lesser extent, television programmes) is an extremely 
costly business. Film production involves producing a master copy only once, but 
producing a different one each time, which means that new rounds of investment 
have to be dedicated to each new project. The combination of high risk and the need 
for a continuous flow of funds have made it a prerequisite for the survival of 
economically-minded film/audiovisual companies to devise strategies that would 
enable them to reach the widest audience possible, as maximising audience means 
maximising revenues and spreading risks. One of them is called the ‘slate’ strategy, 
whereby a slate of 25 or so films are made each year, all of which are aimed at the 
commercial market place. Because it is practically impossible to predict which films 
will be successful, producers have better chances of recouping losses if they can 
spread their possible risks wider (Finney, 1996: 70). Another crucial strategy is to 
hold control over distribution, and this is achieved through vertically integrated 
distribution networks across different media and across geographically distinct 
markets to ensure maximum exploitation of the products. In short, it is only the 
vertically integrated Hollywood majors157 which have been able to generate enough
157 The major studios are companies that historically dominated Hollywood, and all of them have now 
become divisions of large conglomerates: Paramount (now part of the Viacom media conglomerate); 
20th Century Fox (sold to Rupert Mudoch’s News Corporation in 1985); Warner Bros (merged with 
Time and then with AOL); Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer (now trading as MGM/UA); Universal (taken over 
by Matsushita in 1986, by Seagram in 1995 and by Vivendi in 2000); Columbia (bought by Sony in 
1988); United Artists (merged with MGM); Disney (not part of the classis Hollywood oligopoly but 
grown into a conglomerate since setting up its own distribution wing, Buena Vista) (see 
Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 61-62).
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cash flows to spread risks and to make the overall business of film-making 
consistently profitable (Aksoy and Robins, 1992; Hill, 1996:107; Miller, 1996).
These ‘major’ studios have since the 1980s further strengthened their core 
activity of film-making by horizontally integrating themselves into huge 
entertainment and leisure service conglomerates (Balio, 1996). They have now 
established links with other areas of culture/communications industry including 
publishing, television (both terrestrial and cable/satellite), video, music and related 
merchandising. This not only ensures a guaranteed outlet for their feature films and 
television programmes, but also enables them to make the most of ‘hits’ if and when 
they happen. If Hollywood is now enormously more profitable and better-capitalised, 
it has also incorporated many other elements into its sphere of influence so that it has 
become hard to label it as specifically ‘American’. The 1980s and the early 1990s 
witnessed a series of take-overs and buy-outs that saw many of the majors no longer 
in the hands of American companies. The majors have also been forging international
15Rbases of film financing by partnering with foreign companies (Balio, 1996). 
Furthermore, today more than half of their revenue come from foreign markets, and 
the content of their products are increasingly tailored to suit international audiences 
as much as Americans. This has led to a split, although with some degree of overlap, 
between Hollywood which specialises in expensive blockbuster productions and 
indigenous American cinema most of which is made with medium- to low- budget 
and devoted to exploring particularities of contemporary US realities (Hill, 1994).
Given the overwhelming economic advantage of the Hollywood studios, it is 
not surprising that the EU has drawn on their organisational structure as providing a 
key to the revival of its audiovisual industries which are not economically viable. 
However, as we have seen in the case of GATT negotiations, the EU, at least in 
principle, has not totally abandoned a commitment to the ‘European’ way of 
organising audiovisual productions. Traditionally, audiovisual sector in Europe has 
enjoyed a certain level of protection by the state due to its social, cultural and 
political importance. State intervention in film industries may be less visible than in 
television broadcasting, but it is the state that has been sustaining the continued
158 For example, Time Warner Entertainment created a joint venture with Japanese companies Toshiba 
and C. Itoh. European companies, such as the French Canal Plus and Ciby 2000, the Dutch Polygram, 
and the Italian Penta, have all done deals with Hollywood (Hill, 1994).
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existence of audiovisual industries in Europe, either directly through subsidies by 
public organisations such as the Arts Council (UK) or the Centre National de la 
Cinematographic (France), or indirectly through television broadcasters many of 
whom have legal obligations to invest in their respective national film industries 
(Dale, 1997).159 Despite the Commission’s insistence on the role of European nation 
states in safeguarding cultural diversity, a brief review of national film policy reveals 
that the tripartite relationship between the state, culture and the film/audiovisual 
industry is not so straightforward.
During the first half of the twentieth century, the involvement of the state was 
mostly limited to measures which were either directed against film imports (import 
and screen quotas) or aimed at supporting domestic film industries regardless of the 
nature of the product.160 Apart from censorship mechanisms which filtered out 
politically or culturally ‘unsuitable’ materials, these measures were undertaken for 
economic reasons such as the safeguarding of local employment, and cultural 
motives, such as lessening the ‘American’ influence on ‘national’ culture, were often 
secondary (Moran, 1996). However, a change in emphasis in European government 
policy took place in the 1960s when France, Italy and Germany all moved in the 
direction of more targeted support mechanisms. This is exemplified by the 
introduction in a number of European countries of the ‘selective’ support system 
which distributes subsidies to projects based on their artistic and cultural merits 
(Nowell-Smith, 1998; Dale, 1997).161 The result of this shift can be seen in the form 
of the New German Cinema of the 1970s, or the French New Wave and its 
continuing legacy of ‘auteur’ tradition, which all helped to elevate the status of film 
industries to the realm of ‘high’ culture. The emergence of such art film, however, 
coincided with the decline in the European popular genre film and with the rise of 
television which took over the place of cinema as a form of mass entertainment.
159 UK, Italy, France and Portugal have obligations for television channels to invest in the film 
industry. In other countries such as Spain and Germany, there is no such statutory obligation but TV 
channels nonetheless play a considerable role in film financing (CEC/DG X, 1997).
160 This obviously does not apply to the fascist regimes where national film industries became a crucial 
tool for state propaganda.
161 The ‘selective’ system in this context refers to support mechanisms for the production process itself 
and differs from the selective support used by the EU which aids the distribution of films. The 
selective systems existed alongside other forms of support which may have been indifferent to the 
cultural objectives, but because o f the cultural prestige attached to it, the selective mechanism was 
considered to be central to the national support system.
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Consequently, European films have become a medium which predominantly attracted 
the cultural elite, thereby consolidating the dependency of the European film industry 
on state support.
If the policy shift in the 1960s had contributed to (rather than ‘caused’) the 
decline of traditional popular cinema, a new trend that emerged in the mid-1990s can 
also be partly attributed to recent changes in policy orientations in Europe. Prompted 
by a recognition that ‘cultural subsidies’ have undermined the performance of 
European films, governments in a number of European countries have started to 
redirect support towards more commercial projects since the beginning of the 1990s 
(Dale, 1997: 186-199). Some countries have introduced new support schemes such as 
Spain’s ‘automatic’ system, French new tax incentives or the lottery-funded 
‘Greenlight Fund’ in the UK, all of which, although through very different 
mechanisms, are designed to encourage the production of big-budget, mainstream 
films targeted at wider audiences in the global market (Danan, 2002; Dale, 1997). In 
addition, the past decade saw the conclusion or renewal of co-production agreements 
between several European countries (for instance, Italy and France and Germany and 
Spain) which also points towards the increase in bigger-budget productions 
(CEC/DG X, 1997). Another important change is that a number of larger production 
companies - including French companies Studio Canal Plus and Gaumont and the 
Spanish company Sogepaq- have started to produce Hollywood-style, English 
language films which lend themselves to international distribution relatively easily. 
As far as the French companies are concerned, this was related to a change in French 
regulation allowing films shot in English to be eligible for state support (Danan, 
2002:356).
Whether or not these programmes will be effective in bringing about the 
desired effects, these changes simply show that the pressure towards globalisation 
and marketisation is proving extremely difficult for national policy makers to resist. 
And this tendency was even more obvious in the field of broadcasting when in the 
1980s almost all the governments in Western Europe rushed towards deregulation 
and privatisation. Several factors have contributed to such policy change. The rise of 
neoliberalism, the globalisation of the audiovisual industries, the onset of new media 
technologies, and the intensified business interest in the cultural industries in general, 
and the weakening of the traditional cultural hierarchy (such as ‘high’ and mass
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culture) have all helped the apparent commercialisation of national audiovisual 
policies (Mommaas, 1996). While it is important to recognise that most European 
nation states still regard national film and television industries as a symbol of cultural 
identity, and that ‘selective’ forms of support still occupy a central place in national 
support systems, national audiovisual policies have shifted their emphasis from the 
promotion of cultural creation and diversity to adjusting to the market reality of 
internationally-operating audiovisual industries. And since the EU audiovisual policy 
is even less concerned with those cultural objectives which have traditionally been 
associated with national cultural policy, it raises the question as to who will take the 
responsibility for safeguarding the interests of the general public.
This is not to suggest that cultural creativity and commercial, mainstream 
audience appeal are mutually exclusive, and nor is cultural diversity necessarily 
incompatible with globalisation. The point I am trying to make is that the economic 
imperative of the audiovisual industry is increasingly in conflict with the traditional 
model (at least in Europe) of relationship between state and culture established 
during the nation-building process in the 19th and the early 20th century (Mommaas, 
1996). Some authors argue that recent economic, political and cultural change has 
made it possible for the emergence of transnational cultural spaces which are based 
not only on the coordinated activities of a globalised industry but also on the 
globalised networking of more locally operating institutions (See, for example, 
Castells, 2000a; Lash and Urry,1994). Although such claims may not be applicable to 
the whole cultural sector in general, it is certainly the case with the audiovisual 
industries whose arrangement is being disembedded from the former national system 
of cultural politics and re-embedded in the new transnational dynamics of the global 
cultural industries. This may also signal the shift of authority from the traditional 
social elite to a corporate elite, with serious implications for the protection of public 
interests. The efforts of corporate elites to pursue profits are often (although not 
always) detrimental to the interests of people as citizens, even if they give us more 
choice and control over our leisure time as consumers.
Thus, both EU and national audiovisual policies are, albeit to a different extent, 
characterised by their tendency towards marketisation. The EU’s attempt to create an 
‘European audiovisual space’ does not seek to refashion national cultural space at the 
European level. Instead, it draws its model from the Hollywood mode of industry
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organisation in which the arrangement of audiovisual production is largely 
determined by the market mechanism. As this Hollywood model itself is being de­
linked from national cultural and economic systems, EU audiovisual policy looks 
towards a new international system of cultural trade. In this connection, Wolfgang 
Streeck makes an interesting observation:
Today, the European state system is undergoing deep changes in response to 
economic internationalization, especially with respect to the uses of public 
power in the economy. The expectation of the 1950s and 1960s that the 
European nation-states would be gradually superseded by a supranational 
interventionist state built in their image is now recognized as fallacious... 
Instead of supranational institutions taking over post-war state interventionism, 
the present condition of the European Union would seem to tell us more about 
the future condition of the nation-state than the traditional condition of the 
nation-state prefigures the future condition of the Union. (Streeck, 1996: 313- 
314)
Conclusion
My argument was that there are two facets of EU audiovisual policy. On the one 
hand, it purports to defend the (supposed) cultural distinctiveness of Europe, but on 
the other hand it seeks to maximise the competitive position of European businesses 
committed to satisfying the needs of consumers in global markets. I have tried to 
show that the abiding logic behind both policy strands is commercial, and that such 
marketisation of culture is locked into the broader structural trend in which the role 
of public authorities is beginning to be conceived in a fundamentally different way 
from the traditional model of cultural organisation.
In January 2002, undoubtedly prompted by criticisms for the EU’s overtly 
economistic approach, the Council issued a statement reaffirming that the audiovisual 
sector essentially constitutes ‘an expression of creativity, particularly of identities’ 
and ‘a fundamental means of promoting democracy’, as well as ‘an economic activity
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1of growing importance’ . Some commentators also point out that there are signs 
that much of the over-exaggerated importance placed on unadulterated free market 
deregulation in the early 1990s is now abating, and that the EU audiovisual agenda 
increasingly advocates a more balanced approach (Barnett, 2003; Ward, 2002). The 
EU may be trying to mediate between cultural and economic goals and between the 
interests of citizens and dominant business interests. But so far its policy practices in 
the audiovisual sector have proven to be dominated by the preoccupation with the 
EU’s global competitiveness.
162 Council Resolution of 21 January 2002 on the development of the audiovisual sector, Official 
Journal C32, 05/02/2002.
Conclusion
The cultural construction of Europe is a complex process that involves different 
tendencies and logics which sometimes reinforce and sometimes contradict each 
other. However, as this thesis has tried to show, there are certain sets of dominant 
ideas and practices that have shaped the form and contents of the cultural politics of 
the EU, with each of them having important implications for the relationship between 
culture, politics and identity.
Tracing the EU’s attempts in the cultural sphere since the 1970s, the 
evolution of EU cultural policies can be broadly divided into three periods: the 
1970s, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and from the mid-1990s to the present. 
Generally speaking, cultural aspects of European integration first began to attract 
attention from EU policy makers in the 1970s. In retrospect, this period served as a 
preparatory stage for the development of cultural policy in the subsequent periods, 
characterised by non-committal declarations or resolutions and feasibility studies. 
The proposals that were actually translated into binding legislation were those with a 
direct connection to the creation of the single market, such as the freedom of trade in 
cultural goods, free movement of cultural and education workers, and issues relating 
to copyright and taxation in the cultural sector. Although the European Parliament 
kept urging the Commission to take action in the areas of activity traditionally 
associated with ‘culture’, the conservation of heritage or support for museums, for 
example, most of these initiatives were not implemented at all or, at best, carried out 
as pilot projects on an ad hoc basis.
Thus, until the mid-1980s, culture and education had kept a low profile in EU 
integration. But a growing awareness among the European elites that the lack of 
popular involvement could impede the success of accelerating market integration has 
triggered a sudden surge of interest in questions of culture and identity. This is best 
exemplified by the ‘People’s Europe’ campaign, designed to bring the EU closer to 
the ordinary citizens of Europe. The period between the mid-1980s and the early 
1990s therefore witnessed the introduction of various cultural schemes which are 
highly symbolic, from the adoption of the European flag and the European anthem to 
the launching of the European City of Culture festivals. It was also during this period
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that major support programmes such as MEDIA and ERASMUS were launched 
despite the absence of a clear legal mandate for the EC/EU to act in these areas. The 
EU in the late-1980s also attempted to make inroads into what may be termed 
cultural standardisation measures, including the promotion of a ‘European 
dimension’ in school curricula, the support for a ‘European’ history textbook and the 
creation of Europe-wide, multilingual television channel.
The overriding concern of EU officials in the 1980s seemed to lie in using 
culture and education as an identity device, as a means to generate feelings of 
belonging and solidarity among the general public. Such a ‘consciousness-raising 
campaign’ was legitimated by invoking the idea of common cultural heritage which, 
according to EU discourse, Europeans needed to be made aware of. The underlying 
assumption is that public commitment rests on a culturally integrated community as 
the basis of social solidarity. This clearly draws on the idealised model of the nation­
state in which a political unit is built upon a homogeneous (or homogenising) 
cultural unit.
The growing significance of cultural policy from the mid-1980s onward 
culminated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which introduced Community 
competence in the cultural sphere. However, having EU competence in culture and 
education clearly spelled out also meant that Europeanisation in these policy areas 
has been circumscribed in important ways. The Treaty provisions explicitly rule out 
any harmonisation of member states’ laws in the spheres of both education and 
culture, and limit EU involvement to those measures which ‘contribute to the 
flowering of the cultures of the Member States’. Thus the Maastricht Treaty signalled 
an overall change of direction in EU cultural policies, as captured by the slogan 
‘unity in diversity’ (as opposed to a single-minded focus on ‘unity’) which began to 
proliferate in EU official discourse during the 1990s. This has involved a shift in 
emphasis in the EU cultural agenda from the notion of a ‘common European culture’ 
as a symbolic tool for transforming the affective identification of the masses to a 
more pragmatic approach in which culture is prioritised in terms of its utility for 
various social and economic objectives. These objectives include, among other 
things, strengthening the competitiveness of the European cultural industry, 
improving the image of cities to attract business investment, boosting the 
regional/local economy through cultural tourism, and enhancing people’s
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employability and combating social exclusion. During the course of the 1990s, 
therefore, commercial, market-oriented reasoning came to outweigh the popular 
identity concerns that were the driving force behind many of the cultural initiatives of 
the 1980s.
Seen from a broader perspective, such a shift can be understood as forming 
part of a general ideological restructuring that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
Chapter 2 on national cultural policies, we saw how the rise of neoliberalism has 
influenced changing conceptions about the role of the state in regulating cultural 
spaces at the national level. In the case of the EU, the effect of neoliberal discourse is 
even more pronounced, to the extent that the preoccupation of EU policy actors with 
European competitiveness in the global market has transformed the fundamental 
rationale for EU intervention in the cultural sphere. This tendency is most noticeable 
in audiovisual and education/training policies, but the language of the market 
increasingly seems to penetrate other areas of EU activities seemingly unrelated to 
the pursuit of economic growth, such as heritage conservation (Chapter 6) and the 
European City of Culture (Chapter 7).
Although the EU officials (especially in the Commission and the European 
Parliament) still rely on the rhetoric of shared culture and identity, the function of 
culture in ensuring social cohesion now takes on a different meaning in the context of 
a developing neoliberal economic order. Fostering a sense of cultural identity and 
belonging becomes not just a means of psychologically anchoring European 
integration on a popular level, but also of helping to cope instrumentally with 
potentially adverse socio-economic conditions within the EU where the European 
model of the welfare state is increasingly challenged by de-regulation and monetarist 
goals both at the national and European levels. Hence the importance attached to 
participation in cultural activities in regional development or employment training 
policies as a way of empowering marginalized individuals and groups, although it is 
not clear (yet) if, and how, concrete cultural measures initiated by the EU can 
contribute to social cohesion beyond the level of a rhetorical exercise.
Another distinctive characteristic that marks the period from the mid-1990s 
onwards is a change in the preferred method of implementing cultural measures. 
Whereas a large part of the ‘People’s Europe’ initiatives was mass-oriented 
campaigns, the support programmes which were mostly introduced in the mid-1990s,
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and which came to constitute the core of the post-Maastricht cultural policy, tend to 
focus on the networking and partnerships of cultural professionals and organisations 
across Europe. The Kaleidoscope, Ariane and Raphael programmes and their 
successor ‘Culture 2000’, as well as MEDIA and SOCRATES, all point to the 
promotion of cultural exchanges and the building of professional networks. Judging 
from the way these programmes are organised and administered, it seems to matter 
less what goes into the supported projects in terms of their cultural meanings and 
contents, as long as there is an element of partnership between individuals and 
organisations from different member countries. This is a far cry from the top-down 
imposition of standardised, homogenous culture, which is the model of national 
cultural integration propounded by theorists such as Gellner. Instead of the simple 
accumulation of authority in EU institutions in a formal, legal sense, the 
developments of cultural policies since the 1990s can be taken as an instance that 
testifies to the emergence of a more decentred and diffuse system of power in which 
the networks of cultural professionals and institutions play a crucial role in the 
European project alongside national (as well as subnational) and supranational actors.
If the EU cultural policies are not meant to bring about cultural integration as 
postulated by the conventional model of the nation-state, how can we conceptualise 
the relevance of culture within the overall European project? It is my contention that 
the notion of ‘Europeanness’ is currently being institutionalised through EU cultural 
policies along three lines. First, in line with the ‘network’ model of governance, EU 
cultural measures are mobilising those professionals and organisations with a vested 
interest in specific provisions the EU is able to offer. These actors form cross-border 
partnerships and networks as a way of reaping benefits from a new window of 
opportunity opened up at the European level. By encouraging those ‘informal’ actors 
to participate in EU-wide networks of policy programmes, the EU in turn gains 
recognition as a legitimate level of governance. This is a functional, fragmentary 
mode of integration in which Europeanisation proceeds on a group-by-group, sector- 
by-sector basis.
Second, and related to the above, Europe as a cultural project is also being 
built around the notion of individual market opportunity. Whether be it in the area of 
audiovisual media, cultural heritage or even in education^ EU cultural policies seem 
to attach particular importance to the commercial, aspects o f culture. The EU, so the
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official discourse goes, encourages people’s engagement in European culture by 
promoting cultural tourism and urban regeneration projects, by ensuring the 
provision of high-tech audiovisual products and service, or, in a more general sense, 
by enabling people’s access to the best cultural and educational services within a 
border-free, integrated market. In this context, social inequality and 
disenfranchisement become framed as a lack of skills or a lack of consumer access to 
marketised and increasingly digitally-mediated cultural commodities. Taking this line 
of argument further, some authors suggest that European integration may be better 
conceptualised as a process of transnational class integration than as a variation on 
national integration (Holman and Pijl, 1996; van Apeldoom, 2000). It is not clear if 
European integration is generating any intra-class solidarities, but such a claim does 
sound plausible to the extent that the emergent European cultural space consists of 
cultural professionals, exchange students and those with a sufficient means and skills 
to partake in leisure travelling and other forms of cultural consumption.
Third, although the focus of EU cultural policies has shifted from creating a 
feeling of belonging to establishing a new political/economic opportunity structure, 
the language of identity and community continues to frame EU intervention in the 
cultural sphere. This manifests itself most strongly in the essentialised discourse of 
European culture and heritage which is invoked whenever there is a perceived threat 
from Europe’s ‘Other’ -  whether it is construed as the economic Other (the US, 
Japan) or cultural Other (Muslim and non-White populations inside and outside the 
EU borders). Manuel Castells argues that debates about the transformation of 
European societies in the age of globalisation are expressed in the opposition 
between the power of flows and the power of identity (2000: 345). If the two 
meanings of Europeanisation described above revolve around transnational flows and 
exchanges within a circumscribed space in a globalising economy, the EU’s 
articulation of European cultural heritage can be said to represent an opposite 
direction, a search for Europe’s roots and organic unity. As Chapter 5 on European 
history tried to show, this type of defensive identity is not just problematic but can be 
politically dangerous given the multiethnic, multicultural composition of 
contemporary European societies.
In sum, instead of generating cultural cohesion, the effect of EU cultural 
policies seems to be one of creating increased opportunities for certain sections of the
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population on the one hand, and new forms for exclusion and polarisation on the 
other. Delanty’s observation about the general process of European integration 
applies directly to the construction of European cultural space:
It may be suggested that European integration is being conceived around a 
notion of mobility rather than one of citizenship, the fluidity of which enhances 
fragmentation. The drive for greater convergence is one that is achieved by 
brining about the provision of possibilities for the enhanced mobility of goods, 
capital and labour. A societal framework that is held together by processes of 
mobility runs the risk of achieving convergence on some levels, at the const of 
divergence on others (Delanty, 2000b:86).
In this context, Europeanisation may be characterised as cultural fragmentation and 
pluralisation as opposed to standardisation or unification. The EU as it currently 
stands does not qualify as a community of belonging in the sense that may be 
applicable to the nation-state. EU cultural measures construct the meaning of being 
part of ‘Europe’ according to what individuals do or might aspire to do with 
reference to economic and political participation. On the other hand, such a 
pragmatic, instrumental way of conceptualising European identity seems to omit 
serious questions about social solidarity, and this omission is sometimes brought to 
the surface in the form of ethno-cultural discourse on European culture and history. 
The biggest task that now faces the EU in this regard is to articulate a model of 
European society without relying on an exclusivist kind of cultural identity while at 
the same time going beyond the idea of integration based solely on the instrumental 
interests of the participants.
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ANNEXI
Projects supported by MEDIA (1991-1995)
Distribution, exhibition and promotion
EFDO (European Film Distribution Office): support for cross-frontier distribution of 
films with particular emphasis on low-budget productions 
MEDIA Salles and Europa Cinemas: promotion of European films in cinemas 
EVE (European Video Area): promotion of the production and cross-frontier 
distribution of European films/programmes on video
BABEL (Broadcasting Across the Barriers of European Language): promotion of the 
circulation of programmes by providing support for dubbing and subtitling 
EURO AIM (European Association for an Independent Productions Market): support 
structure providing a range of services to assist independent producers in the 
marketing, promotion, and sales of their productions
GRECO (European grouping for the circulation of works): promotion of the 
transmission of television programmes produced by independent producers 
European Film Academy: an association formed by prominent figures in the media 
industry to promote the European film in general
Improving production conditions
SCRIPT (European Script Fund): a fund to encourage the development of 
screenplays and the pre-production of works of fiction
DOCUMENTARY : support for the development of creative documentaries as 
regards production, promoting and marketing
SOURCES (Stimulating Outstanding Resources for Creative European 
Screenwriting) support to improve screenplay writing by organising training courses 
for European authors and scriptwriters
CARTOON: support for the animated film industry competitive by reorganising 
production infrastructure, providing incentives for projects and training professionals
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MEDIA Investment Club: support for audiovisual works using advanced 
technologies (computer graphics, digital and computer techniques in television, 
HDTV, interactivity)
MAP-TV (Memory-Archives-Programmes Television): development grants to 
promote audiovisual productions using archive material
LUMIERE: conversion and restoration of cinematographic works stored in film 
libraries
Mobilisation of finance
EMG (Euro Media Guarantee): a mechanism to attract investors by sharing the risk 
attached to audiovisual productions
Training
EAVE (European Audiovisual Entrepreneurs): long-term courses to train 
entrepreneurs in the audiovisual industry
MEDIA Business School: short-term training courses to help professionals to 
improve their managerial skills
Measures for countries with low production capacity or limited geographical and 
linguistic area
SCALE (Small Countries Improve their Audiovisual Level): support for initiatives 
by countries with a low production capacity
(Source: CEC, 1993c)
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ANNEX II
MEDIA II (1996-2000)
Development
-  Support for project development: Loans are granted to European independent 
production companies to develop production projects in the following genres: film 
and television drama, creative documentaries, animation, productions using new 
technologies or archive based productions, to assist writing techniques, 
establishing financial arrangements and business plans, and marketing schemes
-  Support for production companies: Funds are made available for financing part of 
the investment for the expansion of independent production companies to support 
drawing up of a business plan and their structuring efforts
-  Support for developing multimedia projects: Support for projects submitted by 
companies specialising in audiovisual productions using digital technology
-  Industrial platforms: Financial support for the groupings of European companies
Distribution
-  Video and cinema distribution
Selective support: Loans granted to the groupings of at least three distributors 
from different countries for the distribution of one or more recent non-national 
films
Automatic support: Grants are made to distributors proportionate to cinema 
attendance in previous years for non-national European films. It must be 
reinvested in production, guaranteed minimum receipts or the distribution of 
films outside their national territory.
Video distribution: Support given to publishers and distributors of European 
films/ audiovisual programmes on video
-  Television broadcasting
Support is given in the form of advances on receipts to independent producers 
whose drama, documentary or animation projects involve at least two member 
states’ broadcasters, preferably in different language communities
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-  Support for marketing the operating rights of European audiovisual works
A loan granted to TV distributors on the basis of a catalogue which they intend 
to market
-  Promotion and access to the market
Grants made to European initiatives aiming to facilitate the promotion of 
European independent production, either at major markets and audiovisual 
festivals or at more specific events
-  Cinema exhibition
Funding is provided for the networking of cinemas showing European films. 
The amount of funding is redistributed between the member cinemas of 
networks which undertake to screen a majority of European films and to take 
measures to promote the European cinema
Training
-  Training in economic and commercial management
Support for updating of training modules on management and for facilitating 
exchanges/networking of training programmes and students/professionals
-  Training on new technologies
Support for updating of training modules on new audiovisual technologies, and 
for facilitating networking and exchanges between training institutions and 
students/professionals, with particular emphasis on distance learning on 
interactive media and on regions with a low production capacity
(Source: CEC, 1999a)
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ANNEX III
Results of MEDIA II
-  Support for the development of 1690 European works (films, TV films, 
documentaries, animated films, multimedia), including Elizabeth by Sheka Kapur 
(6 awards at BAFTA 1999 and Golden Globe), East is East by Damien O’Donnell 
(Alexander Korda Prize for the best British film at BAFTA 2000 and Espigo de 
Oro at Valladollid), Solas by Benito Zambrano (5 awards at the Prix Goya 2000 
and Iris d’Or at the Brussels Festival), Dancer in the Dark by Lars von Trier 
(Palme d’Or at the Cannes Festival 2000), Pane e Tulipani by Silvio Soldani (7 
distinctions at the David di donatello 2000) and Kirikou et la sourciere by Michel 
Ocelot (Grand Prix for full-length films at the Annecy Animated Film Festival
1999), The Million Dollar Hotel by Wim Wenders, Pearls and swine by Fridrik 
Thor Fridrikson, etc.
-  Support for the development of 281 European production companies
-  Support for more than 1930 promotion and distribution campaigns for 400 
European films, including Aprile by Nanni Moretti, On connait la chanson by 
Alain Renais (7 Cesars and the Prix Louis Delluc in 1998), La Vita e Bella by 
Roberto Benigni (Oscar for the best foreign film in 1999 and Grand Prix du Jury 
at Cannes 1998), Festen by Thomas Vinterberg (Prix du Jury at Cannes 1998), 
Lola Rennt by Thomas Twycker, Todo sobre mi madre by Pedro Almodovar (Best 
screenplay prize at the Cannes Festival 1999, Oscar for the best foreign film
2000), Asterix by Claude Bern, Breaking the Waves by Lars von Trier, Secrets and 
Lies by Mike Leigh, Trainspotting, Ridicule, Brassed Off, Ma vie en rose, etc.
-  Support for co-production and distribution of 380 works for television (fiction, 
documentaries, animated programmes), such as Le Comte de Monte Cristo, St 
Ives, Carvalho, Mobutu Roi de Zaire, Balzac or Simsalagrimm
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-  Support to publish and distribute on video 212 catalogues of European works
-  Support for 350 cinemas, with a total of 831 screens in 213 European cities
-  Support for 64 film festivals (each year) showing total of 7500 European works
-  Support for 40 training schemes, attended by more than 5000 professionals 
(producers, scriptwriters, creators, etc.). Films benefited from the advice given 
under these initiatives include Character (Oscar for best foreign film 1998), 
Breaking the waves, Antonia’s Line, Death and the Maiden, The Ulysses ’ Gaze, 
Too Much, Ma vie en rose.
(Source: CEC, 1999;
<http ://www. europa. eu. int/comm/ avpolicy/media/media2_en.html>)
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